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Advanced computer assisted markets, otherwise known as smart markets, are becoming
an important part of our modern society. This dissertation considers smart barter exchange
markets, which enable people to trade a wide range of goods: from shifts, to houses, to
kidneys. Centralized and computerized clearing is what makes these markets ‘smart’. The
market clearing problem is to match demand and supply so as to maximize the gains of
trade. Trades, in this regard, need not be limited to pairwise swaps but may consist of
trading cycles and chains involving multiple agents.
This dissertation presents several sophisticated market clearing algorithms that enable
optimal clearing in large real-life barter exchange markets. With a particular focus on
kidney exchanges, it shows how these algorithms can enable a significant alleviation of the
present shortage of kidney donors and an improvement in health outcomes for kidney
patients. State-of-the-art techniques are developed to allow the algorithms to be scalable,
even when there are bounds on the number of simultaneous transactions, multiple
objective criteria, and side constraints. Furthermore, innovative models and solution
approaches are presented to allow market uncertainty, such as transaction failure, to be
taken into account.
The research presented in this dissertation contributes to the advancement of scientific
knowledge in combinatorial optimization and market design, particularly in the domains of
mathematical programming and market clearing, and aids the establishment and operation
of smart barter exchange markets in the field of kidney exchange and beyond.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Smart barter exchange markets
Advanced computer assisted markets, otherwise known as smart markets, are becoming
an important part of our modern society (Bichler et al., 2010). Smart markets rely on
computers for operation, for ubiquitous access (e.g. through the internet), for trustworthy
intermediation, and for determining market outcomes. Typically, all agents report their
preferences to a centralized market operator or clearing house, and the operator or clearing
house then provides an allocation and transfer prices so as to optimally match demand
and supply (Roth, 2008). The problem of determining the optimal allocation and transfer
prices is known as the market clearing problem. In this thesis we consider the clearing
problem for barter exchange markets.
Barter exchange is one of the oldest and most straightforward forms of economic
activity (Smith, 1937). It concerns the direct trading of one product or service for another.
Nearly everyone will, over the course of their lives, have engaged in some form of barter or
another. Trivial examples include trading collectibles such as marbles or sports pictures,
trading books, or perhaps, trading a shift with a colleague. Typically, these forms of
barter are bilateral and involve two agents whose disposable possessions mutually suit
each other’s wants. This reveals an important di culty of barter exchange: there must
be a coincidence of wants (Jevons, 1875). To quote Jevons:
There may be many people wanting, and many possessing those things wanted;
but to allow for an act of barter, there must be a double coincidence, which
will rarely happen. ... The owner of a house may find it unsuitable, and
may have his eye upon another house exactly fitted to his needs. But even if
the owner of this second house wishes to part with it at all, it is exceedingly
14_Erim Glorie[stand].job
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unlikely that he will exactly reciprocate the feeling of the first owner, and wish
to barter houses.
(Jevons, 1876, chapter 1)
Digital marketplaces can overcome the complexities of finding a coincidence of wants
(Roth, 2008). Even opportunities for multilateral exchanges, involving many agents
and many goods, can now be identified using computer algorithms. Examples of
digital barter markets include house exchanges (in which agents seek to simultane-
ously buy each others houses, see for example www.besthouseswap.com), service ex-
changes (e.g., www.swapright.com), intra-organizational skilled worker exchanges (e.g.,
www.sta↵share.co.uk), and book exchanges (see for example www.readitswapit.co.uk).
Arguably, the most advanced barter exchange markets operated today are kidney ex-
change markets, which aim to enable transplants between incompatible patient-donor
pairs (Rapaport, 1986; Roth et al., 2004; de Klerk et al., 2005).
1.2 Kidney exchange
In the United States alone, over 640,000 patients are presently su↵ering from end-stage
renal disease (United States Renal Data System (USRDS), 2013). 430,000 of these pa-
tients are being treated with dialysis, which means their blood has to be filtered several
times a week for multiple hours. The quality of life on dialysis is low and the annual
mortality rate is over 20 % (United States Renal Data System (USRDS), 2013). Kidney
transplantation has been established as the preferred alternative treatment (Wolfe et al.,
1999). Compared to dialysis, it o↵ers substantial advantages in terms of quality of life,
patient survival, and costs (Port et al., 1993; Franke et al., 2003; Winkelmayer et al.,
2002): on average, patients who receive a kidney transplant live 10 years longer than
patients who remain on dialysis (Port et al., 1993), while the long term costs of trans-
plantation are 4 to 5 times lower (Winkelmayer et al., 2002). Unfortunately, the number
of kidneys available for transplantation is still largely insu cient to meet demand: only
about 17,000 US patients can receive a transplant each year (SRTR, 2011).
Kidney transplants can come from both deceased and living donors. Deceased donor
kidneys are allocated to patients by means of a waiting list, which in the US currently
contains 108,571 patients and has an average waiting time of 4 years (SRTR, 2011). Living
donors, such as a brother or sister of the patient, can provide a direct transplant. Grafts
taken from living donors generally function twice as long as grafts taken from deceased
15_Erim Glorie[stand].job
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donors (SRTR, 2011). However, in over 30 % of the cases, a living donor and his or her
intended recipient are medically incompatible (Segev et al., 2005b).
Kidney exchanges allow incompatible patient-donor pairs to swap donors in order to
proceed with transplantation. If a patient’s donor is compatible with some other patient,
and the donor of the other patient is compatible with the first patient, the patients
can swap donors so that both patients can obtain a transplant (de Klerk et al., 2005;
Roth et al., 2004). Due to the large potential for increasing the number of transplants,
many countries have developed kidney exchange programs. Leading examples are the
Netherlands, the US, the UK, Australia, and South Korea (Keizer et al. (2005), Manlove
and O’Malley (2012), Park et al. (1999), Delmonico et al. (2004)).
Compatibility in kidney exchange is determined by two factors: blood type compat-
ibility and human leukocyte antigen (HLA) compatibility. In both cases, a patient and
donor are incompatible if the patient has antibodies against an antigen contained in the
donor’s cells as then the patient’s immune system will reject the donor’s tissue. There
are four blood types, A, B, AB, and O, corresponding to the presence of the antigens A
and B. If the donor’s blood contains an antigen that is not present in the patient’s blood,
the patient will have antibodies against the donor. The HLA system contains many anti-
gens, and testing for antibodies against any of the donor’s HLA is done by a so-called
crossmatch test, which combines the patient’s and donor’s serum. If the crossmatch test
is positive, the donor and patient are incompatible.
In kidney exchange, the trading preferences of agents are directly related to the com-
patibility structure. In most kidney exchange markets agents are assumed to be indi↵erent
between compatible donors. However, because of the compatibility structure, some pa-
tients will have a disadvantaged position. These are in particular blood type O patients
and highly sensitized patients, i.e. patients with antibodies against a large part of the
donor population. Patient sensitization is measured by the percentage of panel reactive
antibodies (PRA), which provides an estimate of the percentage of donors with whom the
patient will have a positive crossmatch test. Patient’s with a PRA of 80 % or more are
considered to be highly sensitized.
1.3 The clearing problem
Given a set of agents, the objects they brought to the market, and the agent’s reported
preferences over objects, the clearing problem in barter exchange markets is to determine
an allocation of objects to agents so as to maximize the gains of trade. In general, there
may be side payments to compensate for unequal exchanges. Every agent may for instance
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have an asking price for the good he brought to the market and a maximum buying price
for every good he is interested in.
As barter exchange markets are a special case of matching markets in which one
side (e.g. patients) is matched to another (e.g. donors) (Demange and Gale, 1985),
the clearing problem in barter exchange markets is related to the maximum matching
problem (Edmonds, 1965) which is a classic combinatorial optimization problem. The
fundamental aspect in clearing barter exchange markets is that if an agent’s object is
allocated to another agent, the first agent should be allocated another object. Of course,
there may be agents that provide goods without requiring goods in return and agents that
want to obtain goods without providing any, but the actual barter takes place between
agents that both provide and demand goods.
Barter exchange need not be limited to pairwise exchanges but may involve trading
cycles in which each participant gives an object to the next participant in the cycle and
receives an object from the previous participant (Shapley and Scarf, 1974; Roth et al.,
2007). Alternatively, agents that only provide a good without requiring a good in return
may initiate a trading chain which ends with an allocation to an agent that does not
provide any good. In practice, there typically is a constraint on the number of participants
in a trading cycle or chain. For example, to avoid reneging of donors, transplants in kidney
exchange cycles are typically required to be performed simultaneously and the number
of logistically feasible simultaneous transplants is limited. It is precisely this constraint
that makes the clearing problem in barter exchange markets substantially more di cult
to solve than the classical maximum matching problem (Abraham et al., 2007).
The clearing problem in barter exchange markets can also be related to the winner
determination problem in combinatorial auctions (Cramton et al., 2006). The di↵erence
is that in barter exchange markets agents are not assumed to have preferences over com-
binatorial structures (i.e. packages) of objects, but the selected allocation must consist of
combinatorial structures of agents (i.e. cycles and chains).
Solving the clearing problem for barter exchange markets in an acceptable amount of
time requires the aid of sophisticated algorithms and significant computing power. This
is particularly the case when the market contains hundreds or even thousands of agents
and there are many complex constraints or objectives. In kidney exchange, for example,
the primary objective is typically to maximize the number of transplants, but there can
be many secondary objectives, such as minimizing waiting times or inequity (De Klerk
et al., 2010). The most successful exact algorithms in the scientific literature to solve the
clearing problem are so-called ‘branch-and-price’ algorithms (Abraham et al., 2007).
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In practice, the clearing problem is typically considered in a static or o✏ine context, in
which exchanges are conducted at fixed time intervals and the assignment is optimized for
the present state of the market. Of course, current agents and objects may disappear from
the market and new agents may arrive. An alternative would therefore be to consider a
dynamic or online context, in which the timing of exchanges is explicitly taken into account
and the allocation is optimized with respect to the future evolution of the market. Such
a dynamic context may have implications for what is considered an optimal allocation.
1.4 Incentives
In order to select an optimal allocation, accurate information regarding the agents, the
objects, and the preferences is required. In case this information is self reported by
the agents, there may be opportunities for agents to manipulate the information they
reveal in order to try to achieve a better market outcome. Depending on the nature and
severity of the manipulations, it may be necessary to implement incentive constraints that
ensure that agents can never obtain a better outcome by providing false or incomplete
information.
There are two main types of incentive constraints considered in the market design
literature: individual rationality constraints (Roth, 1977) and incentive compatibility
constraints (Myerson, 1979). Individual rationality constraints, which are alternatively
known as participation constraints, guarantee that agents or groups of agents will not be
worse o↵ if they participate in the market than they would be if they did not participate
in the market. Hence, under individual rationality constraints agents have no incentive to
completely withhold themselves or their objects from the market. Incentive compatibility
constraints, on the other hand, guarantee that no agent in the market can achieve a better
market outcome by misrepresenting its information. Hence, under incentive compatibility
constraints it is optimal for agents to truthfully report all their information.
Given a set of agents, objects and preferences, imposing incentive constraints on the
clearing problem restricts the set of possible allocations. Solving the clearing problem
with these constraints may therefore result in a lower objective value compared to solving
the unrestricted clearing problem. However, when using the unrestricted clearing problem
the set of agents, objects and preferences used in the optimization problem may not be the
full or true set of agents, objects and preferences, and this may have even more negative
consequences on the objective.
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1.5 Market uncertainty
After an allocation has been selected, it may not always find continuation. In some barter
exchange markets proposed transactions must be verified before they can proceed. Pro-
posed transactions may fail to go forward if verification fails or if a participant withdraws.
In housing markets, for example, it should be checked whether the participants in a trans-
action meet the financing requirements for side payments. In kidney exchange, proposed
‘transactions’ must be checked with a final crossmatch test (in addition to the initial
virtual crossmatch test) to ensure the success of eventual transplants, and patients and
donors may withdraw at the last moment due to medical, psychological or other reasons
(Delmonico et al., 2004; de Klerk et al., 2005; Glorie et al., 2013).
In case one or more transactions fail, it may be possible to select a new allocation
based on the updated information. Ideally, this new allocation is as close as possible to the
initial allocation in order to minimize the material and emotional costs of the alteration.
In kidney exchange markets, patients who are highly sensitized have an increased risk
of match failure (besides having limited opportunities to be matched in the first place).
Recovering solutions after failure may be particularly beneficial to these patients.
1.6 Contribution and thesis outline
This thesis considers the clearing problem in barter exchange markets. It focuses in
particular on kidney exchange markets, but the findings are easily applicable to other
types of barter exchange markets. The contributions made in this thesis are the following.
In Chapter 2 we first provide an extensive literature review of the state of the art in
kidney exchange clearing. In particular, we discuss the underlying principles of matching
and allocation approaches, the combination of kidney exchange with other strategies such
as ABO incompatible transplantation, the organization of kidney exchange, and important
future challenges.
Next, in Chapter 3, we consider solving the clearing problem with multiple objective
criteria. We show that to achieve the best possible score on all criteria long trading
cycles and chains are often needed, particularly when there are many hard-to-match
patients. Long cycles and chains can be achieved by allowing some transactions to be non-
simultaneous. We indicate why long cycles and chains may pose di culties for existing
approaches to clearing barter exchanges. We then present a generic iterative branch-and-
price algorithm which can deal e↵ectively with multiple criteria and side-constraints and
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we show how the pricing problem may be solved in polynomial time in the cycle and chain
length for a general class of criteria and constraints.
We also study multi-center coordination of unspecified living kidney donation and
ABO incompatible transplantation in kidney exchange (Chapter 4). We address questions
such as whether such coordination should utilize domino paired donation (DPD) or non-
simultaneous extended altruistic donor (NEAD) chains, what the length of the segments
in such chains should be, when they should be terminated, what can be done to convince
transplant centers to participate, and what the time interval should be between clearing
rounds. To this end we integrate our aforementioned clearing algorithm with a newly
developed kidney exchange simulator based on actual data from the Dutch national kidney
exchange program.
Chapter 5 considers the health outcomes of various allocation policies used in kidney
exchange clearing. In order to analyze health outcomes, we introduce an individualized
health value model for kidney exchange. This model is a Markov process with patient-
donor specific transition probabilities. We also propose a new policy intended to maximize
health value. This model links the individualized Markov model to the branch-and-
price algorithm described in Chapter 3. We conduct long term simulations with kidney
exchange data from the Netherlands. Policies are evaluated in terms of quality adjusted
life years, equity, and number of transplants.
Chapter 6 considers the clearing of barter exchange markets in which proposed trans-
actions must be verified before they can proceed. Proposed transactions may fail to go
forward if verification fails or if a participant withdraws. In case one or more matches fail,
a new allocation may be selected. The new allocation should be as close as possible to
the initial set in order to minimize the material and emotional costs of the alteration. We
present a robust optimization approach that intends to maximize the number of agents
selected in both the first and second allocation in a worst case scenario. Our methodol-
ogy allows in particular to protect the transactions for highly-sensitized kidney exchange
patients, which unfortunately are often left without a transplant using the present al-
gorithms employed to clear kidney exchanges. In addition to protecting against failure,
we explicitly consider the option of flexible response to failures. We do this by allowing
recourse actions. We consider three recourse policies that can be easily implemented in
practice. Our clearing algorithm selects an optimal planned solution taking the possibil-
ity of recourse into account. If actual failures occur, our algorithm selects the optimal
recourse action.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we summarize and discuss the main findings of this thesis and
draw some general conclusions. A Dutch summary is also provided.
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The chapters in this thesis can be read individually. Consequentially there is some
overlap in the introduction to each of these chapters. The chapters are based on pa-
pers that were written with various coauthors and are either published in or are (to be)
submitted to scientific journals. The references to these papers are given below.
Chapter 2 K. Glorie, B. Haase-Kromwijk, J. van de Klundert, A. Wagelmans, and W.
Weimar, “Allocation and matching in kidney exchange programs”. Transplant In-
ternational, 27(4):333-43 (2014).
Chapter 3 K. Glorie, J. van de Klundert, and A. Wagelmans “Kidney exchange with
long chains: an e cient pricing algorithm for clearing barter exchanges with branch-
and-price”. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 16(4):498-512 (2014).1
Chapter 4 K. Glorie, M. de Klerk, A. Wagelmans, J. van de Klundert, W. Zuidema,
F. Claas, and W. Weimar, “Coordinating unspecified living kidney donation and
transplantation across the blood-type barrier in kidney exchange”. Transplantation,
96(9):814-20 (2013).
Chapter 5 K. Glorie, G. Xiao, and J. van de Klundert, “Health value analysis of allo-
cation policies in kidney exchange”. Submitted to Operations Research (2014).
Chapter 6 K. Glorie, M. Carvalho, M. Constantino, P. Bouman, and A. Viana, “Robust
barter exchange”. Working Paper (2014).
Appendix A K. Glorie, “Estimating the probability of positive crossmatch after nega-
tive virtual crossmatch”. Econometric Institute report, 2012-25 (2012).
Summary in Dutch K. Glorie, A. Wagelmans, and J. van de Klundert, “Ethisch opti-
maliseren van het ruilen van nieren”. STAtOR, 13(3-4) (2012).
1A previous version of this paper has appeared as (Glorie et al., 2012b).
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Chapter 2
Literature review: clearing in kidney
exchange1
2.1 Introduction
Living kidney donation is an obvious strategy to increase the number of kidney transplants
(Spital, 1988; Wolfe et al., 1999; Port et al., 1993; Franke et al., 2003; Winkelmayer
et al., 2002; Lopes et al., 2013). Moreover, grafts taken from living donors generally
function twice as long as grafts taken from deceased donors (SRTR, 2011). Clinical
advances such as laparoscopic nephrectomy and vaginal extraction have helped increase
the number of living donor kidney transplants over recent years (Segev, 2012). In the
Netherlands for instance, more than half of the transplants now involves a living donor
(Nederlandse Transplantatie Stichting (NTS), 2012). Nevertheless, the number of kidneys
available for transplantation is still largely insu cient to meet demand: in Europe and
the United States together approximately 30 patients die each day while waiting for a
kidney transplant (European Society for Organ Transplantation (ESOT), 2010; United
States Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), 2011). A major part
of the problem is that, even when a living donor is willing to donate, in over 30 percent of
the cases, the donor is incompatible with his or her intended recipient due to blood type
or crossmatch incompatibility (Segev et al., 2005b).
Several strategies have emerged to improve the utilization of living donors by mitigat-
ing or overcoming the causes of incompatibility. Kidney paired donation (KPD) (Rapa-
port, 1986), alternatively known as kidney exchange (Roth et al., 2004), is a strategy that
allows incompatible patient-donor pairs to be matched with other incompatible pairs in
1This chapter is based on (Glorie et al., 2014b).
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order to proceed with transplantation through an exchange procedure. Other strategies
include patient desensitization, living donor-deceased donor list exchange, and altruis-
tic (unspecified or non-directed) donation (Montgomery et al., 2005; den Hartogh, 2010;
Montgomery et al., 2006a).
This review compares and discusses the various approaches to matching and allocation
in kidney exchange as published in the international transplant community. In particular,
it focuses on the underlying principles of market clearing and allocation approaches, the
combination of KPD with other strategies such as ABO incompatible transplantation, the
organization of kidney exchanges, and future challenges.
2.2 History of kidney exchange
The concept of kidney exchange was first proposed by Rapaport in 1986 (Rapaport,
1986). The initial idea was to facilitate exchange between pairs with reciprocal blood type
incompatibilities (A-B and B-A), but this would later be expanded to other blood type
combinations and crossmatch incompatible pairs. The first actual exchange procedure
was performed in South Korea in 1991 (Kwak et al., 1999), followed by Europe in 1999
(Thiel et al., 2001), and then the US in 2000 (Zarsadias et al., 2010), the slow acceptance
being mainly due to ethical and legal considerations (Ross and Woodle, 1998, 2000).
After these first procedures, KPD has developed rapidly. In 2004, the Netherlands was
first to launch a nationwide KPD program (de Klerk et al., 2005). Various countries have
since then begun to develop national KPD programs, including the US (United Network
for Organ Sharing Web Site, 2013), Australia (Ferrari et al., 2009), Canada (Canadian
Blood Services Web Site, 2013), Romania (Lucan et al., 2003), and the UK (Johnson
et al., 2008b,a). International exchanges, although on an ad hoc basis, have also been
documented (Flanagan, 2013; La Vanguardia Ediciones, 2012).
2.3 Transplant modalities
2-Way KPD
Since the inception of KPD various transplant modalities have become available to incom-
patible pairs. The simplest modality is a pairwise exchange, or 2-way KPD, between two
pairs with reciprocal incompatibilities (see Figure 2.1a). In this exchange the donor of the
first pair donates to the patient of the second pair, and vice versa. Usually transplants
take place simultaneously so as to prevent donors from withdrawing consent after their
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Figure 2.1: Transplant modalities. Solid arrows indicate matches between donors and
recipients. Di = donor i, Ri = recipient i, A = altruistic donor, W = waitlist.
24_Erim Glorie[stand].job
12 Literature review: clearing in kidney exchange
intended recipient has received a transplant, but before they have donated themselves
(Kwak et al., 1999; de Klerk et al., 2005).
k-Way KPD
Exchange can also take place between more than two pairs by generalizing the above
concept to a so-called k-way KPD (Figure 2.1b). k-Way KPD which involves k pairs
allows more benefits of trade to be captured as reciprocal matching is no longer required
(Roth et al., 2007; De Klerk et al., 2010). In most cases, k is limited to 3 or 4 because
of logistical reasons such as the simultaneous availability of operating rooms (Ferrari and
de Klerk, 2009; Johnson et al., 2008b; Roth et al., 2007; De Klerk et al., 2010; Lee et al.,
2009; Lucan, 2007; Montgomery et al., 2008). Although this limit is su cient to provide
full benefits of trade for blood type incompatible pairs in the pool (Roth et al., 2007),
highly sensitized patients could benefit if k were allowed to be larger (Ashlagi et al., 2012).
Unspecified donor chains
As an alternative to the cyclic exchange procedures described above, transplants can be
organized in chain procedures. One option is to initiate a chain with an unspecified
donor. Instead of donating to a patient on the deceased donor waitlist, as has been
common in many countries (Johnson et al., 2008b; Gilbert et al., 2005), an unspecified
donor donates to a patient of an incompatible pair (Woodle et al., 2010; Dor et al.,
2011). Subsequently, the donor of that pair donates to a patient of another pair, and so
forth, until the donor of the last pair in the chain donates to a patient on the deceased
donor waitlist. This modality is referred to as domino-paired donation (DPD)(Figure
2.1c)(Montgomery et al., 2006a). Since it is possible to arrange the transplants in a
chain such that no donor-recipient pair needs to donate a kidney before having received
one, donor withdrawal can do less harm in a chain than in a k-way KPD. Therefore, the
requirement of simultaneous transplants could be relaxed in chains. Non-simultaneous
extended altruistic donor (NEAD) chains (Figure 2.1d) do this by recruiting ‘bridge donors
who instead of donating to the deceased donor waitlist like the last donor in a DPD chain
may continue the chain at a later moment in time (Rees et al., 2009). The relaxation
of simultaneity allows chain procedures to involve more incompatible pairs than k-way
KPD (if there is no donor withdrawal), potentially benefitting highly sensitized patients
(Ashlagi et al., 2012). There has been an ongoing debate on whether it is best to use
DPD or NEAD chains (Gentry et al., 2009; Ashlagi et al., 2011b; Gentry and Segev, 2011;
Ireland, 2011). A recent study shows that the answer depends on the composition of the
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KPD pool and that benefits of NEAD chains are limited in case of low numbers of highly
sensitized patients and su cient unspecified donors (Glorie et al., 2013).
List exchange
Another option is to initiate a chain with a list exchange (Figure 2.1e), in which the first
patient in the chain does not directly receive a transplant, but instead receives priority on
the deceased donor waitlist for a future deceased donor kidney, which is usually a blood
type O kidney (Roth et al., 2004, 2006). The last donor of the chain again facilitates a
transplant to a patient on the waitlist. However, the procedure is controversial because
the latter transplant usually involves a non-blood type O kidney. Therefore list exchanges
can produce disadvantages to blood type O patients on the deceased donor waitlist (den
Hartogh, 2010). List exchanges have only been used in several regions in the US, where
the procedure has been declared acceptable by the American Society of Transplantation
(Ferrari and de Klerk, 2009).
Altruistically unbalanced exchange
All of the procedures described above can also take place with compatible pairs (Figure
2.1f). This is known as ‘altruistically unbalanced exchange donation (Ross and Woodle,
2000; Kranenburg et al., 2006). It allows incompatible pairs a better chance of finding a
match, while at the same time o↵ering compatible pairs the opportunity of obtaining a
better quality kidney (Gentry et al., 2007; Ratner et al., 2010; Roth et al., 2008). Studies
suggest that 45 % of recipients in compatible pairs can obtain a kidney from a younger
donor or a 0 mismatch kidney by participating in KPD (Gentry et al., 2007), and that
approximately one third of compatible pairs would indeed be willing to do so (Kranenburg
et al., 2006). Therefore altruistically unbalanced exchanges could result in both a higher
number of transplants and a higher quality of transplants. Nevertheless, this form of
exchange is ethically complicated as it involves asking otherwise suitable patient-donor
pairs to exchange kidneys with strangers (Gentry et al., 2007).
Desensitization
Finally, there is the possibility of using desensitization techniques to overcome blood type
or tissue type incompatibility. Although these techniques are costly and technically de-
manding, several programs have reported promising short-term and intermediate-term
results and using such techniques has become an acceptable procedure in selected indi-
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viduals (Montgomery et al., 2005; Montgomery, 2010; Montgomery et al., 2006b; Warren
and Montgomery, 2010; Gloor et al., 2003; Jordan et al., 1998; Tanabe et al., 1998). In
particular, desensitization for ABO incompatibility has been shown to provide good long-
term graft survival, while still comparing favorably to dialysis in terms of costs (Wilpert
et al., 2010; Gloor et al., 2010; Haririan et al., 2009). Combining desensitization with KPD
can provide transplant opportunities to patients that would otherwise have been deemed
contra-indicated and would have waited indefinitely for a suitable kidney (Claas and Dox-
iadis, 2009; Montgomery et al., 2011; Sharif et al., 2012; Crew and Ratner, 2010; Glorie
et al., 2014b). This is particularly true if the modalities are not just o↵ered separately to
patients, but are coordinated such that hard-to-match patients can be desensitized after
identifying a more favorable donor in a KPD (Glorie et al., 2013; Montgomery et al.,
2011).
2.4 Imbalance
Not all incompatible patient-donor pairs have equal chances of success through KPD (Roth
et al., 2007; de Klerk et al., 2011; Zenios et al., 2001; Gentry et al., 2005; Roodnat et al.,
2012). This is primarily due to blood type imbalance. Because most blood type O donors
can donate directly to their intended recipients, O donors will only need to enter a KPD
pool if they have a positive crossmatch with their recipient. This leads to a scarcity of
blood type O kidneys in KPD pools. At the same time, almost all patients are compatible
with O donors. Consequentially, there will be higher demand for O kidneys than A or B
kidneys, and, similarly, higher demand for A or B kidneys than AB kidneys. This leaves
patient-donor pairs of types O-A, O-B, O-AB, A-AB and B-AB at a disadvantage since
they need a kidney that is in higher demand than the kidney they o↵er (Roth et al., 2007).
Table 1 provides a characterization of the pair types by blood type in terms of whether
they are over-, under-, self-, or reciprocally-demanded (Roth et al., 2005b), and typical
match results.
Another imbalance is due to patient sensitization. Highly sensitized patients are at a
disadvantage since they can only accept a small fraction of kidneys, mostly from donors
with few HLA types, which are in high demand. Patients who are both highly sensitized
and have formed an under-demanded pair will be most di cult to match.
Success rates of KPD are further largely dependent on pool size and pool composition
(Johnson et al., 2008b; Roth et al., 2007; Ferrari and de Klerk, 2009; Roodnat et al., 2012).
The number of potential matches increases considerably with pool size. However, even
in large pools typically only 50 % of pairs can be matched through KPD alone (de Klerk
27_Erim Glorie[stand].job
2.5 Allocation criteria 15
et al., 2011) (see Table 1). In the Netherlands under-demanded pairs comprise 40 % of
the national pool and they have a 19 % chance of finding a match. Other pairs, which
comprise 60 % of the pool, have a 73 % chance of finding a match. Because compati-
ble pairs, altruistic and deceased donors typically represent the blood type frequencies of
the general population, allocating these donors to KPD programs permits better match-
ing. Furthermore, because blood type and tissue type distributions may di↵er between
countries, international exchanges may provide benefits for selected patient-donor pairs
(Flanagan, 2013; La Vanguardia Ediciones, 2012). For instance, in the Dutch KPD pro-
gram 17 % of the patients have a PRA > 80 with respect to the KPD donor population,
whereas in the program of the Alliance for Paired Donation in the US over 50 % of the
enrolled patients have a PRA > 80 (Ashlagi et al., 2012). Part of the reason for these
di↵erences may be the use of di↵erent techniques to detect unacceptable HLA specificities.
2.5 Allocation criteria
In KPD procedures, patient-donor pairs do not select the pairs with which they exchange
kidneys. Instead, the allocation of donors to recipients is determined centrally. For this
reason, the authority that oversees the KPD procedures must carefully consider the allo-
cation criteria it will use. There can be many di↵erent perspectives as to what constitutes
the best allocation.
European agreements governed in the convention on human rights and biomedicine
(Council of Europe, 2002) prescribe that allocation of organs should be both ‘optimal
and ‘fair, without stipulating precisely what is meant by those terms. Similarly, in the
United States the National Organ Transplantation Act states that donated organs should
be allocated ‘equitably among transplant patients (The National Organ Transplantation
Act 42, 1984). The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) defines ‘equitably as a
balance between utility and justice (United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), 1992).
While ‘optimality and maximum utility is generally interpreted as achieving the maximum
number of transplants, defining ‘fairness and justice is less straightforward, particularly
in light of the imbalance described earlier.
Although initial KPD programs have matched patient-donor pairs on an ad hoc ba-
sis taking in account the above principles, most programs have now formulated precise
guidelines for the allocation process (Ashlagi et al., 2011b; Keizer et al., 2005; Glorie
et al., 2014d; Ferrari et al., 2011; Bo¨hmig et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2007; Manlove and
O’Malley, 2012). In this regard it is important to make a distinction between allocation
requirements that limit the number of feasible allocations, and thereby transplants, (e.g.
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requiring donors to be in the same age category or have the same CMV-EBV serology as
their recipients) and actual allocation criteria that determine the selection of an allocation
from the set of feasible allocations (e.g. maximum number of transplants between donors
and recipients of the same blood type).
Traditionally, deceased donor organs have been allocated to recipients in priority order.
Several KPD programs have also specified a priority order for KPD allocation criteria.
These include the programs operated in the Netherlands, the UK, Australia, Austria, and
Korea (Keizer et al., 2005; Glorie et al., 2014d; Ferrari et al., 2011; Bo¨hmig et al., 2013;
Kim et al., 2007; Manlove and O’Malley, 2012). Here the criteria are hierarchical and
include such factors as: maximizing the number of matched recipients, maximizing the
number of blood type identical matches (to maximize the likelihood of O patients receiving
a kidney and to help overcome their disadvantage), prioritizing allocations based on the
number of involved recipients with a low match probability, minimizing the length of
the cycles and chains, and prioritizing allocations based on waiting time of the involved
recipients. Simulations show that thanks to the inclusion of the above secondary criteria,
the number of highly sensitized patients matched may increase by 10% (Glorie et al.,
2014d).
Alternatively, criteria could also be weighted as is for example done in the UNOS KPD
pilot program and the program of the Alliance for Paired Donation in the US (Ashlagi
et al., 2011b; United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), 2012). These programs have
specified weights for factors as waiting time, HLA match, PRA, prior crossmatch history,
pediatric status and preferences of the incompatible pairs and their transplant centers (e.g.
the distance the pair is willing to travel and whether the transplant center would accept a
shipped kidney) and select the allocation that has the largest total weight (Ashlagi et al.,
2011b; United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), 2012).
Other programs have formulated requirements and criteria with regard to age, travel
distance, etc. (Lucan, 2007; Kim et al., 2007; Kute et al., 2013; Ycetin et al., 2013). Two
unconventional possibilities are worth mentioning. The first is the use of quality adjusted
life years from transplant. Use of quality adjusted life years is commonly accepted as a
prime decision criteria for many medical interventions, following the framework of Health
Technology Assessment (Hutton et al., 2006; Guindo et al., 2012). However, it may
conflict with commonly accepted criteria such as maximizing the number of transplants
(Wolfe et al., 2008; Zenios, 2002). Another possibility is to consider long term instead of
short term criteria (U¨nver, 2009; Awasthi and Sandholm, 2009; Dickerson et al., 2012).
These two do not necessarily coincide. For example, to maximize the long term number
of matched patients it may be necessary to allow for some match runs in which matches
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are postponed (e.g. to allow for a future 3-way KPD to take place instead of a current
2-way KPD).
After an allocation has been selected, it may not always find continuation. Proposed
matches may fail due to positive crossmatch tests or patient or donor illness. In such
cases a new allocation can be determined based on the updated information, as is for
instance done in the Netherlands, but this requires appropriate organization of cross-
matching (see Section 2.8). An alternative solution is to maintain the initial allocation
as much as possible and only reallocate pairs that are part of procedures that are dis-
continued. For instance, a discontinued k-way KPD could still result in multiple 2-way
KPDs going forward (see Figure 2.2). The KPD program in the UK utilizes a set of hier-
archical allocation criteria that aims to maximize the number of transplants that can take
place after such a discontinuation (Manlove and O’Malley, 2012), by first maximizing the
number of potential 2-way KPDs (including ‘back-up 2-way KPDs), and as a secondary
priority maximizing the total number of transplants (Manlove and O’Malley, 2012).
Figure 2.2: Match failure. Initially a 3-way KPD is selected. If the match between
donor 3 and recipient 1 fails, it is still possible to perform a 2-way KPD, either between
pair 1 and pair 2, or between pair 2 and pair 3.
It can happen that di↵erent allocations rank the same on all of the selected allocation
criteria. In order to select an allocation then, most programs use a deterministic tie-
breaking rule (Keizer et al., 2005; Manlove and O’Malley, 2012). However, an interesting
alternative for such cases is to use a stochastic rule, i.e. a lottery which selects an allocation
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randomly (Roth et al., 2005b). A stochastic rule can provide several fairness properties,
in particular because the probability of selecting a recipient need not be the same for all
recipients and can be set in a way that alleviates the imbalance due to blood type and
tissue type distributions (Roth et al., 2005b).
2.6 Participation constraints
KPD programs benefit from the participation of as many centers as possible to create
a large pool. However, multi-center cooperation has brought about several di culties.
Firstly, it requires consensus between participating transplant centers on the allocation
requirements and criteria. Secondly, centers may judge that it is not in the interest of
(some of their) patients to participate, and hence may prefer to not cooperate (fully).
Thirdly, financial, scientific, or other incentives may exist, which cause cooperation to
be potentially suboptimal. Thus, transplant centers may prefer to match some donors
and patients locally instead of submitting them to the national pool (Glorie et al., 2013;
Ashlagi and Roth, 2011a) (see Figure 2.3). One way to overcome such incentive issues is
by implementing participation constraints which ensure that each transplant center can
perform at least the same number of transplants in a national pool as that it can achieve
on its own. Although such constraints limit the set of feasible allocations, it has been
shown that they do not negatively a↵ect the long-term benefits of KPD programs (Glorie
et al., 2013; Ashlagi and Roth, 2011a).
Figure 2.3: Potential participation problems. An unspecified donor (A) is registered at
center A, which can generate 3 in-house transplants. In a nationally optimized program,
4 transplants are generated, but only 1 of those transplants is performed by center A.
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2.7 Clearing algorithms
Initially most KPD programs manually selected the allocation that best fit their criteria.
However, given that the number of possible allocations grows exponentially with the size
of the KPD pool, manually evaluating all possible allocations is only feasible for very
small pools. In the US, the process of finding a match therefore originally followed a
‘first-accept scheme, which involves matching an incompatible patient-donor pair to the
first pair that meets the acceptance requirements, even though matching with another
pair might yield a better outcome (Segev et al., 2005a).
Most KPD programs today use computer software to identify the best allocation with
respect to their criteria (Ashlagi et al., 2011b; Keizer et al., 2005; Ferrari et al., 2011;
Bo¨hmig et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2007; Manlove and O’Malley, 2012; Kaplan et al., 2005;
Hanto et al., 2008). Such software typically compares all possible allocations and can
perform virtual crossmatching based on known donor HLA types and patient unacceptable
HLA mismatches. However, as KPD programs expand and start to be combined with
other transplant modalities, the number of possible allocations becomes so large, that
even for computer programs, it becomes intractable to enumerate all feasible allocations.
In these situations mathematical optimization algorithms are required to guarantee the
selection of the best possible allocation (Glorie et al., 2014d; Manlove and O’Malley,
2012; Abraham et al., 2007; Constantino et al., 2013). The best current algorithms use a
technique known as ‘branch-and-price’ which enables them to select an optimal allocation
within minutes because they only need to consider a small subset of all possible allocations
(Glorie et al., 2014d; Abraham et al., 2007).
There are several aspects which provide challenges for the future. The first is that
as KPD programs continue to evolve, highly sensitized and hard-to-match patients are
likely to accumulate in the pool (Ashlagi et al., 2012). In such pools, the use of long
chain procedures becomes essential to achieve the full benefits of exchange (Ashlagi et al.,
2012). However, this renders the process of computing an optimal allocation substantially
more di cult. Fortunately, recently developed algorithms have been shown to perform
well even when pools are large and long chains are required (see Chapter 3).
Another aspect is that taking into account the probability of match failure by maximiz-
ing the expected number of transplants (which is di↵erent from maximizing the number
of matches) may become more important as this will eventually lead to more transplants
going forward (Pedroso, 2013; Dickerson et al., 2014; Glorie et al., 2014a). Although this
still poses computational challenges, it may be an opportunity to significantly increase
the success rates of KPD programs (Dickerson et al., 2013; Glorie et al., 2014a).
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Similarly, considering online or dynamic instead of static optimization of kidney ex-
changes, takes into account the timing of exchanges and the fact that patients and donors
enter and leave the KPD pool over time, to optimize the desired allocation criteria in the
long run (U¨nver, 2009; Awasthi and Sandholm, 2009; Dickerson et al., 2012; Ashlagi et al.,
2013). Essentially, this better represents the real decision problem underlying KPD. As
of yet, because of computational complexity, it is only possible to find approximate solu-
tions to the dynamic problem, but even these are often significantly better than solutions
achieved through static optimization. Figure 2.4 illustrates how dynamic optimization can
provide benefits. Shifting focus from static to dynamic optimization and thereby from
short term to long term goals raises questions as to what defines optimality and what is
equity in a dynamic setting. Full answers to these questions await further research.
Figure 2.4: Dynamic optimization. There are 5 pairs in the current KPD pool. Two
2-way KPDs are performed involving pairs 1 and 2, and pairs 3 and 4. One month later
pairs 6 and 7 enter the pool. In hindsight it would now have been better to perform one
4-way KPD between pairs 1, 2, 3, and 5, and one 3-way KPD between pairs 4, 6, and 7.
Dynamic optimization anticipates such situations and maximizes the expected number of
transplants.
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2.8 Organization
Several countries have now implemented or pursue a national KPD program. However,
there are several di↵erences in how these programs are organized. Primarily this is be-
cause of geographical di↵erences: for example, the US has 244 kidney transplant centers
spread out over a large area (United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), 2012), while the
Netherlands has 8 kidney transplant centers which are relatively close together (de Klerk
et al., 2005). This has immediate implications for the coordination between transplant
centers and donor travel. In the Netherlands, it is feasible to move donors to the center
where the matched recipient will receive the transplant. This is preferable as the recipi-
ent’s home institution can provide the recipient with continuity of care and follow-up, and
avoids long cold ischemic times. In the US, the retrieval surgery typically takes place at
the donor center and the kidneys are shipped to the recipient’s center for transplantation.
Even though this requires longer cold ischemic times and risks transportation delays, re-
cent studies show comparable graft survival rates of shipped kidneys and non-shipped
kidneys (Montgomery et al., 2008; Rees et al., 2009; Butt et al., 2009; Simpkins et al.,
2007; Segev et al., 2011).
A major contributor to the success of the Dutch program in establishing consistent
high match rates, is its use of a national centralized tissues typing laboratory (Ferrari and
de Klerk, 2009; de Klerk et al., 2008). In this laboratory potential donors and recipients
are tested for HLA crossmatch. Having a centralized laboratory substantially enhances
coordination between centers as it removes dispute about crossmatch outcomes by setting
a uniform crossmatch standard.
Finally, the frequency of match runs and thereby the timing of exchanges also is
a di↵erentiating element between KPD programs. Some programs perform match runs
on demand such as Korea whereas others perform them once per month, or once per
three months as in the Netherlands (Glorie et al., 2013; Ferrari and de Klerk, 2009;
Kim et al., 2007). Although frequent performance of match runs may result in shorter
waiting time for matched recipients, it risks removing only easy-to-match pairs as the
pool may not always be saturated enough for the procedures involving hard-to-match
pairs to take place. Deciding when to match is therefore an important decision for KPD
programs (Glorie et al., 2013). New matching software is able to advice on the optimal
timing based on the composition of the pool (U¨nver, 2009; Awasthi and Sandholm, 2009;
Dickerson et al., 2012; Ashlagi et al., 2013).
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2.9 Outlook
Since its inception in 1986, KPD has greatly expanded and has become an accepted
method of transplantation at transplant centers throughout the world. Many advances
have been made in terms of surgical technique, shipping donor kidneys and international
exchanges. Nevertheless, many blood type O and highly sensitized patients still remain
without a transplant. Important factors that have limited the success of KPD programs
are logistical issues, basic trust between the various participants, and match failures.
Innovative transplant modalities as altruistic donor chains and desensitization can help
ameliorate the problem for critical patient groups. However, to achieve the best possible
outcomes, these modalities should be coordinated jointly with KPD (Glorie et al., 2013).
In this regard, this review has summarized di↵erent allocation and matching strategies.
While there are many other issues that could be explored in the evolving field of KPD,
matching is a key element in KPD, and by selecting the right matching strategy many
patients can benefit. Future opportunities and challenges include making full use of the
various modalities that are now available through integrated and optimized matching
software, encouragement of transplant centers to fully participate, improving transplant
rates by focusing on the expected long run number of transplants, and selecting uniform
allocation criteria to facilitate international pools.
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Chapter 3
An e cient pricing algorithm for
clearing barter exchanges with
branch-and-price: enabling
large-scale kidney exchange with
long cycles and chains1
3.1 Introduction
Barter exchange markets are markets in which agents seek to directly trade their goods
with each other. The trades in such markets consist of cycles in which each agent gives a
good to the next agent in the cycle. Alternatively, the trades may consist of chains which
are started by an agent that provides a good without requiring a good in return and end
with an agent that receives a good without providing one. There are numerous examples
of barter exchange markets: house exchanges (in which agents seek to simultaneously
buy each others houses, see for example www.besthouseswap.com), shift exchanges (e.g.,
between nurses in hospitals), intra-organizational skilled worker exchanges (e.g., between
projects or departments), and book exchanges (see for example www.readitswapit.co.uk).
In the present paper we focus specifically on so-called kidney exchanges but our findings
are easily applicable to other types of barter exchange markets.
1This chapter is based on (Glorie et al., 2014d). A previous version of it has appeared as (Glorie et al.,
2012b).
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Kidney exchanges aim to help end-stage renal disease patients with a living and willing,
but medically incompatible donor to obtain a kidney transplant, which is the preferred
treatment for these patients. In particular, kidney exchanges enable patients to exchange
their donor with another patient: if a patient’s donor is compatible with some other
patient, and the donor of the other patient is compatible with the first patient, the
patients can switch donors so that both patients can obtain a transplant (see e.g. Roth
et al. (2004), de Klerk et al. (2011) and Glorie et al. (2014b)). Due to the large potential
for increasing the number of transplants, many countries have developed kidney exchange
programs. Leading examples are the Netherlands, the US, the UK, Australia, and South
Korea (Keizer et al. (2005), Manlove and O’Malley (2012), Park et al. (1999), Delmonico
et al. (2004)).
Kidney exchange need not be limited to two patient-donor pairs but may involve cycles
in which the donor of each pair donates, simultaneously, a kidney to the patient of the
next pair in the cycle. The simultaneity is required to prevent donors from reneging after
their intended recipient has received a transplant from another donor. Because of simul-
taneity, the length of cycles is limited to the number of logistically feasible simultaneous
transplants. Alternative to cycles, unspecified donors - i.e. donors without a specified
recipient - may initiate a chain of transplants in which the last donor is allocated to the
deceased donor wait list or is preserved for a future exchange. Because in a chain no
patient-donor pair needs to donate before the patient in the pair has received a kidney,
donor reneging in a chain would be less harmful than in a cycle. For this reason it is
sometimes allowed to have one or more non-simultaneous transplants in a chain, allowing
chains to be longer than cycles. Chains are increasingly common and important in clinical
practice (e.g. Ashlagi et al. (2012), Glorie et al. (2013)).
Presently, over 30 percent of living donors are incompatible with their intended re-
cipient (Segev et al., 2005b). A patient and donor are incompatible if the donor’s blood
contains an antigen that is not present in the patient’s blood, because the patient will have
antibodies against such an antigen. Two cases of incompatibility can be distinguished.
The first case, known as blood type incompatibility, revolves around two major antigens:
A and B (blood types are denoted as AB, A, B, and O, representing the presence of these
antigens). The second case, known as crossmatch incompatibility, revolves around all
other antigens against which the patient may have preformed antibodies.
The clearing problem in kidney exchange is to determine an assignment of donors
to recipients that is feasible with respect to the medical compatibilities and maximizes
one or more criteria such as the number of transplants. In practice, this problem is
typically considered in a static or o✏ine context, in which exchanges are conducted at
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fixed time intervals and the assignment is optimized for the present population, as opposed
to a dynamic or online context, in which exchanges are conducted continuously and the
assignment is optimized with respect to the future evolution of the population. The
di culty of the clearing problem arises from the requirement that all transplants in a
cycle must be performed simultaneously and that therefore cycles are limited in length.
Whenever this limit is finite and larger than 2, the static clearing problem is NP-hard
(Abraham et al., 2007).
Abraham et al. (2007) present a mixed integer programming formulation for the clear-
ing problem with the objective of maximizing a weighted sum of transplants. They solve
this formulation by a branch-and-price algorithm (see Barnhart et al., 1998), in which they
identify positive price variables by depth-first search. Abraham et al. (2007) show that
when each transplant has equal weight in the objective function and when exchanges are
limited to cycles or chains involving at most 3 patients and 3 donors, this approach works
well even when the instance size is large. The main argument for limiting cycles and chains
to length 3 is that initially in many pools the maximum possible number of transplants
can be achieved using only cycles and chains up to length 3 (Roth et al., 2007). As we will
show, however, when kidney exchange programs continue to evolve, cycles and chains up
to length 3 are often not enough to attain the maximum possible number of transplants
(see also Ashlagi et al. (2011b)). Moreover, when heterogenous objective weights are used
or when an objective other than maximizing the sum of transplants is desired, allowing
longer cycles and chains may improve the objective function. Unfortunately, with long
cycles and chains depth-first pricing becomes a major bottleneck. In this paper we will
show how this problem can be overcome.
In practice, maximizing the (weighted) sum of transplants is not the only relevant
objective criterion (see e.g. de Klerk et al. (2011)). Instead of a single weighted objective
criterion, several existing kidney exchange programs use a hierarchically ordered set of
criteria (e.g., De Klerk et al. (2010), Manlove and O’Malley (2012), and Kim et al. (2007)).
The Dutch national kidney exchange program, in particular, uses the following hierarchical
set:
Definition 3.1. Hierarchical criteria used in the Dutch kidney exchange program:
(i) Maximize the number of transplants;
(ii) Maximize the number of blood type identical transplants;
(iii) Match the patients in priority order based on ‘match probability’ (see Keizer et al.,
2005);
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(iv) Minimize the length of the longest cycle or chain;
(v) Maximize the spread over transplant centers per cycle and chain;
(vi) Match the patient with the longest waiting time.
The Dutch criteria are based on European agreements governed in the convention
on human rights and biomedicine Council of Europe (2002), which determines that the
allocation of organs should be both ‘optimal’ and ‘fair’. For this reason the criteria
include factors related to the probability of obtaining a transplant (criteria (ii) and (iii))
and waiting time (criterion (vi)). The exact aim of criterion (ii) is to help establish a fair
allocation across patient blood types by ensuring that patients of disadvantaged blood
types, such as blood type O, receive as many transplants as possible (donors of the same
blood type will be reserved for them whenever this is viable). Criterion (iii) establishes
such fairness in a broader sense by taking into account the total match probability (as
defined in Keizer et al. (2005)). The priority order within criteria (iii) and (vi) is based
on the traditional priority mechanisms for allocating deceased donor kidneys. Criteria
(iv) and (v) are of a logistical nature. The hierarchy among the criteria implies that
every criterion should be optimized subject to the best possible score on previous criteria.
For example, the number of blood type identical transplants (criterion (ii)) should be
maximized under the condition that the total number of transplants is maximum (criterion
(i)).
Because of the evolution of kidney exchange pools and the ways in which exchange can
take place, and because of the advent of large multi-center exchanges and the requirement
of multi-criteria optimization, there is a need for new techniques for kidney exchange
clearing that facilitate long chains. The work presented in this paper makes the following
contributions:
1. We develop a generic iterative branch-and-price algorithm for clearing kidney ex-
changes with a weighted or hierarchically ordered set of objective criteria;
2. We propose a polynomial solution method for the pricing problems as they result
for a general class of criteria (which includes all criteria of the Dutch exchange);
3. The presented approach accommodates long, possibly non-simultaneous, unspecified
donor chains at running times that are feasible in practice;
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4. The approach allows for optimization for a set of transplantation centers, such as
at a (inter-) national level, while taking individual rationality constraints of the
participating transplantation centers into account.
This paper is organized as follows. First, Section 3.2 describes the multi-criteria
kidney exchange problem mathematically. Section 3.3 details our iterative branch-and-
price algorithm used to solve the multi-criteria kidney exchange clearing problem. In
particular, Section 3.3.2 describes a new branching scheme and Section 3.3.3 describes
how the pricing problem can be solved in polynomial time for a wide range of criteria.
Section 3.4 discusses the setup of our simulations using actual kidney exchange data and
Section 3.5 presents the computational results. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes the paper.
3.2 A kidney exchange model
In this section we formalize the concepts used in kidney exchanges and we mathematically
define the problem under consideration.
3.2.1 Problem definition
Definition 3.2. A kidney exchange pool N consists of two sets, i.e. N = NU [NS, where
NU refers to the set of all unspecified donors and NS to the set of all incompatible specified
donor-recipient pairs.
Definition 3.3. A kidney exchange graph D = (N,A) has as its node set a kidney ex-
change pool N . There is an arc ai,j = (ni, nj) 2 A from node ni 2 N to node nj 2 NS if
the donor corresponding to node ni is compatible with the recipient corresponding to node
nj.
Note that in any kidney exchange graph D = (N,A), nodes in NU , which correspond
to donors without recipients, have no incoming arcs. We define a transplant cycle and a
transplant chain as follows
Definition 3.4. In any given kidney exchange graph D = (N,A), a length-k cycle is an
arc traversal hn1, . . . , nki such that {n1, . . . , nk} ✓ NS and such that (nk, n1) 2 A and,
for every 1  i < k, (ni, ni+1) 2 A.
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Figure 3.1: Kidney exchange example
Definition 3.5. A length k chain is an arc traversal hn0, . . . , nki such that n0 2 NU and
{n1, . . . , nk} ✓ NS and for every 0  i < l, (ni, ni+1) 2 A.
In practice, there exist limits on the number of transplants that can be performed
simultaneously within a cycle or chain segment. This implies a natural bound on the
maximum cycle and chain length.
Definition 3.6. For kidney exchange graph D = (N,A) and K 2 N,
C(K) :=
n
c ✓ N : c is a cycle or chain in D with length at most K
o
Note that, because chains can allow for the requirement of simultaneity to be relaxed,
in general the limit on chains is greater than or equal to the the limit on cycles. Typi-
cally, chains use one or more non-simultaneous transplants to link several simultaneous
segments of transplants. For ease of exposition, we use a single limit parameter in our no-
tation. However, it is straightforward to use separate parameters and in the experiments
in Section 3.5 we will do exactly this.
Definition 3.7. Let D = (N,A) be a kidney exchange graph, K 2 N, and C(K) be
defined as above. Then, any subset M =
 
c1, c2, . . . , c|M |
 ✓ C(K), is called an exchange
if ci \ cj = ; for all, 1  i, j  |M |, i 6= j.
Thus, an exchange is a collection of interdependent kidney transplants which can be
feasibly performed together. In the remainder of the paper, we assume a kidney exchange
graph D = (N,A), and K 2 N are given, and we denote with M the exchange set, i.e.
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the set of all exchanges M as defined above. Thus, an exchange set M always implicitly
defines a kidney exchange graph D = (N,A), and K 2 N . Now that we have formally
defined exchanges, and the exchange set, we proceed by considering the criteria by which
exchanges M 2M are evaluated.
Definition 3.8. For any given exchange set M, a criterion is a function f :M! R.
We now arrive at the formal definition of the problem under consideration:
Definition 3.9. For any given exchange setM and ordered set of criteria I = {f1, . . . , f|I|},
a hierarchical multicriteria clearing problem is to find an exchange M⇤ 2 M such that,
for each i = 1, . . . , |I|, M⇤ 2Mi where Mi is recursively defined as Mi := {M 2Mi 1 :
fi(M)   fi(M 0), 8M 0 2Mi 1} with M0 :=M.
Note that the set of criteria used in the Dutch kidney exchange program are an or-
dered set of kidney exchange criteria which fit the above definition, as would be the sole
criterion of maximizing the (weighted) number of transplants. Because any minimization
criterion can be rewritten as a maximization criterion, the definition also accomodates for
minimization criteria. Moreover, the definition also accommodates for individual ratio-
nality (or participation) constraints for hospitals as sometimes required in multi-hospital
settings (Glorie et al., 2013).
Figure 3.1 illustrates an example of a kidney exchange clearing problem with 5 donor-
recipient pairs, n1, . . . , n5. The bound on the length of exchange cycles K is 4. The
graph has 4 feasible cycles, c1 = hn1, n2i , c2 = hn2, n3i , c3 = hn3, n4i , c4 = hn1, n2, n3, n5i.
There are two maximal exchanges given by M1 = {c1, c3} (highlighted) and M2 = {c4}.
Although both exchanges have the same number of transplants, in the Dutch system
exchange M1 could be preferable over exchange M2 by, for example, criterion (iv) in
Definition 3.1: the maximum cycle length is 2 instead of 4.
3.2.2 Complexity of the clearing problem
We will now prove that the clearing problem is NP-hard. Although this was first proved
by (Abraham et al., 2007), we present here an alternative proof which is an extension of
the reduction from X3C to PARTITION INTO TRIANGLES given in Garey and Johnson
(1979).
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Consider the following decision problem:
Static k-EXCHANGE (SkE)
INSTANCE: A directed graph D = (N,A) and a positive integer k  |N |.
QUESTION: Is there a partition of N into disjoint sets C1, C2, . . . , Cm, such that each
Ci, i = 1, . . . ,m forms a directed cycle in D of length at most k?
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. For 3  k  |N | SkE is NP-Complete.
Proof. We transform EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (X3C) to SkE. The NP-Complete
problem X3C is defined as
EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS (X3C)
INSTANCE: A finite set X with |X| = 3q and a collection C of 3-element subsets of X.
QUESTION: Does C contain an exact cover for X, that is, a subcollection C 0 ✓ C such
that every element of X occurs in exactly one element of C 0?
Let the set X and the collection C of 3-element subsets of X be an arbitrary instance
of X3C. We shall construct a graph D = (N,A), such that a partition of N into disjoint
sets C1, C2, . . . , Cm, with each Ci, i = 1, . . . ,m a directed cycle in D of length at most k,
exists, if and only if C contains an exact cover for X.
The basic units of the X3C instance are the 3-element subsets in C. We can locally
replace each such subset ci = {xi, yi, zi} 2 C with the collection Ai of edges shown in
Figure 3.2. Then D = (N,A) is defined by
N = X [
|C|[
i=1
{ai[jl] : 1  j  n, 1  l  9}
A =
|C|[
i=1
Ai
Notice that the only nodes that appear in the edges belonging to more than a single
Ai are those that are in the set X. In every Ai there are n diamond like structures of
nodes, where n =
⌃
k 1
12
⌥
. It is not hard to see that this instance of SkE can be constructed
in polynomial time from the X3C instance.
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Figure 3.2: Local replacement for ci = (xi, yi, zi) 2 C for transforming X3C to SkE.
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If c1, c2, . . . , cq are the 3-element subsets from C in any exact cover for X, then the
corresponding partition N = C1 [ C2 [ . . . [ Cm of N is given by taking
{ai[11], ai[12], xi} , {ai[14], ai[15], yi} , {ai[17], ai[18], zi} , {ai[n3], ai[n6], ai[n9]} 
ai[jl], ai[(j + 1)l 1], ai[(j + 1)l 2]
 
, j = 1, . . . , n  1, l = 3, 6, 9
from the nodes meeting Ai whenever ci = {xi, yi, zi} is in the exact cover, and by
taking
{ai[jl], ai[jl 1], ai[jl 2]} , j = 1, . . . , n, l = 3, 6, 9
from the nodes meeting Ai whenever ci is not in the exact cover. This ensures that
each element of X is included in exactly one 3-node cycle in the partition. Notice that
cycles containing more than 3 nodes are never feasible because of the choice of the number
n. Indeed, if there would be a cycle C 0 of length > 3, then the shortest such C 0 involves
a directed path P1 from si to ti through the gadget corresponding to some subset p and a
directed path P2 from ti to si through the gadget corresponding to some subset p0, where
si 2 {xi, yi, zi} and ti 2 {xi, yi, zi} \ {si}. The length of each of P1 and P2 is at least
3n + 1 + 3n, so the length of C 0 is at least 12n + 2. Because we have chosen n = dk 112 e,
it easily follows that 12n+ 2   k + 1 and that hence C 0 is infeasible.
Conversely, if N = C1 [ C2 [ . . . [ Cm of N is any partition of D into cycles of
size k or less, the corresponding exact cover is given by choosing ci 2 C such that
{ai[n3], ai[n6], ai[n9]} = Cj for some j, 1  j  m. We leave to the reader the straightfor-
ward task of verifying that the two partitions we have constructed are as claimed.
Corollary 3.1. For 3  k  |N | the hierarchical multicriteria clearing problem is NP-
hard.
3.2.3 Integer programming formulations
The clearing problem can be formulated as a mixed integer linear program. For example,
for the single criterion of maximizing the number of transplants the clearing problem can
be formulated using the so-called cycle formulation, which we describe below. Although
alternative mixed integer programming formulations for the kidney exchange problem have
also been investigated, the linear programming (LP) relaxation of the cycle formulation
provides the strongest upper bound (Constantino et al., 2013).
47_Erim Glorie[stand].job
3.2 A kidney exchange model 35
Cycle formulation
The cycle formulation, which was first presented in Abraham et al. (2007), uses a binary
decision variable xc for each cycle and chain c 2 C(K) that is defined as:
xc =
(
1 if c 2M⇤,
0 otherwise.
Setting x =
⇥
x1, . . . , x|C(K)|
⇤T
, the integer program is given by:
P0:
max z0(x) =
X
c2C(K)
|c| · xc (3.1)
s.t.
X
c2C(K):n2c
xc  1 8n 2 N (3.2)
xc 2 {0, 1} 8c 2 C(K)
In P0, the objective (3.1) is to select a collection of cycles and chains that maximizes
the number of transplants. The constraints (3.2) ensure that no patient or donor is
contained in more than one selected cycle or chain.
The number of variables in the cycle formulation can be very large (see Table 3.1 which
shows the number of cycles and chains in pools based on actual data from the Dutch
kidney exchange program), particularly because the number of chains grows rapidly with
the number of nodes. In an exchange pool with 200 nodes there can be over a billion
chains up to length 6, thus the formulation requires at least that many variables. In
contrast, Abraham et al. (2007) showed that, when dealing only with cycles up to length
3, this number of variables is often not even attained in pools of 5,000 nodes or more (see
Table 2 in Abraham et al. (2007)).
Generalized cycle formulation
The cycle formulation above can be generalized to allow for many other practically relevant
criteria, including each of the criteria (i)-(vi) mentioned in the introduction.
Consider a criterion fi 2 I. As before, let x =
⇥
x1, . . . , x|C(K)|
⇤T
denote the vector of
decision variables that indicate whether a cycle/chain c 2 C(K) is selected. In addition,
for ni,mi 2 N, let yi denote a ni ⇥ 1 vector of auxiliary variables which are allowed
to assume values in some subspace Fi ✓ Rni . Then, for wi 2 R|C(K)|, vi 2 Rni , Ai 2
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Nodes Arcs Cycles  4 Chains  4 Chains  6
10 50 0 1.0e+1 5.4e+1
20 192 8.00e+1 2.21e+2 1.34e+2
50 1087 2.04e+2 9.87e+3 2.51e+5
100 4443 5.07e+3 1.84e+5 2.44e+7
200 16412 1.00e+5 2.23e+6 1.34e+9
500 99501 8.58e+6 1.02e+8 5.83e+11
Table 3.1: Average number of cycles and chains over five random kidney exchange pools
of the indicated size sampled from historical data of the Dutch national kidney exchange
program
Rmi⇥|C(K)|, Bi 2 Rmi⇥ni , and bi 2 Rmi , the generalized cycle formulation is given by the
following integer program:
Pi:
max zi(x, yi) = w
T
i x+ v
T
i yi (3.3)
s.t. (3.2)
Aix+ Biyi  bi (3.4)
x 2 {0, 1}|C(K)|
yi 2 Fi
Here, the objective (3.3) is to maximize zi(x) with respect to fi (note that if fi were
to be a minimization criterion, it can be rewritten as a maximization criterion by mul-
tiplying the objective coe cients with  1). As before, the constraints (3.2) ensure that
no patient or donor is contained in more than one selected cycle or chain. The general
constraints (3.4) allow for various relationships between the selected cycles x and the
auxiliary variables yi that are required to model fi.
Ostensibly, the above formulations can also allow for multiple criteria by including a
separate term in the objective function for each criterion under consideration. Each term
is then multiplied with the relative weight attached to the criterion it models. As long as
the weights are relatively close to each other this approach works well. However, if the
criteria are hierarchically ordered, the required scaling of the weights will quickly lead to
numerical instability which renders the program to be infeasible. This is, for example,
the case with the six criteria used in the Dutch national program. Therefore, in the next
subsection, we present a recursive formulation which models the criteria in the hierarchy
without leading to numerical instability.
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Recursive cycle formulation
In this subsection we present a recursive formulation modelling hierarchical criteria that
does not su↵er from numerical instability: the recursive cycle formulation. The idea
is not to capture the hierarchical multi-criteria structure into a single integer program,
but instead recursively define multiple programs R1, . . . , R|I| which are linked together
by ‘objective propagation’ constraints. This corresponds to a lexicographic optimization
approach (see e.g. Isermann (1982); Rentmeesters et al. (1996)).
The first program in the recursion sequence is the generalized cycle formulation of
criterion f1. In case of the Dutch criteria, we have R1 := P0, where P0 is the program we
have defined before for the maximization of the number of transplants.
Then, denoting, in addition to the notation introduced above, the optimum value of
Ri by z⇤i , the programs Ri, i = 2, . . . , |I|, are recursively defined as:
Ri:
max zi(x, yi) = w
T
i x+ v
T
i yi (3.5)
s.t. (3.2)
Ajx+ Bjyj  bj j = 1, . . . , i (3.6)
zj(x, yj)   z⇤j j = 1, . . . , i  1 (3.7)
x 2 {0, 1}|C(K)|
yj 2 Fj j = 1, . . . , i
As in the generalized cycle formulation, the objective (3.5) is to maximize the single
criterion fi. However, the constraints (3.6) now include all the relationships required for
modeling criteria f1, . . . , fi. Constraints (3.7) are the objective propagation constraints,
which link the program Ri to the programs R1, . . . , Ri 1, by propagating their correspond-
ing objective function values.
The recursive cycle formulation naturally fits the definition of the hierarchical multi-
criteria kidney exchange clearing problem. Indeed, the constraints (3.6) and (3.7) directly
describe the sets Mi, i = 1, . . . , |I|. The exchange corresponding to the solution of
program R|I| is the solution to the hierarchical multi-criteria kidney exchange clearing
problem.
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Step 0 Initialize C(K) and x =
⇥
x1, . . . , x|C(K)|
⇤T
FOR i = 1, . . . , |I| DO
Step i Solve Ri on D:
z⇤i := maxx2{0,1}|C(K)| fi(x)
s.t. (3.2), f1(x)   z⇤1 , . . . , fi 1(x)   z⇤i 1
END FOR
Output x⇤ := argmax x2{0,1}|C(K)|f|I|(x)
s.t. (3.2), f1(x)   z⇤1 , . . . , f|I| 1(x)  
z⇤|I| 1
M⇤ := {c 2 C(K) : x⇤c = 1}
Table 3.2: Iterative algorithm for solving the hierarchical multi-criteria kidney exchange
clearing problem
3.3 Iterative solution approach
In this section we will develop an iterative branch-and-price algorithm for solving the
hierarchical multi-criteria kidney exchange problem based on the recursive cycle formu-
lation. The idea is to iteratively solve integer programs corresponding to the criteria in
the hierarchy. If a program is solved, its objective function value is propagated to the
integer program corresponding to the next criterion by means of an objective propaga-
tion constraint. Table 3.2 gives a schematic overview of this iterative approach, where
Ri and fi(x) := fi({c 2 C(K) : xc = 1}) respectively denote the integer program corre-
sponding to criterion fi and the objective function value of the exchange corresponding to
x =
⇥
x1, . . . , x|C(K)|
⇤T
under criterion fi. Note that the algorithm is also valid when there
is no hierarchy between the criteria and the criteria are captured into a single integer
program. The algorithm then requires a single iteration.
3.3.1 Branch-and-price methodology
Because the integer programming formulations described in Section 3.2 with one variable
per cycle and chain grow exponentially in the size of the exchange pool, the (recursive)
integer programs R1, . . . , R|I| included in the approach of Table 3.2 are solved using
branch-and-price. The branch-and-price method starts with a limited subset C ✓ C(K)
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of cycles and chains and solves the linear program (LP) relaxation of the integer program
(IP) under consideration using the corresponding restricted variable set. Whenever linear
programming duality conditions imply that adding variables may improve the solution
value, corresponding cycles and chains are generated and added to C. This process
repeats until strong duality conditions are satisfied. By doing this repeatedly for each
node in a branch-and-bound tree, an optimal integral solution can be obtained.
Generating columns for any of the LP relaxations to R1, . . . , R|I| corresponds to gen-
erating cycles and chains in the kidney exchange graph. Let  n denote the dual value
of the constraint corresponding to node n 2 N in (3.2). For the LP relaxation of Ri,
i = 1, . . . , |I|, we have the following reduced cost ric of a cycle or chain c 2 C(K) \ C:
ric = wi[c] 
X
n2c
 n  
iX
j=1
miX
k=1
Aj[k, c] · µj,k  
i 1X
j=1
wj[c] · ⌫j (3.8)
where, as before,  n denotes the dual value of the constraint corresponding to node n 2 N
in (3.2), µj,k denotes the dual value of the k-th constraint modeling criterion j in (3.6),
and ⌫j denotes the dual value of the j-th objective propagation constraint in (3.7).
In order to establish LP-optimality we search for cycles with positive reduced cost in
the kidney exchange graph (see Section 3.3.3 for details on how this can be accomplished).
If no such cycle can be found, the LP has been solved to optimality. If the LP solution
is fractional, we branch, restricting one or more variables in the values they can assume,
and then resolve the LP. At each node of the branching tree, the LP solution provides
an upper bound on the restricted problem of that node. An integral lower bound can be
obtained by solving the IP with the columns generated for the LP. If, at any node, the
LP upper bound is no better than the best lower bound, its subtree can be pruned. If the
IP lower bound matches the upper bound at the root node, the problem has been solved
to optimality.
3.3.2 Branch-and-bound
Branching
An important and essential part of any branch-and-price procedure is the branching
scheme. In the best branching scheme investigated in Abraham et al. (2007) branch-
ing is performed on the cycles and chains in the kidney exchange graph. Whenever the
LP solution is fractional, the cycle or chain whose corresponding variable has an LP value
closest to 0.5 is selected and two branches are created, one in which the cycle’s corre-
sponding variable is set to 0, and one in which it is set to 1. Branches are then explored
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using depth-first search. As there are are up to
PK
i=2 |N |i cycles of length K or less in D,
the branching tree may have exponential depth. We therefore propose to branch on the
arcs, of which there can be only up to N2. We consider two branching schemes based on
the following definition:
Definition 3.10. An arc a 2 A is fractional if
xa :=
X
c2C(K):a2c
xc
is fractional.
The existence of fractionally selected cycles need not immediately imply that a frac-
tional arc exists. For instance, multiple fractional cycles might overlap, such that xa = 1
for every arc a 2 A. Fortunately, Theorem 3.2 establishes that this can never be true for
all arcs whenever the LP solution is fractional.
Theorem 3.2. There exists a fractional arc if and only if the LP solution is fractional.
Proof. The first implication is trivial: if a 2 A is a fractional arc, then by definition
of xa, there must be at least one c 2 C(K) : a 2 c for which xc is fractional. To
prove the other implication, suppose c1 is a fractionally selected cycle containing arcs
a1, a2, . . . , a|c1|. If any arc a 2 c1 is not also covered by at least one other fractionally
selected cycle, then xa = xc1 and hence a is fractional. Therefore suppose there are
one or more other fractional cycles which have at least one arc in common with cycle
c1. Now, let c2 be such a fractional cycle containing, without loss of generality, arc
a1 = (n1, n2) but not arc a2 = (n2, n3), and let c3, . . . , cm be all other fractional cycles
containing arc a1. There are two options: either
Pm
i=1 xci = 1 or
Pm
i=1 xci < 1. In the
first case, xa1 =
Pm
i=1 xci = 1 so arc a1, and hence node n2, is totally covered, implying
that no positively valued cycle c 2 C(K)\ {c1, c3, . . . , cm} can cover arc a2 = (n2, n3),
and that therefore xa2 2 [xc1 , 1   xc2 ], making arc a2 fractional. In the second case,
xa1 =
Pm
c=1 xc < 1 and thus arc a1 is fractional. This completes the proof.
In our first branching scheme, we branch on groups of multiple arcs. If the LP solution
is fractional, we select the node with the largest number of fractional out-arcs and then
divide its out-arcs in two subsets, S1 and S2, and create a branch for each subset. In each
branch, all the arcs of its corresponding subset are banned. The subsets S1 and S2 are
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determined by adding arcs to S1 in non-decreasing order of xa value, until the sum of xa
values of arcs in S1 is at least 0.5. The remainder of the arcs are added to S2. Theorem
3.2 guarantees us that we can always find a node with at least one fractional out-arc.
In the second branching scheme, we branch on only one arc at a time. If the LP
solution is fractional, we select the arc with fractional value closest to 0.5. We then create
two branches: one in which the arc is banned, and one in which it is enforced. Again,
Theorem 3.2 guarantees that a fractional arc always exists, and, moreover, that when we
have branched on all fractional arcs, we have an integer solution.
In order to enforce an arc a 2 A in the master problem, we need to add the following
constraint:
X
c2C(K):a2c
xc = 1 (3.9)
Adding constraint (3.9) to the master problem changes the reduced cost of a cycle or
chain. In particular, if A⇤ ✓ A is the set of enforced arcs, the reduced cost ric of a cycle
or chain c 2 C(K) \ C in problem Ri is now given by:
ric = wi[c] 
X
n2c
 n  
iX
j=1
miX
k=1
Aj[k, c] · µj,k  
i 1X
j=1
wj[c] · ⌫j  
X
a2A⇤
1a2c⇠a (3.10)
where, in addition to the previously introduced notation, ⇠a is the dual value of con-
straint (3.9) and 1a2c is an indicator function which is 1 if a 2 c and 0 otherwise.
Note that banning an arc in the master problem is trivial, because that arc can simply
be removed from the graph.
Bounding
In all cases, before branching, integral upper and lower bounds can be derived from the
last iteration of the algorithm. For example, in Step 2 of the iterative solution algorithm,
the maximum number of blood type identical transplants can not be higher than the
total number of transplants determined in Step 1. Nor can it be lower than the number
of blood type identical transplants in Step 1’s solution. These derived bounds are used to
prune the irrelevant parts of the branching tree as soon as they violate the bounds.
If the objective is to maximize the number of transplants, an upper bound can be
derived by determining in polynomial time the maximum number of transplants when
K = 1. If there is a low number of highly-sensitized patients (i.e. patients who are
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crossmatch incompatible with many donors), Roth et al. (2007) have shown that this upper
bound is tight.2 As in Abraham et al. (2007) such an upper bound can be determined
by finding a maximum weight matching in a bipartite graph with donors on one side and
patients on the other. Let us denote this bipartite graph asG = (U, V,E), with U denoting
the patients, V denoting the donors, and E denoting the edges. Donors are connected to
their own patients with a zero-weight edge and to all other compatible patients with an
edge of weight 1.
For each edge e 2 E, let xe be defined as:
xe =
(
1 if e is selected,
0 otherwise.
A maximum weight matching can then be found in polynomial time by solving the
following LP3:
max
X
e2E
we · xe
s.t.
X
e={u,v}2E
xe = 1 8u 2 U
s.t.
X
e={u,v}2E
xe = 1 8v 2 V
xe 2 [0, 1] 8e 2 E
During the branching process the initial bounds may be improved upon by the LP
solutions (which provide an upper bound), or by a primal heuristic for constructing a
feasible integer solution (which provides a lower bound). In all branching schemes, we
use, as a primal heuristic, the solution to the IP with the columns generated for the LP.
If, at any node of the branching tree, the LP upper bound is no better than the best lower
bound, that node’s subtree can be pruned. If, at any node, the IP lower bound matches
the upper bound at the root node, the problem has been solved to optimality.
2In their simulations Roth et al. (2007) use instances in which 10 % of the patients is highly sensitized,
which in their study implies that these patients are crossmatch incompatible with 90 % of the donors.
3Although in principle a graph-based algorithm for maximum weight matching could also be used,
for large instances it is often faster to solve the indicated linear program, possibly with delayed edge
generation
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3.3.3 Pricing
In Abraham et al. (2007) the pricing problem is solved by traversing the kidney exchange
graph D in search for a positive price cycle. In the worst case, this procedure enumerates
all cycles in D and therefore is of order O(|N |K), which is exponential in the size of the
input. In this section we present a polynomial algorithm to solve the pricing problem in
O(K |N | |A|) time.
The algorithm requires that the reduced cost of a cycle can be expressed as a linear
function of arc weights. Therefore, we first formulate the following lemma on the reduced
cost of a cycle or chain in the recursive cycle formulation.
Lemma 3.1. If the objective coe cients wj[c] and the constraint coe cients Aj[k, c],
j = 1, . . . , i, k = 1, . . . ,mj for each cycle or chain c 2 C(K) in problem Ri can be
described as linear functions of arc weights, then there exist weights ⇡ia 2 R, for all arcs
a 2 A, such that, for every cycle and chain c 2 C(K),
ric =
X
a2c
⇡ia (3.11)
i.e. the reduced cost of c can also be described as a linear function of arc weights.
Proof. Let wi[c] =
P
a2c ↵i!i,a and Aj[k, c] =
P
a2c  i,j!
0
j,k,a for j = 1, . . . , i and k =
1, . . . ,mj, then by (3.10),
ric = wi[c] 
X
n2c
 n  
iX
j=1
miX
k=1
Aj[k, c] · µj,k  
i 1X
j=1
wj[c] · ⌫j  
X
a2A⇤
1a2c⇠a
=
X
a2c
↵i!i,a  
X
n2c
 n  
iX
j=1
miX
k=1
X
a2c
 i,j!
0
j,k,a · µj,k  
i 1X
j=1
X
a2c
↵j!j,a · ⌫j
 
X
a2A⇤
1a2c⇠a
=
X
a={n,n0}2c
 
↵i!i,a    n0  
iX
j=1
miX
k=1
( i,j!
0
j,k,a) · µj,k  
i 1X
j=1
(↵j!j,a) · ⌫j   1a2A⇤⇠a
!
=
X
a={n,n0}2c
⇡ia
where
56_Erim Glorie[stand].job
44
An e cient pricing algorithm for clearing barter exchanges with branch-and-price:
enabling large-scale kidney exchange with long cycles and chains
⇡ia = ↵i!i,a    n0  
iX
j=1
miX
k=1
( i,j!
0
j,k,a) · µj,k  
i 1X
j=1
(↵j!j,a) · ⌫j   1a2A⇤⇠a (3.12)
with  n the dual value of the constraint (3.2) for node n, µj,k the dual value of the k-th
constraint modeling criterion j in (3.6), ⌫j the dual value of the j-th objective propagation
constraint in (3.7), and ⇠a the dual value of constraint (3.9).
The linear relationship between the objective and constraint coe cients and the arcs
in D holds for most criteria used in practice. In particular, all of the Dutch criteria have
this property. Also, the constraints required for branching on arcs have this property.
Note, however, that the constraints required to branch on cycles (as used by Abraham
et al. (2007)) do not satisfy this relationship, because they require constraints to enforce
the inclusion of a single cycle.
Now, let us define a reversion operator as follows:
Definition 3.11. For any directed cycle or chain c =
⌦
n1, n2, . . . , n|c|
↵
, the directed cycle
(respectively chain)
c 1 :=
⌦
n|c|, n|c| 1, . . . , n1
↵
is the reverse of c.
The pricing problems can now be solved in polynomial time through the algorithm
given in Table 3.3. The algorithm first constructs the arc set eA ✓ A of arcs that are not
banned and then determines for each starting node n 2 N a shortest path up to length K
in eD = (N, eA) (depending on whether node n corresponds to an unspecified donor or not)
using an adapted version of the Bellman-Ford method (Bellman, 1958)(Ford, 1956). For
each node n 2 N and k = 0, 1, . . . , K the algorithm calculates functions fnk : N ! R[{1}
and gnk : N ! N that respectively provide the weight of the shortest path between n and
any other node n0 2 N using at most k arcs, and the predecessor of node n0 2 N on such
a shortest n  n0 path.
The algorithm consists of four main steps. Before executing the main steps, Step
0 transforms the arc specific weights obtained from Lemma (3.1) such that the pricing
problem becomes a minimization problem. Then, for each node n 2 N , Step 1 initializes
the functions fnk and g
n
k , Step 2 calculates the function values of f
n
k and g
n
k in case of
a cycle (i.e. n 2 NS), and Step 3 calculates the function values in case of a chain (i.e.
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n 2 NU). The final step, Step 4, checks whether there are cycles or chains with positive
reduced cost and, if there are, constructs them in reverse from the function values of gnk .
As stated in Theorem 3.3 below, the algorithm is exact, i.e. it always finds a positive
price cycle or chain if one exists. In fact, for each starting node it finds the maximum
weight cycle or chain of length at most K. However, it might be the case that a cycle
or chain returned by the algorithm contains a subcycle (and hence is not feasible for the
master problem). In the case of such a compound cycle or chain, Theorem 3.3 guarantees
us that the subcycle will always have a positive price. We can choose to abort the
algorithm as soon as a positive price cycle or chain is found, or it can be run to completion,
possibly resulting in multiple positive price cycles and chains being identified (Nota bene,
if run to completion, the algorithm will output each cycle c⇤ up to |c⇤| times, therefore it
may be desirable to filter the generated cycles for duplicates).
Before providing the theorem, we first introduce the following definition:
Definition 3.12. For any directed cycle c composed of simple cycles  1, . . . ,  m in D =
(N,A), and arc weights ⇡ia 8 a 2 A, the maximum simple cycle S(c) is the cycle given by
S(c) = argmax 2{ 1,..., m}
(X
a2 
⇡ia
)
Theorem 3.3. C⇤ 6= ;, and, for all c⇤ 2 C⇤, S(c⇤) 2 C(K) and riS(c⇤) > 0, if and only if
9c 2 C(K) : ric > 0.
Proof. Analogous to the Bellman-Ford method, we have, for each n, n0 2 NS, k =
0, . . . , K, that
fnk (n
0) = min
(X
a2P
w0a : P is an n  n0 walk traversing at most k arcs
)
= max
(X
a2P
wa : P is an n  n0 walk traversing at most k arcs
)
Then, obviously,
c⇤(n) := {n0, gn(n0), gn(gn(n0)), . . . , n} 1 (3.13)
= argmax
(X
a2P
⇡ia : P is an n  n walk traversing at most k arcs
)
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Step 0 Set w0a :=  ⇡ia 8 a 2 eA as in (3.12), C⇤ = ;
FOR EACH Node n 2 N DO
Step 1 Set fn0 (n) := 0 and, 8 n0 2 N\ {n}, fn0 (n0) :=1 and gn0 (n0) := ;
Step 2 IF n 2 NS THEN
set, for k = 0, . . . , K   2, and for all n0 2 N ,
aˆ = (n00, n0) := argmina=(u,n0)2 eA {fnk (u) + w0a},
fnk+1(n
0) := min {fnk (n0), fnk (n00) + w0aˆ},
gnk+1(n
0) :=
⇢
n00 if fnk (n
00) + w0aˆ < f
n
k (n
0),
gnk (n
0) otherwise.
Step 3 ELSE IF n 2 NU THEN
set, for k = 0, . . . , K   1, and for all n0 2 N ,
aˆ = (n00, n0) := argmina=(u,n0)2 eA {fnk (u) + w0a},
fnk+1(n
0) := min {fnk (n0), fnk (n00) + w0aˆ},
gnk+1(n
0) :=
⇢
n00 if fnk (n
00) + w0aˆ < f
n
k (n
0),
gnk (n
0) otherwise.
END FOR
Step 4 For n, n0 2 NS, if (n0, n) 2 eA and fnK 1(n0) + w0{n0,n} < 0,
C⇤ ! C⇤ [ ⌦n0, gnK 1(n0), gnK 2(gnK 1(n0)), . . . , n↵ 1,
and, for n 2 NU , n0 2 NS, if fnK(n0) < 0,
C⇤ ! C⇤ [ ⌦n0, gnK 1(n0), gnK 2(gnK 1(n0)), . . . , n↵ 1
Table 3.3: Polynomial pricing algorithm
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is a, possibly compound, maximum weight cycle with length at mostK. Let  1(n), . . . ,  m(n)
be the simple cycles composing c⇤(n) (if c⇤(n) itself is a simple cycle, m = 1 and
 1(n) = c⇤(n)). By definition, S(c⇤(n)) 2 { 1, . . . ,  m} ✓ C(K). Therefore, it remains to
prove that 9n 2 NS : c⇤(n) 2 C⇤ and that, for all n 2 NS : c⇤(n) 2 C⇤,
P
a2S(c⇤(n)) ⇡
i
a > 0.
To prove the first part, let c 2 C(K) be a cycle with Pa2c ⇡ia > 0 and let n 2 c. By
(3.13) we then have that
P
a2c⇤(n) ⇡
i
a  
P
a2c ⇡
i
a > 0, and, therefore
fnK 1(n
0) + w{n0,n} =
X
a2c⇤(n)
w0a =  
X
a2c⇤(n)
⇡ia < 0
which implies that c⇤(n) 2 C⇤ as desired.
To prove the second part, let n 2 NS : c⇤(n) 2 C⇤. ThenX
a2c⇤(n)
⇡ia =
X
a2 1(n)
⇡ia + . . .+
X
a2 m(n)
⇡ia > 0.
Because of this, 9  2 { 1(n), . . . ,  m(n)} :
P
a2  ⇡
i
a > 0, and, by definition 3.12,P
a2S(c⇤(n)) ⇡
i
a > 0 as desired. The proof for chains is analogous.
Corollary 3.2. Given a kidney exchange graph D = (N,A) and arc weights ⇡ia 8 a 2
A, a positive weight cycle or chain up to length K, if one exists, can be found in time
O(K |N | |A|).
Proof. The proof follows directly from the description of the algorithm in Table 3.3.
3.4 Simulations
We test our algorithm using several realistic simulators. The first is a kidney exchange
simulator based on historical data from the Dutch national kidney exchange program.
This simulator is described in detail in (Glorie et al., 2013). The second is the simulator
described in (Saidman et al., 2006) (and used in (Abraham et al., 2007)), which is the
most commonly used generator for kidney exchange pools. This second simulator is based
on US population data. We use the simulators to generate both static kidney exchange
pools (individual pools sampled from the available patient-donor population) as well as
dynamic sequences of pools and exchanges (pools that dynamically evolve by simulating
arrivals sampled from the patient-donor population and by simulating removals due to
exchanges and, for example, patient illness). In this section we will briefly explain the
main aspects of the data and simulation procedures. Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 give an
overview of the pool composition under the various simulators.
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3.4.1 Static simulation with Dutch clinical data
The data for our first simulator is obtained from the Dutch Transplant Foundation Neder-
landse Transplantatie Stichting (NTS) (2012) and originates from the empirical registry of
the Dutch national kidney exchange program. It includes 438 incompatible patient-donor
pairs who participated in Dutch kidney exchanges between October 2003 and January
2011. In addition it contains 109 unspecified donors who were screened at one of the
seven Dutch transplant centers during that period. Each patient and donor has a blood
type as well as a registration center. Donors also have a record of their antigen types,
while patients have a record of the antigen types that are medically unacceptable to them.
Patients and donors are marked as blood type or crossmatch (in)compatible based on the
data. A static kidney exchange pool is generated at random from the data using sampling
with replacement.
Using Table 3.6, which details the characteristics of the patients and donors in the
data set described above, a pool with similar characteristics as the Dutch pool can be
easily constructed by generating pairs and unspecified donors by sampling randomly from
the categories listed in the table. Each category should then have a probability of being
sampled equal to the percentage listed in the table.
3.4.2 Static simulation with US population data
We also perform simulations with US population data using the simulator described in
(Saidman et al., 2006). The simulation is based on data from the United Network for
Organ Sharing (UNOS) in the US. The simulator generates patients with a random blood
type, sex, and probability of being crossmatch incompatible (this probability is called the
percentage Panel Reactive Antibody (PRA)) with a randomly chosen donor. Each patient
is assigned a potential donor with a random blood type and relation to the patient. If the
patient and the potential donor are incompatible, they are added to the kidney exchange
pool. Blood types and probabilities of crossmatch failure are then used to determine
the compatibilities in the pool. Table 3.4 summarizes the probabilities as described in
(Saidman et al., 2006). Because the original simulator did not include unspecified donors,
we add to each pool a fixed percentage of unspecified donors (generated as above but
without assignment to a patient).
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Prob. blood type A .3373
Prob. blood type B .1428
Prob. blood type AB .0385
Prob. blood type O .4814
Prob. low PRA (5 %) .7019
Prob. medium PRA (10 %) .2
Prob. high PRA (90 %) .0981
Prob. female .409
Prob. spousal donor* .4897
% unspecified donor** 4.5
* Applies to female patients only.
Spousal PRA := 1 - .75 (1 - PRA )
** Original simulator did not have
altruistic donors
Table 3.4: Probabilities in Saidman simulator
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3.4.3 Sparse pools
Ashlagi and Roth (2012) recently found that the percentage of highly sensitized patients
(i.e. patients with a high probability of crossmatch incompatibility with a randomly
chosen donor) in practice can be significantly higher than assumed in (Saidman et al.,
2006). A possible reason for a higher percentage of highly sensitized patients could be
the use of more sensitive crossmatching techniques. Ashlagi and Roth (2012) describe an
empirical distribution in which half of the patients have a very high PRA - between 95
and 100 % - and the other half have a very low PRA - between 0 and 5 % (see Table
1 in Ashlagi and Roth (2012)). Because of this a kidney exchange pool can in practice
be much sparser than the pools generated by the Saidman simulator. We make some
modifications to the Saidman simulator to reflect this phenomenon of sparse pools. In
particular, we adjust the value for low PRA to 2.5 % and the value for high PRA to 97.5
% and we modify the frequencies such that the simulated pool contains approximately
50% highly sensitized patients. Table 3.5 summarizes the probabilities in the modified
simulator.
Prob. blood type A .3373
Prob. blood type B .1428
Prob. blood type AB .0385
Prob. blood type O .4814
Prob. low PRA (2.5 %) .7
Prob. high PRA (97.5 %) .3
Prob. female .409
Prob. spousal donor* .4897
% unspecified donor 4.5
* Applies to female patients only.
Spousal PRA := 1 - .75 (1 - PRA )
Table 3.5: Probabilities in modified Saidman simulator
3.4.4 Dynamic simulations
We use the static simulators described above to perform dynamic kidney exchange simu-
lations as described in (Glorie et al., 2013). The dynamic simulation procedure consists
of repeated simulated arrivals and exchanges.
For the Dutch simulator we generate a population by sampling from the historical
population (we generate the same number of arrivals as in the data set) and then assign
each pair and each unspecified donor in the population a random arrival date. Arrival
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dates are drawn uniformly, corresponding to a Poisson arrival process. In each exchange
round, the optimization algorithm described in Section 3.3 implemented with the Dutch
hierarchical criteria identifies a matching. The last donor of each chain in an exchange
round donates to the waiting list (hence, this donor is not available for future exchange
rounds). Proposed matches may fail with a probability depending on patient and donor
characteristics. If matches fail this information is incorporated in the compatibility matrix
and the optimization algorithm is rerun for the present exchange round. This process is
repeated until a feasible matching is found. Patients and donors may leave the pool over
time due to simulated attrition and reneging. For the precise probabilities we refer to
(Glorie et al., 2013).
When using the simulator with US data we generate a population of size 10,000 and
then, for every exchange, we generate a fixed number of arrivals by sampling with replace-
ment from this population. In each exchange round, the optimization algorithm described
in Section 3.3 implemented with the maximum number of transplants criterion identifies a
matching. Match failure is simulated as above. We use this dynamic simulation to study
the clearing time of pools in a dynamic state. We do this by considering the clearing time
of the tenth exchange round.
3.5 Computational results
Our experiments were performed on a Windows 7 64-bit computer with a 3 GHz AMD
Athlon II X2 processor and 4 GB of RAM. The iterative branch-and-price algorithm has
been implemented in C#.NET and LP’s and IP’s are solved using CPLEX 12.5.
Table 3.9 displays the run time performance of our algorithm with the single objective
of maximizing the number of transplants (all transplants have equal weight) on instances
constructed by the simulator with Dutch clinical data described in Section 3.4.1. The
performance of the di↵erent pricing and branching strategies described in Section 3.3 is
compared on instances of various sizes. The cycle length limit is set to either 3 (short
cycles) or 4 (long cycles) and the chain length limit is set to either 3 (short chains) or 6
(long chains).
In our comparisons we include the depth-first pricing algorithm with cycle branching
as described in Abraham et al. (2007). In this algorithm, the kidney exchange graph is
traversed for positive price cycles by exploring nodes in non-decreasing dual value order.
Intermittently, the search path is pruned based on the fact that new nodes will have dual
value as least as large as the current node.
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In all instances the master problem is seeded with a starting collection of 10,000
random cycles and chains (generated by random walks from a randomly chosen node in
the kidney exchange graph until a feasible cycle or chain is found). The collection of cycles
and chains is managed such that whenever the problem contains more than 400,000 cycles
and chains, the cycles and chains with the lowest reduced cost are deleted (excepting those
that are branched on or have a non-zero LP value). Per pricing iteration up to 100 new
cycles and chains are added (except in the depth-first pricing algorithm, where we adhered
to the setting of 1 new cycle or chain per iteration, as advised in Abraham et al. (2007)
and which, after tuning, we found to work best for this pricing algorithm).
The first column in Table 3.9 indicates the pool size. The second column contains
the total run time in seconds. The third and fourth column respectively contain the time
spent on solving LP’s and IP’s for the master problem. When branching is applied, the
fifth column reports the number of processed nodes in the branch-and-bound tree over
the total number of nodes in the tree; the sixth column reports the total time required
for solving pricing problems.
As can be seen from the table, our algorithm is able to find optimal solutions in
instances with 500 nodes – which contain around 5.83e+11 chains up to length 6 (see
Table 3.1) – within two minutes. In almost all instances the polynomial pricing algorithm
performs better than the depth-first pricing algorithm. In fact, using depth-first pricing,
the algorithm is not able to solve the larger instances within the imposed time-limit of
three hours (see the instance with 500 nodes), because the pricing takes too much time.
Using polynomial pricing all instances can be solved fast. Subset arc branching appears
to require the least amount of branching decisions of the various branching strategies,
although the di↵erence in performance is small. Often the optimal solution is already
found in the root of the branch-and-bound tree.
Next, we perform experiments with instances constructed by the simulator with US
population data described in Section 3.4.2-3.4.4. When we consider only cycles and chains
up to length 3 all algorithms perform similarly, therefore we directly proceed and report
results for cycles up to length 4 and chains up to length 6 (K = 4 and L = 6). We
generate various instances using both static and dynamic simulation with the Saidman
simulator and the modified Saidman simulator.
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 summarize the average performance characteristics over, respec-
tively, the static and the dynamic instances. The columns in Table 3.10 and 3.11 are
similar to the columns in Table 3.9, except that now, as not all versions of the algorithm
are able to solve all the instances, the percentage of solved instances is reported in the
last column.
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The findings reported in Tables 3.10 and 3.11 are in line with the findings reported in
Table 3.9 for static instances generated with Dutch data. Both for the instances generated
by the Saidman simulator and the sparser instances generated by the modified Saidman
simulator the polynomial pricing algorithm performs much better than the depth first
algorithm, regardless of whether they are simulated as static or dynamic. In fact, when
using depth-first pricing with cycle branching, many of the larger instances cannot be
solved within the imposed time limit of three hours (this is the case for 20 percent of
the instances with 500 nodes, and 80 percent of the instances with 1,000 nodes) while all
of these instance can be solved within reasonable time when using polynomial pricing.
As before, many instances can be solved in the root of the branching tree, but, in total,
branching is now required for more instances. When branching is required, arc branching
appears to be slightly more e↵ective than subset arc branching because it leads to fewer
branches on average (see the 1,000 node instances).
As (Ashlagi et al., 2011b) have shown, allowing longer cycles and chains is important
to increase the number of transplants for the hardest to match patients. This is especially
true if the pool is sparse. Allowing long cycles and chains may also be important for
objectives other than maximizing the number of transplants, whether they are captured
through a hierarchical objective function or through a single weighted objective function.
By allowing longer cycles and chains these objectives may be improved.
Table 3.12 and Figure 3.3 display the long term e↵ects of using the multiple hierar-
chical criteria used in the Netherlands. In particular, Table 3.12 shows the percentage of
instances showing improvement in the i-th objective criterion and Figure 3.3 shows the
relative di↵erence on the total number of transplants, the average wait time, the num-
ber of highly sensitized patients (patients with PRA > 80) transplanted, and O patients
transplanted versus (a) a policy using only the single criterion of maximizing the number
of transplants, and (b) a policy using only short cycles and chains.
As we can see from Table 3.12, additional criteria often make a di↵erence, even if they
have a low hierarchical ranking. For instance, in our simulations, Dutch criterion (vi)
constitutes an improvement in 34.5 % of the instances. While the long run improvement
in the total number of transplants versus a single criterion policy aimed at just maxi-
mizing the number of transplants is small (see Figure 3.3), the improvement in terms
of highly sensitized patients transplanted is significant. This - normally disadvantaged -
group can receive up to 4.5 percent more transplants when using the Dutch allocation
criteria. Also O type patients, which are another disadvantaged group, benefit by over
3 percent. Furthermore, Figure 3.3 shows how long cycles and chains may lead to a 9
percent improvement of average waiting time.
69_Erim Glorie[stand].job
3.6 Conclusions 57
Figure 3.3: Long term e↵ects using Dutch hierarchical criteria. Cycle limit is 4, chain
limit is 6. Dark bars: comparing the 6-criteria policy versus the 1-criteria ’maximum
transplants’ policy. Light bars: comparing the 6-criteria policy versus the 6-criteria policy
with cycles and chains limited to 3.
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown how to clear large multi-criteria kidney exchanges with
long chains using a general and scalable exact algorithm. This is particularly important
because, over the last years, kidney exchange has quickly increased as a modality for
transplanting end stage renal disease patients with an incompatible living donor and long
exchange chains have turned out to be increasingly important to help the most disad-
vantaged patients. Most kidney exchange programs not only seek to maximize directly
the number of transplants, but also seek to optimize other objectives, such as fairness
prescribed in international treaties (e.g. Council of Europe (2002)). For this reason many
programs use a set of multiple, often hierarchical, optimization criteria. Using our algo-
rithm, we can e↵ectively deal with such criteria, even in large and sparse exchange pools
that now begin to arise in practice.
To maximize the benefits from exchange it should be coordinated at an (inter-)national
level. However, participation barriers for transplant centers may prevent such nationally
coordinated kidney exchange from being established. To make such coordination possible
then, participation constraints must be included. Our algorithm can also deal with such
constraints by including them as a hierarchical objective at the highest level.
Mathematically, the algorithm consists of an iterative branch-and-price procedure.
By using a general but e↵ective class of integer programming formulations we are able to
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optimally clear exchange pools with billions of cycles and chains within minutes. The key
part of our algorithm is a polynomial pricing procedure for this class of formulations in
combination with a branching strategy that branches on arcs or on subsets of arcs. These
elements allow us to e ciently deal with long chains which would not be possible with
depth-first pricing techniques suggested in previous research.
We hope our algorithm may serve as a reference solution framework for other re-
searchers, so that solution methods and data can be shared, to the benefit of the patients
su↵ering from end stage renal disease across the globe. Our approach is also easily appli-
cable to other types of barter exchange markets besides kidney exchange and can therefore
have implications for a broader class of allocation issues.
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Pool Total LP IP # nodes proc. / Pricing
size time (s) time (s) time (s) # nodes time (s)
Depth first pricing with cycle branching, short cycles and chains
10 .61 .04 .00 1 / 1 .00
20 .21 .04 .00 1 / 1 .00
50 1.11 .26 .00 7 / 13 .00
100 .78 .09 .28 1 / 1 .06
200 1.81 .52 .47 1 / 1 .36
500 54.92 32.59 .47 28 / 55 12.17
Depth first pricing with cycle branching, long cycles and chains
10 .28 .05 .00 2 / 3 .00
20 .83 .17 .00 5 / 9 .00
50 .42 .13 .00 2 / 3 .00
100 7.52 .14 .27 1 / 1 6.81
200 730.65 9.30 .20 16 / 31 713.17
500 >10,800 - - - -
Polynomial pricing with arc branching, short cycles and chains
10 .33 .03 .00 1/1 .00
20 .20 .03 .00 1/1 .00
50 2.97 .91 .00 20/39 .00
100 .80 .09 .25 1/1 0.13
200 1.58 .17 .30 1/1 0.64
500 21.98 1.09 .69 1/1 18.08
Polynomial pricing with arc branching, long cycles and chains
10 .27 .06 .00 2 / 3 .00
20 .94 .19 .00 6 / 11 .00
50 1.61 .53 .00 10 / 19 .00
100 .83 .13 .31 1 / 1 .08
200 2.78 .67 .30 1 / 1 1.33
500 103.67 21.44 4.53 24 / 47 35.72
Polynomial pricing with subset arc branching, short cycles and chains
10 .16 .05 .00 1 / 1 .00
20 .16 .03 .00 1 / 1 .00
50 .50 .13 .00 3 / 5 .00
100 .70 .08 .22 1 / 1 .11
200 1.59 .17 0.30 1 / 1 .64
500 22.06 1.08 0.67 1 / 1 18.13
Polynomial pricing with subset arc branching, long cycles and chains
10 .42 .09 .00 3 / 5 .00
20 .91 .22 .00 6 / 11 .00
50 1.20 .39 .00 7 / 13 .00
100 .88 .14 .31 1 / 1 .08
200 2.78 .67 .30 1 / 1 1.31
500 95.02 15.59 7.64 12 / 23 35.61
Table 3.9: Average performance characteristics over 10 randomly sampled static in-
stances from historical data from the Dutch national kidney exchange program. The
cycle length limit is set to either 3 (short cycles) or 4 (long cycles) and the chain length
limit is set to either 3 (short chains) or 6 (long chains).
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Pool Total LP IP # nodes proc. / Pricing
size time (s) time (s) time (s) # nodes time (s) % Solved
Saidman simulator, Depth first pricing with cycle branching
100 3.67 2.16 .11 1.8 / 2.6 1.26 100
200 180.26 24.41 .39 3.0 / 5.0 154.51 100
500 1270.82 191.80 .43 25.0 / 49.0 1067.03 80
1000 4109.97 556.64 1.81 58.5 / 116.0 3383.05 40
Modified Saidman simulator, Depth first pricing with cycle branching
100 2.14 1.59 0.07 1.0 / 1.0 0.40 100
200 121.01 31.76 .30 1.0 / 1.0 87.98 100
500 2948.91 311.19 1.18 2.4 / 3.8 2634.55 80
1000 1760.15 120.33 15.36 11.0 / 6.0 416.34 20
Saidman simulator, Polynomial pricing with arc branching
100 1.40 .84 .15 5.6 / 10.2 .09 100
200 1.58 .53 .53 1.0 / 1.0 .36 100
500 9.66 3.43 1.29 3.6 / 6.2 3.46 100
1000 102.36 23.78 13.94 10.8 / 20.5 52.07 100
Modified Saidman simulator, Polynomial pricing with arc branching
100 .87 .35 .11 1.0 / 1.0 .31 100
200 92.08 34.36 .87 1.0 / 1.0 56.43 100
500 740.31 131.38 1.46 1.0 / 1.0 606.38 100
1000 1111.98 705.45 29.99 301.5 / 602 76.28 100
Saidman simulator, Polynomial pricing with subset arc branching
100 .93 .48 .15 3.4 / 5.8 .09 100
200 1.59 .52 .56 1.0 / 1.0 .36 100
500 8.50 3.04 1.26 2.8 / 4.6 3.32 100
1000 180.55 43.06 21.20 30.0 / 59.0 79.07 100
Modified Saidman simulator, Polynomial pricing with with subset arc branching
100 .90 .36 .12 1.0 / 1.0 0.31 100
200 33.92 9.94 .47 1.0 / 1.0 23.17 100
500 24.83 12.18 1.84 1.0 / 1.0 10.21 100
1000 1717.42 857.50 16.14 363.0 / 725.0 203.52 100
Table 3.10: Average performance characteristics over 10 randomly generated static
instances generated with US population data. Cycle limit is 4, chain limit is 6.
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Pool Total LP IP # nodes proc. / Pricing
size time (s) time (s) time (s) # nodes time (s) % Solved
Saidman simulator, Depth first pricing with cycle branching
100 52.57 1.82 .25 4.8 / 8.6 49.32 100
200 117.55 3.97 .58 4.4 / 7.8 110.70 100
500 6644.83 20.40 .77 1.0 / 1.0 6609.75 50
Modified Saidman simulator, Depth first pricing with cycle branching
100 1.37 .76 0.04 4.0 / 7.0 0.06 100
200 790.68 3.45 .56 1.0 / 1.0 785.65 80
500 2449.93 187.54 2.18 93.0 / 47.0 2258.44 80
Saidman simulator, Polynomial pricing with arc branching
100 4.98 .65 .24 3.8 / 6.6 3.41 100
200 9.95 .68 .38 1.0 / 1.0 7.68 100
500 1731.53 18.39 2.31 19.3 / 37.7 1685.6 100
Modified Saidman simulator, Polynomial pricing with arc branching
100 1.24 .33 .14 2.6 / 4.2 .35 100
200 13.78 .82 .64 1.0 / 1.0 11.33 100
500 54.47 3.62 1.49 1.0 / 1.0 40.98 100
Table 3.11: Average performance characteristics over 10 randomly generated dynamic
instances generated with US population data. Cycle limit is 4, chain limit is 6.
Criterion i ii iii iv v vi
% of instances showing
improvement at step i 99.3 24.5 52.1 .3 .3 34.5
Table 3.12: Percent of instances showing improvement at step i in the i-th objective
criterion of the Dutch hierarchical criteria. Cycle limit is 4, chain limit is 6.
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Chapter 4
Coordinating unspecified living
kidney donation and transplantation
across the blood type barrier in
kidney exchange1
4.1 Introduction
Living donor kidney transplantation is the preferred treatment for patients with end-
stage renal disease. However, due to blood type and crossmatch incompatibility over 30
percent of living donors are incompatible with their intended recipient. Kidney exchange
is a modality that identifies matches between such incompatible donor-recipient pairs
that allow them to proceed with transplantation through a cyclic transplant procedure
(de Klerk et al., 2011; Montgomery et al., 2006a, 2005; Park et al., 1999; Rapaport,
1986; Roth et al., 2006; Saidman et al., 2006; Segev et al., 2005b; De Klerk et al., 2010).
Over recent years various countries have pursued nationwide implementation of kidney
exchange (Wallis et al., 2011; Irwin et al., 2012).
Not all pairs can be matched through kidney exchange however. Alternative transplant
modalities available to incompatible pairs include unspecified living donation and ABO
incompatible (ABOi) transplantation. Unspecified living donation (Dor et al., 2011), al-
ternatively known as altruistic or non-directed donation, facilitates chains of transplants in
which each pair is further matched to another pair (Montgomery et al., 2006a; Roth et al.,
2006). ABOi transplantation utilizes desensitization techniques to overcome ABO incom-
1This chapter is based on (Glorie et al., 2013).
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patibility as a contraindication for transplantation (Tyden et al., 2005; Shin and Kim,
2011). However, despite the availability of these alternative modalities transplantation
rates of highly sensitized patients and blood type O patients have remained persistently
low (Roodnat et al., 2012).
This paper studies central coordination of unspecified donation and ABOi transplanta-
tion in kidney exchange. Important questions are whether such coordination should utilize
domino paired donation (DPD) (Roodnat et al., 2010) or non-simultaneous extended al-
truistic donor (NEAD) chains (Rees et al., 2009), what the length of the segments in such
chains should be, when they should be terminated, and how much time should be allowed
between matching rounds. Furthermore, this paper compares the e↵ects of coordinating
the di↵erent modalities centrally or locally and independently.
In DPD, an unspecified donor donates to a recipient of an incompatible pair, and
simultaneously the donor of the pair donates to the recipient of another pair, and so on,
until the donor of the last pair in the resulting chain donates to a recipient on the wait-
list (Roodnat et al., 2010). In NEAD chains, the donor of the last pair in the chain is
recruited as a bridge donor who can start a new chain segment of incompatible pairs at
a later time (Rees et al., 2009). Gentry et al. (Gentry et al., 2009) showed that, when
the monthly renege rate of bridge donors is above 4 percent, DPD strategies yield more
transplants than NEAD strategies. In their simulations DPD chain segments involved
at most 2 incompatible pairs and NEAD chain segments involved at most 3 pairs. In-
terestingly, Ashlagi et al. (Ashlagi et al., 2011b,a) showed that when chain segments of
longer length are allowed, non-simultaneous chains almost always outperform simultane-
ous chains. However, due to computational di culty of optimization with longer chain
segments, they only perform the analysis on an eight month time period.
Incentive problems appear to play an important role in establishing multi-center coor-
dination (De Klerk et al., 2010). Fear for loss of in-house transplants, for example, might
cause transplant centers to want to match some donors and patients locally so as to guar-
antee a certain number of in-house transplants (see Figure 4.1). One way to overcome
such incentive issues is by implementing participation constraints which ensure that each
transplant center can perform at least the same number of transplants in a national pool
as that it can achieve on its own. Policies that implement such constraints are called
individually rational (IR) (Curiel, 2010; Ashlagi and Roth, 2011b; Glorie et al., 2014d).
In this research we use specifically developed exact mathematical optimization software
(Glorie et al., 2014d) to simulate and analyze multiple kidney exchange policies over a
complete seven year time period. Our simulation uses actual data from the Dutch national
kidney exchange program and features an accurate modeling of various types of match
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Figure 4.1: Potential incentive problems. An unspecified donor (A) is registered at
center A, which can generate 3 in-house transplants. In a nationally optimized program,
4 transplants are generated, but only 1 of those transplants is performed by center A.
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failure. Sensitivity analysis is performed on the composition of the population, the time
unspecified and bridge donors wait before donating to the waitlist, the time between
matching rounds, and donor renege rates.
Our analysis includes the policies investigated in Gentry et al. (Gentry et al., 2009)
and Ashlagi et al. (Ashlagi et al., 2011b) for which, under the same settings, we find
comparable results but we show that the benefits of longer chains depend considerably on
the composition of the patient and donor population. Additionally, our analysis considers
a variety of new IR policies that feature central coordination of both unspecified donation
and ABOi transplantation for highly sensitized patients (with panel reactive antibody
[PRA] > 80) (Tyden et al., 2005). We show that, by using these new policies, substantially
more transplants can be obtained than under any of the previously investigated policies
and than could be expected from any of the transplant modalities independently. We also
show the importance of allowing the exchange pool to build up by allowing su cient time
between matching rounds.
4.2 Materials and methods
4.2.1 Data
This study uses empirical data from the Dutch national kidney exchange program. The
data include 438 ABO blood type or crossmatch incompatible patient-donor pairs who
participated in Dutch kidney exchanges between October 2003 and January 2011, as well
as 109 unspecified donors who donated during that period. There are eight transplant
centers with pair registrations ranging between 4-123 (median 47) and unspecified donor
registrations ranging between 3-64 (median 7). Donor HLA types and unacceptable HLA
mismatches are provided by the national reference laboratory for histocompatibility test-
ing. The national reference laboratory identifies unacceptable HLA specificities on basis of
a combination of a complement dependent cytotoxicity (CDC) and a solid phase antibody
screening. Antibody specificities leading to a positive CDC crossmatch are considered to
be a contraindication for transplantation and the HLA antigens recognized are defined
as unacceptable mismatches. Table 4.1 details the patient and donor characteristics. In
addition to center-reported PRA levels (which are based on the general population), the
table includes kidney exchange donor population PRA levels which are computed using
virtual crossmatches between each patient and all donors in the data set. In this paper,
whenever we refer to a PRA level, we refer to these kidney exchange donor population
based PRA levels.
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ABO blood type
A B AB O
Patients (%) 30 15 1 54
Donors (%) 56 14 2 29
PRA level w.r.t. general population (at time of entry)
0-9 10-79 80-100
Patients (%) 78 17 5
PRA level w.r.t. kidney exchange donor population
0-9 10-79 80-100
Patients (%) 48 35 17
Table 4.1: Patient and donor characteristics
4.2.2 Simulation
Monte Carlo simulations (Ross, 2006) are used to compare di↵erent policies for unspecified
donation in kidney exchange. Each simulation spans the period between 1 October 2003
and 23 December 2010 and involves a population of size 547 generated from the empirical
data using sampling with replacement.
The arrivals of patient-donor pairs and unspecified donors are determined by assigning
each pair and each unspecified donor in the population a random date in the simulation
period. Arrival dates are drawn uniformly, corresponding to a Poisson arrival process.
This appears to be a more realistic arrival process than the constant-size batch arrivals
assumed in (Gentry et al., 2009) and (Ashlagi et al., 2011b): a Chi Square goodness of
fit test on historical arrivals in our data set significantly rejects a fit with batch arrivals
(p < 0.0001) but not with Poisson arrivals (p=0.47).
Kidney exchanges are conducted at regular time intervals (once per 3 months in our
base case). Compatibility between patients and donors is based on blood type and virtual
crossmatching. ABO incompatible transplantation may be considered for highly sensitized
(PRA>80) patients with isoagglutinin titer of at most 1:256 (which corresponds to 60 %
of these patients).
4.2.3 Market clearing
In each exchange, an exact optimization algorithm, described in (Glorie et al., 2014d), is
run on the pool of incompatible pairs, unspecified donors and bridge donors in order to
determine an allocation. The algorithm allows cycles involving up to 4 pairs and, depend-
ing on the analyzed policy, DPD chains or NEAD chain segments involving up to 6 pairs
and 1 unspecified or bridge donor. In determining an allocation, the algorithm adheres
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the allocation criteria used in the Dutch national kidney exchange program (Keizer et al.,
2005). That is, the algorithm ranks solutions on six hierarchical criteria: (i) number of
transplants, (ii) number of blood type identical transplants, (iii) match probabilities of
matched patients (inverse ranking), (iv) longest cycle and chain length (inverse ranking),
(v) smallest spread per cycle and chain over transplant centers, and (vi) longest wait time;
the algorithm returns the highest ranking solution.
4.2.4 Policies
The policies considered in our simulation are distinguished by whether unspecified dona-
tion is coordinated locally or nationally (with or without IR requirement), by whether
unspecified donors initiate DPD or NEAD chains (either involving a maximum of 3 or 6
pairs), and by whether ABO incompatible transplantation for highly sensitized patients
(PRA > 80) is allowed.
If unspecified donation is coordinated locally, all pairs in a chain need to be registered
at the same transplant center as the unspecified donor who initiated the chain. If un-
specified donation is coordinated nationally, pairs in the chain may be registered at any
transplant center.
IR policies mitigate incentive problems in multi-center coordination at a potential cost
of a reduced number of transplants. Under an IR policy we first determine the maximum
number of transplants that each center can achieve individually and then impose restric-
tions to the kidney exchange optimization algorithm to ensure that each center achieves
at least this number.
4.2.5 Match failure, reneging and attrition
Incompatible pairs may leave the program if the pairs recipient gets transplanted in an-
other program or leaves the program for psychological or medical reasons. Alternatively,
the pairs donors may become ineligible or may reconsider participating. To model those
cases, simulated attrition randomly removes 2 % of the incompatible pairs at the end of
each month. This estimate is in line with earlier studies (Gentry et al., 2009; Ashlagi
et al., 2011b) and empirical findings in the Dutch national kidney exchange program.
Also, there are various types of failure that may prevent kidney exchange matches
from going forward to transplantation. These include positive crossmatch after a negative
virtual crossmatch, desensitization failure, donor withdrawal and patient illness. Based
on Dutch match failure data, we model these types of failure using both an exogenous
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probability (12.5%) and an endogenous probability calculated by the following probit
model (see Appendix A):
Pr[Failure : PRA] =   ( 1.5007 + 0.0170 · PRA)
where   represents the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distri-
bution. If a failure occurs, the optimization algorithm is rerun for the current matching
round using the updated information, as is current practice in the Netherlands.
4.2.6 Bridge donors
The last donor in a NEAD chain segment becomes a bridge donor, i.e. a donor whose
intended recipient has already received a transplant and who can start a next NEAD
chain segment in a later exchange. Bridge donors may renege if they decide not to donate
or become ineligible. At the end of each month, simulated reneging removes a percentage
of the bridge donors (e.g. 1 %). When a bridge donor does not start a new chain segment
within a specified period of time (e.g. 3 months), the NEAD chain is ended and the
bridge donor donates to the wait list. Unspecified donors are assumed not to renege, but
if they do not initiate a DPD or NEAD chain within the specified period, they donate to
the deceased donor waitlist. In concordance with (Ashlagi et al., 2011b), when we allow
for DPD or NEAD chain segments longer than length four, these involve an intermediate
short-term bridge donor after the first three transplants.
4.2.7 Base case
In the base case simulation, kidney exchanges are conducted once per three months (thir-
teen weeks), starting from 1 January 2004. There are a total of 29 kidney exchanges
during the simulation period. Chain segments are limited to 3 pairs and 1 unspecified or
bridge donor. The monthly probability of reneging for bridge donors is set to 1 %, which
corresponds to the estimate made in (Ashlagi et al., 2011b) based on clinical experience in
the US. As this may not be a reliable point estimate we also perform sensitivity analysis
(see below). Short term bridge donors have a renege probability of 0.5 %. Unspecified
donors and bridge donors are available for DPD or NEAD chains up to three months after
their entry or recruitment date, after which they donate to the waitlist. The percentage
of unspecified donors is 20 % and the percentage of highly sensitized (PRA>80) patients
is 17 %.
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4.2.8 Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis is used to assess the e↵ects of changes in uncertain or variable factors
on the simulation outcomes. This is done by performing repeated simulations while vary-
ing these factors. In particular, the patient-donor population, the bridge donor renege
rate, the availability period of unspecified and bridge donors, and the timing between kid-
ney exchanges are varied. Variety in the number of pairs and unspecified donors arriving
each month is inherent to the design of the simulation procedure. For the patient-donor
population we simultaneously vary the percentage of donors that are unspecified, con-
sidering values of 1 %, 5 %, and 20 %, and the percentage of highly sensitized patients,
considering values of 10 %, 20 %, 30 %, 40 %, and 50 %. We consider renege rates of 1
%, 2 %, 5 % and 10 %, and unspecified donor availability periods of 3 months (13 weeks),
6 months (26 weeks) and 18 months (78 weeks). When varying the timing of exchanges,
we use intervals of 1 week, 1 month (4 weeks), 2 months (8 weeks), 3 months (13 weeks),
and 6 months (26 weeks). For the last case we adjust donor availability to match the time
interval, in the other cases it is set to the default value of 3 months.
4.2.9 Statistical analysis
As in Gentry et al. (Gentry et al., 2009) 30 Monte Carlo simulations are run for each
experiment and average results are reported. The results include (i) the total number of
patients transplanted (including patients from the deceased donor waitlist), (ii) the total
number of blood type O patients transplanted, (iii) the total number of highly sensitized
(PRA > 80) patients transplanted, and (iv) the average waiting time. For NEAD chains,
any remaining bridge donors at the end of the simulation period are assumed to be able
to donate directly to the deceased donor waitlist and hence their number is added to the
total number of transplants. For all policies the improvement to Local DPD-4,3 (i.e. a
local DPD policy with a maximum of 4 pairs per cycle and 3 pairs per chain), which is
current practice in the Netherlands, is calculated. For the base case, 95 % confidence
intervals (2.5 - 97.5 percentile) are also reported. Significance of results is tested using
the sign test.
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Figure 4.2: Relative performance for various kidney exchange policies with 95 % con-
fidence intervals in a population with 20 % unspecified donors and 17 % patients with
PRA>80.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 National coordination
Figures 4.2-4.4 display the performance of the various kidney exchange policies in the
base case simulation. In particular, they show the improvement over Local DPD-4,3,
which is representative of current practice in the Netherlands. Local DPD-4,3 produced
an average of 429.2 transplants, including 109 transplants for wait list recipients, 143.2
transplants for ABO blood type O patients, and 46.5 transplants for highly sensitized
patients (PRA > 80). This is similar to the actual number of transplants achieved his-
torically in the observed time period. The average waiting time was 297.7 days (waiting
time for unmatched patients is counted until the end of the horizon).
Figure 4.2 shows that on average the number of transplants increases by about 4.1
% under national DPD-4,3 and by about 4.6 % under national NEAD-4,3 (both with
84_Erim Glorie[stand].job
72
Coordinating unspecified living kidney donation and transplantation across the blood
type barrier in kidney exchange
Figure 4.3: Relative performance for various kidney exchange policies with 95 % con-
fidence intervals in a population with 20 % unspecified donors and 17 % patients with
PRA>80.
p < 0.001). Particularly highly sensitized patients (PRA > 80) benefit from national
coordination: they receive 21 % more transplants under both National DPD-4,3 and
National NEAD-4,3, constituting almost all of the gains in the total number of transplants.
Not only are patients transplanted more often, they are also transplanted faster: the
average wait time for transplantation is reduced by 15 % under national DPD (p < 0.001)
and by 18 % under national NEAD (p < 0.001).
Importantly, the restriction that national implementation is individual rational does
not lead to a significant loss of transplants or to an significant increase in wait time,
indicating that individual rational national coordination is a viable strategy (Figure 4.3).
4.3.2 Allowing longer chain lengths
Figure 4.4 shows the results of allowing unspecified donor chains to be of longer length
(up to length 6). In contrast to the findings in Ashlagi et al. (Ashlagi et al., 2011b), in
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our simulations allowing longer chains produces no significant di↵erence in the number
of transplants or waiting time (compare IR National DPD-4,6 and IR National NEAD-
4,6 with IR National DPD-4,3 and IR National NEAD-4,3 in Figure 4.3). However, the
composition of the kidney exchange population in our base case is di↵erent from theirs
due to di↵erences between the Dutch and the APD data. To understand the nature of
these di↵erences we will perform sensitivity analysis on the population composition (see
below).
4.3.3 Allowing ABOi transplantation for highly sensitized pa-
tients
Figure 4.4 also shows the e↵ect of allowing ABOi transplants for highly sensitized patients.
When coordinated locally, allowing ABOi transplantation augments the total number of
transplants with about 0.5 % (p = 0.0081). However, when utilized in a nationally
coordinated policy together with any of the unspecified donation modalities, the increase
in total transplants is approximately 10 % (p < 0.001) and the increase in transplants
for highly sensitized patients is over 55 % (p < 0.001). This brings the probability of
obtaining a transplant on par for all patient groups (the probability is 87 % for non-
highly sensitized patients and 86 % for highly sensitized patients). These benefits require
only a small number of ABOi transplants: on average 38 ABOi matches were made in
the simulated policies, whereas historically 42 pairs that took part in the Dutch KPD
program, but remained unmatched, eventually received an ABOi transplant outside the
program.
4.3.4 Sensitivity analysis population composition
Figures 4.5-4.9 provide a sensitivity analysis on the population composition. For compar-
ison, we have included the same policies as used in (Ashlagi et al., 2011b). As expected,
the number of transplants decreases with the percentage of highly sensitized patients and
increases with the percentage of unspecified donors. However, the number of transplants
under policies allowing long chains decreases less fast (with respect to the percentage of
highly sensitized patients) than the number of transplants under policies allowing only
short chains, leading to larger di↵erences. This is independent of whether the policy is
DPD or NEAD. This explains the relative e↵ectiveness of long chains in the simulations
of (Ashlagi et al., 2011b).
The benefits of allowing ABOi transplantation increase with the percentage of donors
that are unspecified. The benefits also increase with the percentage of highly sensitized
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Figure 4.5: Sensitivity analysis on the percentage of highly sensitized patients when the
percentage of unspecified donors is 20 %
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Figure 4.6: Sensitivity analysis on the percentage of highly sensitized patients when the
percentage of unspecified donors is 5 %
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Figure 4.7: Sensitivity analysis on the percentage of highly sensitized patients when the
percentage of unspecified donors is 1 %
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Figure 4.8: Sensitivity analysis on the percentage of unspecified donors while 17 % of
patients is highly sensitized.
Figure 4.9: Sensitivity analysis on the percentage of unspecified donors while 50 % of
patients is highly sensitized.
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patients (they only start decreasing slightly when the percentage of these patients is over
30-40 %). The relative e↵ectiveness of ABOi policies in populations with many highly
sensitized patients is substantial. In all cases only a small number of ABOi transplants is
required to obtain the benefits.
4.3.5 Sensitivity analysis unspecified and bridge donor availabil-
ity (chain termination)
We also perform sensitivity analysis on the period during which unspecified donors and
bridge donors are available for (continued) chain donation (see Figure 4.10). When the
period is extended from 3 months until 18 months after the unspecified donors entry date
or the bridge donors recruitment date, local DPD-4,3 achieves 1.1 % more transplants (p
< 0.001). However - and this is notable - for all national policies an extended availability
period does not have a significant e↵ect on the number of transplants. The same holds for
the number of transplants for blood type O and highly sensitized patients, as well as for
the waiting time. As before, we performed this analysis for varying pool compositions and
the pattern turns out to be independent of the number of unspecified donors. Even when
only 1% of all donors is an unspecified donor, the benefits of a longer availability period
are insubstantial and insignificant. This indicates that it is best to perform a waitlist
donation or end an ongoing chain if no kidney exchange transplant options are available
within 3 months (as this reduces the wait time for wait list recipients).
4.3.6 Sensitivity analysis timing of exchanges
Figure 4.11 presents sensitivity analysis on the time interval between exchanges. A longer
time interval increases the number of transplants. When exchanges are run once per three
months, as is currently done in the Netherlands, there are about 7 % (p < 0.001) more
transplants than when exchanges are run once per month, regardless of the policy. An
explanation for this is that additional time between kidney exchanges allows exchange
cycles and chains to be formed that involve relatively more highly sensitized patients (33
% in the case of 3 months versus 1 month). The graphs for both transplant categories are
equally concave, meaning that the increase in transplants diminishes as the time interval
increases. The di↵erence in transplants between the extremes, the near continuous weekly
exchange policy and the bi-annual exchange policy, is 31 % (and 144 % if we decompose
this to highly sensitized patients (not shown in the table)).
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Figure 4.10: Sensitivity analysis on the time unspecified and bridge donors are available
before donating to the waitlist
Figure 4.11: Sensitivity analysis on the time between exchanges
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Figure 4.12: Sensitivity analysis on the renege rate
4.3.7 Sensitivity analysis renege rate
Figure 4.12 displays a sensitivity analysis on the renege rate. When the renege rate
is under 3 %, NEAD chain policies slightly outperform equivalent DPD chain policies.
However, when the renege rate increases beyond 3-4 %, NEAD chains lose bridge donors
too frequently, resulting in a substantial advantage for DPD chain policies. These findings
are in line with (Gentry et al., 2009) and (Ashlagi et al., 2011b). Overall, NEAD chains
produce slightly more transplants for patients in the kidney exchange program, including
highly sensitized patients with PRA > 80 and O patients, but less transplants for waitlist
patients.
4.4 Discussion
In the recent history of transplantation medicine various novel modalities for transplant-
ing patients with an incompatible living donor have been introduced. In this paper we
presented a simulation study that considers the coordination of two of those modalities,
unspecified donation and transplantation across the ABO blood type barrier, in kidney
exchange. Clinical data and allocation criteria from the Dutch national kidney exchange
program (de Klerk et al., 2011) have been used to perform the simulations and to de-
termine donor-recipient matches. Our findings are therefore, at least in part, conditional
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on these data and criteria. Extensive sensitivity analysis on the population composition,
however, helps us understand the general implications.
Our results strongly suggest that there is clear synergy in the central coordination of
unspecified donation and ABOi transplantation in kidney exchange, even when the latter
is performed exclusively for highly sensitized patients. Only a few ABOi transplants are
required to substantially increase the benefits of national unspecified donation policies.
These benefits are in terms of total transplants, transplants for blood type O and highly
sensitized patients, and waiting time, and are much larger than could be expected from
any of the transplant modalities independently.
In our base case simulations the benefits of long unspecified donor chains are not
significant. This contrasts with the recent study of (Ashlagi et al., 2011b) whose simu-
lations suggest significant benefits of long chains. The di↵erence in the outcomes is the
result of di↵erences in the composition of the patient-donor populations. The benefits of
long unspecified donor chains increase with the percentage of highly sensitized patients.
When we consider highly sensitized population compositions similar to those investigated
in Ashlagi et al., we therefore do find significant benefits of long chains. Thus, whether
it is best to perform shorter simultaneous chains or longer non-simultaneous chains, will
not only depend on the risk of reneging but also on the population under consideration.
Interestingly, the benefits of allowing coordinated transplantation across the blood
type barrier are present in all population compositions we investigated, despite the in-
creased risk of match failure, and they become more substantial in populations with many
highly sensitized patients. Importantly, the benefits include more equitable transplant op-
portunities among patients.
Another observation in this study is that allocating unspecified or bridge donors di-
rectly to the waitlist if they cannot initiate a chain segment within the next exchange
round (in 3 months) reduces the waiting times for patients on the waitlist without re-
ducing the benefits for patients in the kidney exchange program. This criterion for chain
initiation and termination helps balance the fact that DPD and NEAD policies shift
transplants away from patients on the deceased donor wait list to patients in the kidney
exchange program. Finally, we find that the time between matching rounds has consid-
erable impact on the number of transplants that can be achieved. Allowing more time
means that the pool can build up and better exchange combinations can be identified.
Multi-center coordination of transplant modalities in kidney exchange is a di cult
task. Nevertheless, the present study suggests that the synergy of simultaneously coordi-
nating at least two such modalities, unspecified donation and transplantation across the
blood type barrier, increases both the number and the equitability of transplants. Using
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individual rationality guarantees for transplant centers may help to overcome some of
the coordination di culties with no harm to these benefits. Actual national experience
and thorough evaluation of implementation will be necessary to fully understand real life
e↵ects.
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Chapter 5
Health value analysis of allocation
policies in kidney exchange1
5.1 Introduction
For patients su↵ering from end-stage renal disease (ESRD), kidney transplantation has
been established as the preferred treatment (Wolfe et al., 1999). Compared to alter-
native renal replacement therapies, such as dialysis, it o↵ers substantial advantages in
terms of quality of life, patient survival, and costs (Port et al., 1993; Franke et al., 2003;
Winkelmayer et al., 2002): on average, patients who receive a kidney transplant live 10
years longer than patients who remain on dialysis (Port et al., 1993), while the long term
costs of transplantation are 4 to 5 times lower (Winkelmayer et al., 2002). Living donor
transplantation (LTx) is the most e↵ective treatment because graft survival after living
donor transplantation is generally twice as good as graft survival after deceased donor
transplantation (DTx)(SRTR, 2011).
Unfortunately, even though the number of living donor kidney transplants has in-
creased over recent years (Segev, 2012) (in many countries, including the US and the
Netherlands, the number of living donors has now surpassed the number of deceased
donors2), the number of kidneys available for transplantation is still largely insu cient to
meet demand: in Europe and the United States together, approximately 30 patients die
each day while waiting for a kidney transplant (European Society for Organ Transplan-
tation (ESOT), 2010; United States Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
(OPTN), 2011). A major part of the problem is that, even when a living donor is will-
1This chapter is based on (Glorie et al., 2014c).
2In fact, in the Netherlands more than half of the transplants now involve a living donor (Nederlandse
Transplantatie Stichting (NTS), 2012)
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ing to donate, in over 30 percent of the cases, the donor is incompatible with his or her
intended recipient due to blood type or crossmatch incompatibility (Segev et al., 2005b).
Kidney exchange (KE) is a modality that allows incompatible patient-donor pairs
to be matched with other incompatible pairs in order to proceed with transplantation
through an exchange procedure. In such a procedure, the donor of the first pair should be
compatible with the patient of the second pair, and the donor of the second pair should be
compatible with the patient of the first pair. The pairs then switch donors so that both
patients are able to receive a transplant (Rapaport, 1986). Kidney exchange procedures
are not limited to pairwise exchange, but can involve exchange cycles, and exchange chains
- which are initiated by altruistic donors - of arbitrary length. However, due to incentive
reasons (in order to prevent donors from withdrawing consent after their intended recipient
has received a transplant), all transplants in a cycle must be performed simultaneously.
Because of the large potential for increasing the number of kidney transplants, many
countries have now developed kidney exchange programmes (Park et al., 1999; Delmonico
et al., 2004; Keizer et al., 2005; Petrini et al., 2007).
Typically, the allocation of donors to patients in kidney exchange programs is de-
termined by a central authority. The allocation policy used by this authority has an
important e↵ect on the outcomes of the exchanges. It determines not only which patient-
donor pairs are involved in an exchange but also with whom they exchange. In this paper
we focus on health outcomes - in terms of quality adjusted life years (QALYs) - of var-
ious allocation policies proposed in the literature. Moreover, we compare these policies
to an allocation policy that maximizes the discounted sum of the quality adjusted life
years gained. Such a policy has been envisioned since the advent of kidney exchange
programmes (Zenios, 2002; Abraham et al., 2007), but to our knowledge, this paper is
the first to thoroughly model and evaluate it to centrally determine allocations in kidney
exchange as it is available today. We calculate an upper bound on the maximum health
value that can be achieved by any policy and show that our newly proposed policy comes
much closer to this bound than the other policies investigated.
Use of quality adjusted life years is commonly accepted as a prime decision criteria for
many medical interventions, following the framework of Health Technology Assessment
(Hutton et al., 2006; Guindo et al., 2012). However, it may conflict with criteria that
are currently used in most kidney exchange programs, such as maximizing the number of
transplants (Wolfe et al., 2008; Zenios, 2002). In this paper we develop a Markov model for
assessing the quality adjusted life years associated to particular kidney exchange policies.
The transition probabilities in our Markov model are patient-donor specific functions
related to characteristics as age, antigen mismatch, and gender. Using this model, we
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conduct long term simulations with kidney exchange data from the Netherlands, which
has the longest running national kidney exchange program (de Klerk et al., 2005). We then
evaluate policies in terms of quality adjusted life years and on the outcomes for several
traditional kidney exchange criteria such as equity, mortality and number of transplants.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the Markov model for de-
termining the health value outcomes. Section 5.3 describes the allocation policies under
consideration. Then, Section 5.4 details the simulation procedure by which the policies
are assessed. The results are presented in Section 5.5. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 An individualized health value model for kidney
exchange
In order to assess the quality adjusted life years gained from any kidney exchange alloca-
tion rule, we develop a patient and donor specific Markov chain model (see e.g. (Thijms,
2003)). Markov chain models are commonly used in the literature to analyze health out-
comes (see e.g. (de Wit et al., 1998)). A Markov chain model is a discrete statistical
process characterized by a set of states, transition probabilities between states, and an
initial distribution over states.
5.2.1 States
We define six states, consisting of five transient treatment states - (i) ‘ESRD’, (ii) ‘Renal
Function (RF) Recovery’, (iii) ‘LTx Recovery’, (iv) ‘DTx Recovery’, and (v) ‘KE Recovery’
- and one absorbing state, (vi) ‘Death’. The default treatment for ESRD is dialysis (i.e.
ESRD patients who do not receive a transplant are assumed to be treated with dialysis).
Recovery of renal function on dialysis is very rare, but may occur. In that case the
patient transitions to the ‘RF Recovery state’. The ‘LTx Recovery’ and ‘DTx Recovery’
states respectively represent recovery after a living and deceased donor transplant. The
state ‘KE Recovery’ represents the situation in which the patient successfully receives a
kidney exchange transplant. Although recovery after a kidney exchange transplant is in
principle similar to recovery after any other living donor transplant, the ‘KE Recovery’
state is added separately to allow us to capture the impact of the present matching
decision on the health outcomes by explicitly taking donor characteristics into account
in the transition probabilities (see below), whereas the ‘LTx Recovery’ state represents
a transplant from a presently unknown, future living donor. From each of the recovery
states it is also possible for patients to return to the ESRD state. This can for instance
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ESRD
RF Recovery
LTx Recovery
DTx Recovery
Death
KE Recovery
Figure 5.1: Individualized health value model: state space and transitions. The model
consists of six states with patient and donor specific transition probabilities.
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happen due to graft failure. Should a patient return to the ‘ESRD’ state from the ‘KE
Recovery’ state, possible future living donor allocations (for which the involved donor is
presently unknown) are modeled as transitions to the ‘LTx Recovery’ state (so this state
also captures future kidney exchange transplants). Figure 5.1 displays the state space
and possible transitions.
5.2.2 Transition probabilities
The transition probabilities are functions of patient and donor characteristics. Let us
denote a patient-donor pair participating in kidney exchange as X-Y , where X is the
patient and Y is the donor, and let N be the set of all patient-donor pairs. (NB. Patients
without donors can be indicated as X-;, and donors without patients, such as altruistic
donors, can be indicated as ;-Y .) In kidney exchange, a patient can only receive a
transplant from another donor if the patient’s own donor donates to some other patient.
Formally, an allocation µ : N ! N [ ; is a function such that if µ(X-Y ) = W -Z then
µ(W -Z) 6= ; for all X-Y , W -Z 2 N . This implies that if µ(X-Y ) = ;, the pair X-Y is
unmatched. We define:
pµij(X-Y ) :=
Pr[transition of X from state i to state j|X receives a transplant from µ(X-Y )]
Moreover, we have
pµii(X-Y ) := 1 
X
j 6=i
pµij(X-Y )
Transitions from the ‘ESRD’ state
At the start of the horizon, if a patient does not take part in a kidney exchange, he
or she starts in the ‘ESRD’ state. From the ‘ESRD’ state patients have three recovery
options: ‘RF Recovery’, ‘LTx Recovery’, and ‘DTx Recovery’. As explained in Section
5.2.1, future kidney exchange transplants, for which the donor is unknown, are implicitly
modeled through the ‘LTx Recovery’ state. The probability of obtaining a deceased or
direct living donor kidney transplant for an ESRD patient depends on the availability of
deceased and living donors, the probability of compatibility between patient and donor,
and, for deceased and altruistic donors, the allocation policy. If a patient does not recover
and does not die, it remains in the ‘ESRD’ state.
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Transition to the ‘DTx Recovery’ state
The probability of compatibility is based on blood types and PRA level. The probability
of obtaining a deceased donor transplant in a given period can be estimated by:
Pr[DTx|X-Y ] = Pr[DTx donor is allocated to blood type BLOX ] (1  PRAX)
where the allocation probability can be calculated from historical data over a given period
by:
Pr[DTx donor is allocated to blood type BLOX ] =
#DTx transplants for blood type BLOX
#patients of blood type BLOX on the waitlist
and where BLOX and PRAX respectively indicate the blood type and the PRA level
(on a 0 to 1 scale) of patient X. In order to estimate the allocation probability we use
historical Dutch data (see (Nederlandse Transplantatie Stichting (NTS), 2012)). Table
5.1 lists the annual allocation probabilities we use in our model per blood type category.
Blood type patient Probability
O .22
A .24
B .14
AB .34
Table 5.1: Annual probability that a suitable deceased donor becomes available and is
allocated to a patient of the indicated blood type
Transition to the ‘LTx Recovery’ state
The probability of obtaining a living donor kidney transplant can be calculated similarly.
However, because participants in kidney exchange programs have likely exhausted their
opportunities to find a compatible living donor (e.g. because they have asked most of
their family members and friends), the probabilities for the general patient population
are likely to be higher than the conditional probability for patients in a kidney exchange
program. Preliminary simulation experiments confirm this. In our model we therefore
adjust the general probabilities by a scaling factor. Our experiments suggest that a scaling
factor of .5 results in outcomes in concordance with historical data.
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The probability of obtaining a living donor transplant in a given period can be esti-
mated by:
Pr[LTx|X-Y ] = .5 · Pr[LTx donor is allocated to blood type BLOX ] (1  PRAX)
where the annual allocation probabilities per blood type category are as listed in Table
5.2.
Blood type patient Probability
O .22
A .27
B .12
AB .18
Scaling factor .5
Table 5.2: Annual probability that a suitable living donor is available to a patient of the
indicated blood type. For patients in a kidney exchange program the probabilities should
be multiplied with the provided scaling factor.
Transition to the ‘RF Recovery’ state
The probability of recovery of renal function after dialysis treatment is estimated at 1.1
% based on recovery rates described in (Chu and Folkert, 2010).
Transition to the ‘Death’ state
Transition to the ‘Death’ state depends on patient survival. We obtain mortality rates
for patients on dialysis from historical Dutch data (Registratie Nierfunctievervanging
Nederland (Renine), 2012). The annual mortality rates for patients on dialysis depend on
patient age and are respectively 3.3%, 11.4%, 17.4% and 28.5% for age categories 16-44,
45-64, 65-74 and above 75 years old.
Transitions from the ‘KE Recovery’ state
There are two possible transitions from the ‘KE Recovery’ state, transition to the ‘ESRD’
state and transition to the ‘Death’ state. If these two do not occur, patients remain in
the ‘KE Recovery’ state.
Transition to the ‘ESRD’ state
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Transition to the ‘ESRD’ state occurs if there is a match failure preventing transplanta-
tion, or if there is graft failure subsequent to the transplant.
There are various types of failure that may prevent kidney exchange matches from
going forward to transplantation. These include positive crossmatch after a negative
virtual crossmatch, desensitization failure, and patient or donor withdrawal for medical
or other reasons. Based on Dutch match failure data and in line with the medical literature
(Ashlagi et al., 2011b; Glorie et al., 2013), we model these types of failure using both an
exogenous probability of 12.5% and an endogenous probability calculated by the following
probit model:
Pr[Failure|X-Y ] =  ( 1.5007 + 0.0170 · PRAX) (5.1)
where   represents the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribu-
tion. For the derivation of these probabilities we refer to Appendix A.
In order to estimate the probability of graft failure, we build a model for graft failure
based on the medical literature. In (Laging et al., 2012) and (Laging et al., 2014) Dutch
data from 1990 to 2011 is used to identify factors influencing patient and graft survival.
Recipient age, HLA mismatch, donor type (living or deceased) and transplant year are
identified as significant factors. By employing all the parameters in (Laging et al., 2012)
and (Laging et al., 2014) to filter all the e↵ect factors except for time period after trans-
plant, we can get the estimated fit function for cumulative graft failure hazard rate. Given
a pair X-Y , the hazard rate  graft(t|X   Y ) in period t is:
 graft(t|X   Y ) = 0.0418t · exp( 0V AR(X Y ))
where 0.0418t is the estimated baseline hazard rate, the parameters   are as specified in
Table 5.3, and V AR(X Y ) represents the relevant explanatory variables. For the transplant
year variable the baseline is 2008, for all other variables it is 0.
Variable Coe cient
RECIPIENT AGE -0.0160
HLA MISMATCH .1017
DUMMY LIVING DONOR -.5058
TRANSPLANT YEAR -.0263
Table 5.3: Hazard rate parameters for graft failure
Transition to the ‘Death’ state
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As before, transition to the ‘Death’ state depends on patient survival. We estimate
the survival function similarly to the graft failure function described above. Again the
relevant variables are obtained from (Laging et al., 2012). Given a pair X-Y , the hazard
rate  survival(t|X   Y ) in period t is:
 survival(t|X   Y ) = 0.00926t · exp( 0V AR(X Y ))
where 0.00926t is the estimated baseline hazard rate, the parameters   are as specified in
Table 5.4, and V AR(X Y ) represents the relevant explanatory variables. Again, for the
transplant year variable the baseline is 2008, for all other variables it is 0.
Variable Coe cient
RECIPIENT AGE .06859
DUMMY LIVING DONOR 0.5749
TRANSPLANT YEAR -.0608
Table 5.4: Hazard rate parameters for patient survival
Transitions from other states
Since donor specific information is not known in the other states in the model, graft failure
and patient survival in these states are based on average donor characteristics. For the
‘LTx Recovery’ and ‘DTx Recovery’ states, we use the same graft survival and recipient
survival functions described in Section 5.2.2, but evaluate these functions using mean
values for the HLA mismatch (see Table 5.5).
Variable Mean value
HLA MISMATCH living 3
HLA MISMATCH deceased 2.6
Table 5.5: Mean values of HLA mismatch
For the ‘RF Recovery’ state we estimate mortality rates and dialysis recommencement
rates based on the numbers reported in (Craven et al., 2007). In particular, we estimate
the 3 monthly mortality rate at 4.5 % and the 3 monthly dialysis recommencement rate
at 13.5 %.
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5.2.3 Distribution over states
Let Aµ(X-Y ) = [pµij(X-Y )] be the matrix of transition probabilities and let I(k) denote
the probability distribution over states after k transitions (the entries of I(k) correspond
to the states ‘ESRD’, ‘RF Recovery’, ‘LTx Recovery’, ‘DTx Recovery’, ‘KE Recovery’,
and ‘Death’). It then holds that I(k + 1) can be recursively computed as
I(k + 1) = I(k) · Aµ(X-Y )
with I(0) = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] in case µ(X-Y ) = ; and I(0) = [Pr[Failure|X-Y ], 0, 0, 0, 1 
Pr[Failure|X-Y ], 0] otherwise. In other words, the initial distribution specifies a start
from the ‘ESRD’ state if patient X remains unmatched under µ and a start from the ‘KE
Recovery’ state if X is matched and there is no match failure, if there is match failure
X remains in the ‘ESRD’ state. The match failure probability Pr[Failure|X-Y ] is as
specified in equation (5.1).
5.2.4 Calculating QALYs gained
The Markov chain model is supplemented with information on quality of life per state.
We use two scenarios based on (de Wit et al., 1998) and (Kontodimopoulos and Niakas,
2008). The ‘optimistic’ scenario is based on (de Wit et al., 1998), which assessed quality
of life of patients with the EuroQol (EQ-5D) Instrument (EuroQol Group, 1990; Brooks,
1996) using Standard Gamble (Torrance et al., 1972) and Time Trade O↵ (Churchill et al.,
1987). The ‘pessimistic’ scenario is based on (Kontodimopoulos and Niakas, 2008), which
obtained estimates using the SF-36 Health Survey from which the preference based SF-6D
utility index was derived (Ara and Brazier, 2008). Let QoL(X) denote the quality of life
of patient X per state. The discounted quality adjusted life years gained Q(X-Y ) for
patient donor pair X-Y can be calculated as follows. Let t = 1, 2, . . . denote the time
periods, and let   indicate the discount rate. Assuming that transitions only take place
at the end of a period, we have
Q(X-Y ) =
1X
t=0
QoL(X)T I(t) · 1
(1 +  )(t)
In our case, the ’ESRD’ state is assigned a quality of life of .63, all recovery states
are assigned a quality of life of .90 in the optimistic scenario and .72 in the pessimistic
scenario. The ’Death’ state is assigned a quality of life of 0. Following the discussions
in the medical community (Luce, 1995; Bonneux and Birnie, 2001; Rittenhouse, 1996;
Gravelle and Smith, 2001; Jacobs et al., 1995), we use a discount rate for health benefits
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that is lower than the current discount rate of costs. In particular, we use a discount rate
for health benefits of 1 % per year in our optimistic scenario and 1.5 % per year in our
pessimistic scenario.
For each patient we compute the total discounted QALYs for a period of 25 years from
entry into the kidney exchange pool. We discount to the beginning of the horizon, which
in our simulations will be 1 January 2004 (see Section 5.4). Periods before a patient’s
entry date are not counted.
5.3 Allocation policies
5.3.1 Policies
In the literature on kidney exchange, various allocation policies have been suggested
(Ashlagi et al., 2011b; Keizer et al., 2005; Glorie et al., 2014d; Ferrari et al., 2011; Bo¨hmig
et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2007; Manlove and O’Malley, 2012; Kaplan et al., 2005; Hanto
et al., 2008). In this regard it is important to make a distinction between allocation
requirements that limit the number of feasible allocations, and thereby transplants, (e.g.
requiring donors to be in the same age category or have the same CMV-EBV serology as
their recipients) and actual allocation criteria that determine the selection of an allocation
from the set of feasible allocations (e.g. maximum number of transplants between donors
and recipients of the same blood type).
In line with current practice of kidney exchange programs, we focus on periodical
allocation policies. These are policies where patient-donor allocations are determined
periodically, i.e. after a certain amount of time has expired or after certain number of
new pairs have entered the program. These policies contrast with dynamic policies, in
which decisions are made dynamically and take into account the timing of exchanges and
the fact that patients and donors enter and leave the kidney exchange pool over time, to
optimize the desired allocation criteria in the long run.
Table 5.6 summarizes the policies under consideration. In our base case policy, we
consider the most commonly used allocation criteria, which is to maximize the total
number of transplants. The second policy we consider, is a hierarchical criterion policy,
which refines the primary criterion of maximizing the total number of transplants by
several tie breaking criteria. We consider the hierarchical criteria used in the Dutch kidney
exchange program (Keizer et al., 2005; Glorie et al., 2014d), which ranks allocations on
(i) number of transplants, (ii) number of blood type identical transplants, (iii) match
probabilities of matched patients (inverse ranking), (iv) longest cycle and chain length
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Policy Criteria Requirements*
MaxTrans Maximize # transplants None
Dutch Dutch hierarhical criteria None
MaxTransR Maximize # transplants HLA mismatch < 2, age di↵erence < 10
DutchR Dutch hierarhical criteria HLA mismatch < 2, age di↵erence < 10
MaxQaly Maximize QALYs None
* In addition to blood type and crossmatch compatibility
Table 5.6: Allocation policies
(inverse ranking), (v) smallest spread per cycle and chain over transplant centers, and
(vi) longest wait time, and selects the highest ranking allocation.
We consider two versions of each policy. In the first version only blood type and
crossmatch compatibility are considered as allocation requirements. In the second version,
additional requirements with respect to some common measures are formulated (see e.g.
Lucan (2007); Kute et al. (2013); Kim et al. (2007); Ycetin et al. (2013); Glorie et al.
(2014b)): in particular, we consider a maximum number of 2 HLA mismatches and a
maximum age di↵erence between donor and recipient of 10 years.
Finally we consider a policy which maximizes the total sum of discounted QALYs,
as calculated with the Markov model described in Section 5.2, for the entire patient
population.
In all policies listed above the maximum cycle and chain length is set to 3. In our
experiments we will also consider longer limits and set the cycle limit to 4 and chain limit
to 6 (except for the perfect information policy, where we set the limit to infinity). We
will indicate this by appending the policy names with ‘Long cycles and chains’.
5.3.2 Determining the allocation by mixed integer programming
Under the above allocation policies, for a given set of patient-donor pairs, the kidney ex-
change allocation problem corresponds to a cycle packing problem in a weighted directed
graph in which the nodes represent patient-donor pairs, the arcs represent the compat-
ibilities, and the weights on cycles in the graph correspond to priorities or weights on
matchings (Abraham et al., 2007; Glorie et al., 2014d). The goal is to find a maximum
weight exchange, i.e. a collection of non-overlapping cycles, such that no cycle exceeds
the bound on the number of possible simultaneously feasible transplants.
Let C(K,L) denote the collection of cycles and chains that are feasible with respect
to the bound on cycle length K and the bound on chain length L. Next, let us introduce
a binary decision variable xc for each cycle and chain c 2 C(K,L) that is defined as:
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xc =
(
1 if c is selected,
0 otherwise.
Let x =
⇥
x1, . . . , x|C(K,L)|
⇤T
denote the vector of decision variables and let w 2
R|C(K,L)|. The basic allocation problem can then be represented by the following Mixed
Integer Program:
P1:
max z(x) =
X
c2C(K,L)
wcxc (5.2)
s.t.
X
c2C(K,L):n2c
xc  1 8n 2 N (5.3)
xc 2 {0, 1} 8c 2 C(K,L)
Here, the objective (5.2) is to select a collection of cycles and chains that maximizes
z(x). The constraints (5.3) ensure that no patient or donor is contained in more than one
selected cycle or chain. When the objective is to maximize the number of transplants,
the weights wc are equal to |c|.
For the other objective criteria listed in Table 5.6 the weights may be di↵erent and
some additional variables and constraints may be needed. For a detailed description we
refer to (Glorie et al., 2014d). In principle, all of the criteria mentioned above can be
represented by the following general model. In addition to the decision vector x, let y
denote a n⇥ 1 vector of auxilliary variables which are allowed to assume values in some
subspace F ✓ Rn, for n 2 N. Also, for m 2 N, let v 2 Rn, A 2 Rm⇥|C(K,L)|, B 2 Rm⇥n,
and b 2 Rm. Then the following MIP solves the allocation problem for a general class of
objective criteria:
P2:
max z(x, y) = wTx+ vTyi (5.4)
s.t. Ax+ By  b (5.5)
x 2 {0, 1}|C(K,L)|
y 2 F
The constrains (5.5), which are formulated in a very general way, allow to model the
objective criteria at hand. For instance, for the policy of maximizing the total sum of
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discounted QALYs we set wc equal to the total discounted QALYs for the entire cycle c
if it is selected and define an auxiliary variable yn for each node n 2 N that is defined as:
yn =
(
1 if n is not selected,
0 otherwise.
and we set vn equal to the total discounted sum of QALYs for node i if it is not selected.
The MaxQaly policy can then be solved by the following model:
P3:
max z(x, y) =
X
c2C(K,L)
wcxc +
X
n2N
vnyn (5.6)
s.t.
X
c2C(K,L):n2c
xc + yn = 1 8n 2 N
xc 2 {0, 1} 8c 2 C(K,L)
yn   0 8n 2 N
In all cases the above Mixed Integer Programs may be solved by a branch-and-price
algorithm in which the cycles and chains are generated when this is required by their
reduced cost criterion in the simplex method. For a detailed description we refer to
(Abraham et al., 2007; Glorie et al., 2014d).
5.3.3 Determining the maximum possible gain in health value
We would like to understand how far away the periodical policies described in Table 5.6
are from the maximum possible gain in health value over a given time horizon. To this end
we calculate an upper bound on the total discounted quality adjusted life years that could
be gained over the horizon under consideration if we were to have perfect information at
the beginning of the horizon. We do this by solving problem P3 for the entire horizon at
once. In this case, the weights wc are set equal to the total discounted sum of QALYs for
the entire cycle c if it is selected at the earliest possible date. This ‘perfect information
policy’ represents essentially the best possible dynamic policy over the horizon.
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5.4 Simulator
We evaluate health outcomes by simulations based on historical data from the Dutch
national kidney exchange program. This simulator is described in detail in (Glorie et al.,
2013). In this section we will briefly explain the main aspects of the data and simulation
procedures.
5.4.1 Data
The data for our simulator is obtained from the Dutch Transplant Foundation and origi-
nates from the empirical registry of the Dutch national kidney exchange program. It in-
cludes 438 incompatible patient-donor pairs who participated in Dutch kidney exchanges
between October 2003 and January 2011. In addition it contains 109 unspecified donors,
i.e. donors without a specified recipient, who were screened at one of the seven Dutch
transplant centers during that period. A patient is considered to be incompatible with
a donor whenever the donor’s blood type contains a protein that is not contained in the
patient’s blood type, or whenever the donor has a HLA type that is unacceptable to the
patient, otherwise the patient and donor are compatible.
5.4.2 Simulations
Dynamic simulations are conducted by performing repeated Monte Carlo simulations.
Each such simulation spans the period between 1 October 2003 and 23 December 2010 and
involves a population of size 547 generated from the empirical data using sampling with
replacement. The arrivals of patient-donor pairs and unspecified donors are determined
by assigning each pair and each unspecified donor in the sampled population a random
date in the simulation period. Arrival dates are drawn uniformly, corresponding to a
Poisson arrival process. Matching rounds are conducted every three months, starting
from 1 January 2004. In each matching round, an allocation is determined based on
the specified allocation policy. The underlying optimization problem is solved by the
algorithm described in (Glorie et al., 2014d) and as specified in Section 5.3. There are
a total of 29 matching rounds during the simulation period. Proposed matches may fail
to go forward to transplantation because a final crossmatch test between the donor and
the intended recipient is positive, because of desensitization failure, or because of patient
or donor withdrawal for medical, psychological or other reasons. Based on Dutch match
failure data, we simulate this with both an exogenous probability and an endogenous
probability depending on the patient and donor characteristics (see Appendix A). In
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case of match failure the optimization algorithm is rerun with the updated compatibility
information. This process is repeated until a feasible matching is found.
5.4.3 Statistical analysis
For each simulation run the total discounted quality adjusted life years gained are calcu-
lated using the model and approach described in Section 5.2. Then, for each policy the
average results over 30 simulation runs are computed. Significance of di↵erence in results
between policies is tested using the sign test.
5.5 Results
Figures 5.2-5.6 display the outcomes of our simulations using the procedure described in
Section 5.4.
Figure 5.2 shows the average health value per policy measured in discounted quality
adjusted life years for the entire patient population (both transplanted and not trans-
planted patients). It is interesting to observe that the MaxTrans policy and the Dutch
policy perform equivalently in both the optimistic and the pessimistic scenario. In the
optimistic scenario, both policies result in an average of 9.7 discounted QALYs (7.7 in
the pessimistic scenario), which is 3.6 QALYs more than if no kidney exchanges would be
performed (2.5 QALYs in the pessimistic scenario). The additional hierarchical criteria
included in the Dutch policy compared to the single criterion MaxTrans policy do not ap-
pear to result in a comparative gain in health value. Furthermore, the restricted versions
of both policies, with requirements set so as to improve the transplant quality, turn out
to be so restrictive that the average health value is comparable to not performing kidney
exchanges at all.
On the other hand, if all matching decisions would be made based on perfect infor-
mation so as to optimize the total health value, this would entail an average of 11.6
discounted QALYs gained (8.9 in the pessimistic scenario). This is a theoretical upper
bound, however, since in practice perfect information is not at hand. If we were to employ
our periodical MaxQaly allocation policy, which does not rely on perfect information and
which is like the MaxTrans and the Dutch policy but with an objective of maximizing
health value, an average of 10.3 discounted quality adjusted life years could be gained (8.0
in the pessimistic scenario). This is an increase of .6 discounted quality adjusted life years
over current practice (P < 0.0001) and it is 32 % closer to the upper bound. Allowing
longer cycle and chain lengths (up to length 4 cycles and length 6 chains) does increase
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the health value gains slightly further and preserves the di↵erences between the various
policies.
Figure 5.2: Average health value in discounted quality adjusted life years per policy in
two scenarios. Bars correspond to the optimistic scenario and error bars correspond to
the pessimistic scenario.
Next, we consider the number of transplants (Figure 5.3). The figure clearly shows that
the average number of transplants achieved under the policies MaxTrans (352.5), Dutch
(355.2), and MaxQaly (351.3) is not significantly di↵erent (P = .2923) and is similar in
both scenarios. It also becomes evident how restrictive the restricted policies are, as under
these policies almost no matches can be made. In case of perfect information however,
372.9 transplants could be achieved on average. The additional transplants achieved
under this policy account for a large part of the gain in health value observed for this
policy (Figure 5.2). Under the periodic policies (MaxTrans, Dutch and MaxQaly) there is
therefore still potential to exploit dynamics to achieve more matches and hence generate
more health value.
To provide more insights into the distribution of health value, we will also consider
the health value for each of several patient groups. Figure 5.4 displays the average health
value for matched and unmatched patients per policy. As expected, matched patients
achieve a substantially higher health value than unmatched patients under all policies.
It is interesting to see, however, that under the MaxQaly policy the unmatched patients
achieve a significantly higher health value than under the MaxTrans and Dutch policy (6.7
versus, respectively, 5.2 and 5.1 in the positive scenario (P<0.0001) and 5.7 versus 4.5 and
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Figure 5.3: Average number of matches per policy in two scenarios. Bars correspond to
the optimistic scenario and error bars correspond to the pessimistic scenario.
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4.4 in the negative scenario (P<0.0001)). Matched patients, on the other hand, achieve a
similar health value under these three policies (11.1 versus, respectively, 10.8 and 10.8 in
the positive scenario (P<0.0001), and 8.5 for all three policies in the pessimistic scenario).
This likely occurs because the patients with the worst prospects if they were to be left
unmatched are matched under the MaxQaly policy. For both matched and unmatched
patients it is theoretically possible to achieve an even higher health value, as is evidenced
by the perfect information policy.
Figure 5.4: Average health value in discounted quality adjusted life years for matched
and unmatched patients per policy in two scenarios. Bars correspond to the optimistic
scenario and error bars correspond to the pessimistic scenario.
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 provide a distribution of the average health value over blood
types and age categories. Overall, prospects are best for type AB patients and worst for
type O patients. Type A and type B patients are in between. The distribution for the
Dutch policy di↵ers only marginally from the distribution for the MaxTrans policy. The
MaxQaly policy, however, constitutes a higher health value for all blood types than under
the Dutch policy. In particular, there is a substantial gain for type O patients (9.5 versus
8.7 in the optimistic scenario (P < 0.0001) and 7.4 versus 7.1 in the pessimistic scenario
(P < 0.0001)).
For all policies we observe a substantial di↵erence in health value for patients of
di↵erent age. Even under the Dutch policy elderly patients have a substantially lower
health value than younger patients. An important question is therefore whether elderly
patients are not disproportionally disadvantaged compared to younger patients when a
policy with the objective of maximizing the discounted sum of quality adjusted life years
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is applied. Figure 5.6 shows that this need not be the case as, for short cycles and chains,
the health value of patients of 75 years and older is equivalent under the MaxQaly policy
and the Dutch policy in both scenarios. Equivalence also holds for long cycles and chains
in the pessimistic scenario, but not in the optimistic scenario.
Figure 5.5: Average health value in discounted quality adjusted life years per blood
type per policy in two scenarios. Bars correspond to the optimistic scenario and error
bars correspond to the pessimistic scenario.
Figure 5.6: Average health value in discounted quality adjusted life years per age cat-
egory per policy in two scenarios. Bars correspond to the optimistic scenario and error
bars correspond to the pessimistic scenario.
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5.6 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we have performed a health value analysis of allocation policies for kidney
exchange. The basis for our analysis is an individualized Markov health value model which
can be linked to a mixed integer programming model. In combination with evidence based
data and survival analysis, we have used discrete event simulation to compare existing
policies to a new policy that aims to maximize health value. We have also calculated an
upper bound on the maximum health value attainable by any policy.
Interestingly, we found that policies that directly impose allocation restrictions to
increase the health outcomes - such as restrictions on the acceptable HLA mismatch or on
the age di↵erence between recipients and donors - may actually be detrimental to the total
health value. This is particularly so if the imposed restrictions severely limit the recipient-
donor matches that can be made. Also, we found that additional hierarchical allocation
criteria beyond maximizing the number of transplants, in particularly those currently used
in practice in the Dutch kidney exchange program, do not lead to a significant di↵erence
in health outcomes.
The health value policy we propose performs significantly better in terms of health
outcomes than the other policies tested. Of course, use of quality adjusted life years may
conflict with criteria that are currently used in most kidney exchange programs, such as
maximizing the number of transplants. In particular, there may be concern that a focus
on maximizing health value may be detrimental to the number of transplants that are
performed. However, our findings do not indicate a significant e↵ect on the number of
transplants if our health value maximizing policy would be adopted.
Analyzing the allocations made under our proposed policy, we find that patients with
relatively poor prospects if left unmatched are matched more often than in the other
policies we tested. The result is that our proposed policy especially benefits quality of life
for unmatched patients. In particular, type O patients benefit from the gains in health
value. Furthermore, and perhaps non-obviously, we find that elderly patients need not be
disadvantaged by using health value to determine allocations. For short cycle and chain
lengths, the simulation results yield no significant di↵erence in health outcomes for elderly
patients between the proposed policy and the present Dutch policy. Hence, the proposed
maximum health value policy need not reduce equity.
Although our health value policy improves on the other policies investigated, its per-
formance is of course dependent on the way in which health value is measured and on the
clinical data with which it is evaluated. Our individualized health value model is based on
several models described in the medical literature and their underlying assumptions. Even
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though these models and assumptions have been carefully reviewed and, where possible,
tested with clinical data, there may be factors a↵ecting health outcomes that lay beyond
our health value model such as recipient health status at time of transplant, quality of pa-
tient and donor screening and preparation, and medical and psychological follow-up after
transplant. The clinical data used in our simulations to evaluate the allocation policies is
taken from the longest running national kidney exchange program in the world and we
have used two scenarios for the parameter values for quality of life and the discount rate.
Finally, we note that even though the health value policy we propose improves sub-
stantially over current practice, further improvements in health outcomes are still possible.
This is evidenced by our perfect information policy which serves as an upper bound on the
maximum health value that can be achieved by any policy. We estimate that a further
improvement of up to 12.6 % in health outcomes is possible with respect to our pro-
posed policy. In line with what we have discussed above, further refinement of the health
model and data form one direction for improvement. Another direction is for the match-
ing algorithms to better anticipate information about future patient and donor arrivals.
This appears to be particularly promising as end stage renal disease and participation
in donor programs typically occur after lengthy health service trajectories. Optimization
algorithms, such as the algorithm used in our perfect information policy, can then take
information about future patients and donors into account when determining the alloca-
tion. The last direction we would like to mention is the inclusion of compatible pairs in
kidney exchange programs by the promise of increased quality of life compared to a direct
transplant.
In spite of the fact that the use of quality adjusted life years is commonly accepted as a
primary decision criteria for many medical interventions, its use in deciding on allocations
in kidney exchange may be controversial. We hope our research may provide guidance to
policy makers as to what the consequences in terms of health outcomes will be when health
value maximization is considered as a primary decision criterion. Conversely our study
shows the impact on (loss of) health value, when other criteria are considered instead. As
we believe that consideration of health outcomes is equally appropriate to consider as it
is for many other health problems, we hope the proposed health value model may serve
as a reference framework in future research, to the benefit of the patients su↵ering from
end stage renal disease across the globe.
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Robust barter exchange1
6.1 Introduction
We consider the centralized organization of barter exchange markets. Barter exchange
markets are markets in which agents seek to directly trade their goods with each other
(Abraham et al., 2007; Glorie et al., 2014d). The trades in such markets consist of
trading cycles in which each agent gives a good to the next agent in the cycle (Shapley
and Scarf, 1974; Roth et al., 2007). Alternatively, the trades may consist of chains which
are started by an agent that provides a good without requiring a good in return and end
with an agent that receives a good without providing one (Anderson et al., 2014). Barter
exchanges find a natural application in kidney exchange programs, which aim to enable
transplants between incompatible donor-patient pairs (Rapaport, 1986; Roth et al., 2004;
Glorie et al., 2014b). Other applications include house exchanges (in which agents seek
to simultaneously buy each others houses, see for example www.besthouseswap.com),
shift exchanges (e.g., between nurses in hospitals), intra-organizational skilled worker
exchanges (e.g., between projects or departments), and book exchanges (see for example
www.readitswapit.co.uk).
In this research we focus on barter exchange markets in which proposed transactions
must be verified before they can proceed. Proposed transactions may fail to go forward if
verification fails or if a participant withdraws. In housing markets, for example, it should
be checked whether the participants in a transaction meet the financing requirements.
In kidney exchange, proposed ‘transactions’ must be checked with a so-called crossmatch
test to ensure the success of eventual transplants, and patients and donors may withdraw
1This chapter is based on (Glorie et al., 2014a).
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at the last moment due to medical, psychological or other reasons (Delmonico et al., 2004;
de Klerk et al., 2005; Glorie et al., 2013).
In order to prevent agents from withdrawing from the market after they have received
their desired good, but before they have given up the good with which they came to the
market, trades are typically organized simultaneously (Segev et al., 2005b; Glorie et al.,
2014b). This poses a natural constraint on the length of trading cycles as they cannot
exceed the number of logistically feasible simultaneous transactions.
In our setting, the market is cleared by a central authority (Roth et al., 2005a). The
clearing problem for this authority is to select a set of agents in such a way that each
selected agent can trade with another agent in the set (Abraham et al., 2007; Manlove
and O’Malley, 2012; Constantino et al., 2013; Glorie et al., 2014d). The corresponding
transactions are then verified (i.e. in kidney exchange the patient-donor pairs involved
are notified and the final crossmatch tests are performed). In case one or more proposed
transactions fail, a new set of agents may be selected. The new set should be as close
as possible to the initial set in order to minimize the material and emotional costs of the
alteration. The objective is to maximize the number of transactions going forward.
A possible approach to market clearing in uncertain markets is to consider the ex-
pected number of transactions that can go forward (see e.g. (Pedroso, 2013; Awasthi
and Sandholm, 2009)). However, considering the expectation is not always tractable or
desirable. For instance, in kidney exchange there is a class of patients who are highly sen-
sitized, which means that these patients are compatible with only a very small fraction
of kidney donors. The rare matching opportunities that exist for these patients should
be protected against failure. Failure to match highly sensitized patients has led to the
accumulation of these patients in kidney exchange pools and in substantially longer wait-
ing times and higher mortality for these patients (Ashlagi et al., 2013). In this research
we focus on robustness metrics (see e.g. (Ben-Tal et al., 2009)) that allow us to specify
the desired level of protection from uncertainty. A substantial advantage of using robust
optimization is that it requires no assumptions on the underlying probability distribution.
We consider various recourse policies that determine the allowed actions after an ini-
tial subset of transactions is proposed for verification. In our first policy, called simple
recourse, we take into account costs (or missed gains) for failing transactions. Although
this policy does not allow failing transaction cycles to be recovered, it does allow better de-
cisions to be made regarding the set of transactions that is initially proposed because the
possibility of failure is taken into account. In the second policy, called back-arcs recourse,
we allow part of a failing transaction cycle to be recovered if the remaining participants
in the cycle can trade among themselves. In our last policy, full recourse, we allow for a
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complete recovery of the initial solution using alternative transactions. We develop robust
models for each of the recourse policies. In all cases, the optimum clearing problem is
a combinatorial optimization problem that is modeled as a vertex-disjoint cycle packing
problem in an unreliable digraph. The arcs and nodes of this graph are subject to failure.
Barter exchange has received substantial attention in recent years, particularly due
to the impact of kidney exchange. The clearing problem in barter exchange was first
presented in (Shapley and Scarf, 1974). The idea of using trading chains in addition to
trading cycles was presented in (Roth et al., 2004). (Roth et al., 2007) studied the rel-
evant bounds on trading cycles due to simultaneous exchange. (Abraham et al., 2007)
formulated the clearing problem with bounded cycles as a cycle packing problem in a di-
graph and provided a branch-and-price algorithm to solve it. Their approach worked well
for trading cycles and chains involving up to three agents. (Glorie et al., 2014d) showed
how the pricing problem could be solved e ciently in the cycle and chain length, thereby
allowing the branch-and-price approach to scale better to longer cycles and chains. (Con-
stantino et al., 2013) did a systematic comparison of several compact and non-compact
formulations for barter exchange and concluded that the cycle packing formulation is
strongest.
Failure in barter exchange was first considered in (Awasthi and Sandholm, 2009), which
heuristically solved the online clearing problem using scenario sampling to minimize regret
over several future scenarios. (Dickerson et al., 2012) presented an alternative heuristic
learning approach to deal with uncertain future scenarios. Their approach relied on
using weighted myopia. (Dickerson et al., 2013) studied optimizing the set of proposed
transactions with probabilistic failures, but allowed no recourse to recover trading cycles.
Their approach resembles our simple recourse policy in a probabilistic setting. (Molinaro
and Ravi, 2013) and (Goel and Tripathi, 2012) considered failures in a bilateral exchange
setting where transactions that verify positively must be executed.
Possibilities for recourse were considered in (Manlove and O’Malley, 2012). They in-
troduced the notion of back-arcs recourse, as we use it in this paper, and gave preference
to cycles containing back-arcs in the clearing problem. Back-arcs recourse was also con-
sidered by (Pedroso, 2013) in a stochastic optimization setting. However, their approach
was computationally very expensive. To the extent of our knowledge, we are the first to
explicitly consider failures and full recourse policies in an optimization model for barter
exchanges.
We also would like to place our research in the general context of robust optimization.
Robust optimization was first introduced by (Soyster, 1973). Under the assumption of
‘unknown but bounded’ data, the goal was to optimize the objective value while guar-
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anteeing feasibility with respect to all realizations of the data within the considered ‘un-
certainty set’. Because Soyster’s approach tends to provide very conservative solutions,
Kouvelis and Yu (1997); Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (1997, 1998); El Ghaoui and Lebret
(1997); El Ghaoui et al. (1998) developed new robust optimization frameworks for Integer
Programming and Convex Programming that allow adjusting the size and shape of the
uncertainty set to allow for a balance between feasibility and the attainable objective
value. Both static and dynamic approaches to robust optimization have been considered
(Bertsimas and Thiele, 2006). In a static uncertain optimization problem, all decisions
have to be made before the actual realizations of the parameters are known. In a dynamic
uncertain optimization problem, some decisions - the so-called ‘recourse actions’ - may be
made after the parameters values are known (Ben-Tal et al., 2004; Atamturk and Zhang,
2007; Chen et al., 2007; Bertsimas and Caramanis, 2010). Dynamic problems are referred
to as two-stage or multi-stage problems, depending on the number of stages in which
the decisions can be made. (Ben-Tal et al., 2004) show that two-stage robust linear pro-
gramming is computationally intractable and propose a tractable alternative referred to
as a nely adjustable robust linear programming. A nely adjustable robustness requires
the recourse decision variables to be an a ne function of the realizations of the uncertain
parameters.
The problem considered in this paper can be classified as a two-stage dynamic uncer-
tain optimization problem. In contrast to the robust optimization approaches discussed
above, our focus is not on maintaining feasibility in all scenarios, but instead on maximiz-
ing the gains of trade in the worst-case scenario in our uncertainty set. Transactions that
are infeasible after second stage recourse actions, are considered as lost transactions. As
our problem, including the recourse actions, can be modeled by mixed integer programs,
our solution approaches can be considered as generalizations of the above techniques for
adjustable robust mixed integer programming. However, in our solution approaches we
rely on the specific structure of our problem. The delayed scenario generation approach
we use for our full-recourse policy may be applicable to general mixed integer uncertain
optimization problems, provided that appropriate bounds can be derived for solving the
scenario generation subproblem. Scenario generation has been considered in stochastic
programming (see e.g. Casey and Sen (2005)), but to the extent of our knowledge we are
the first to consider it for adjustable robust optimization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides a math-
ematical description of the robust exchange problem. It first presents a general model
for market uncertainty and then details the simple recourse, back-arcs recourse, and full
recourse policies. Sections 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 describe our theoretical results for each of
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these recourse policies. Section 6.6 considers a method to refine the robust solution by
embedding the robust optimization criteria in a hierarchical set of criteria. Section 6.7
then provides computational results. Finally, Section 6.8 concludes.
6.2 Mathematical problem description
6.2.1 A model for market uncertainty
We model the exchange market as follows. Let D = (N,A) denote an unreliable digraph
where the node set N represents the agents and the arc set A represents the possible
transactions (see Figure 6.1 for an example). Furthermore, let N = NS [ NU where NS
is the set of agents requiring a good in return for their own good, and NU is the set of
agents that provide a good without requiring a good in return. A length-l cycle is an arc
traversal hn1, . . . , nli such that {n1, . . . , nl} ✓ NS, (nl, n1) 2 A and, for every 1  i < l,
(ni, ni+1) 2 A. A length l chain is an arc traversal hn1, . . . , nli such that n1 2 NU ,
{n2, . . . , nl} ✓ NS and for every 1  i < l, (ni, ni+1) 2 A. Next, let k 2 Z+ denote the
maximum size of trading cycles and chains2. Then a solution to the clearing problem
corresponds to a set of vertex disjoint cycles and chains in D with length at most k.
Let U ✓ P(N [A), where P(N [A) denotes the power set of N [A, be the collection
of possible ‘scenarios’ of ultimately available nodes and arcs, i.e. the transactions that
can go forward after verification. In what follows we consider U := {u ✓ N [ A :
B⇣u  b, ⇣u 2 {0, 1}|N |+|A|}, where B is a given matrix, b is a given vector and where
⇣u =
h
⇣u1 , . . . , ⇣
u
|N |, ⇣
u
|N |+1, . . . , ⇣
u
|N |+|A|
iT
with
⇣ui =
8><>:
1 if i  |N | and node i is available in the recourse stage,
1 if i > |N | and arc i is available in the recourse stage,
0 otherwise.
For ease of exposition we will denote with u⇣ the scenario specified by the vector ⇣.
Furthermore, we will denote with ⇣un and ⇣
u
a the elements of ⇣
u referring to, respectively,
node n 2 N and arc a 2 A. A scenario set can, for example, be characterized as the
set of scenarios in which at most p % of nodes fail. This would correspond to the set
U := {u ✓ N [ A :Pn2N ⇣un   |N |(1  p),Pa2A ⇣ua   |A|, ⇣u 2 {0, 1}|N |+|A|}. We do not
require the probability distribution over the set of scenarios to be known.
2Although, in some applications, the maximum cycle and chain length may be di↵erent, we use a single
limit in this paper. This corresponds for instance to the maximum number of simultaneous transplants
in kidney exchange.
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Figure 6.1: Example of an exchange market digraph. There are 5 agents, represented
by the nodes n1, . . . , n5. The arcs in the graph represent the possible transactions: an
arc between nodes ni and nj indicates that agent nj is interested in the good of agent ni.
The graph has 4 feasible trading cycles, c1 = hn1, n2i , c2 = hn2, n3i , c3 = hn3, n4i , c4 =
hn1, n2, n3, n5i. A solution to the clearing problem could, for instance, consist of cycles c1
and c3 since these are vertex disjoint.
N.B. If we choose U := {N [ A}, the above model corresponds to the standard determin-
istic exchange model as considered in (Abraham et al., 2007; Constantino et al., 2013;
Glorie et al., 2014d).
6.2.2 The robust exchange problem
The robust exchange problem is to determine a solution to the clearing problem that is
robust against market uncertainty.
Denote with Du = (Nu, Au) the subgraph of D induced by a scenario u 2 U. Fur-
thermore, denote with C(k) and Cu(k) the set of all cycles and chains in, respectively, D
and Du with cardinality at most k. If C⇤ ✓ C(k) is a solution to the clearing problem
in D (the planned solution which is proposed for verification) then if scenario u 2 U
occurs after verification, an alternative solution C⇤u ✓ Cu(k) in Du may be considered
(the e↵ective solution).
Let us introduce decision variables
Xc =
(
1 if cycle c 2 C(k) is selected in the planned solution,
0 otherwise.
Then the robust exchange problem is given by
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max
X
min
u2U
R(X, u) (6.1)
s.t.
X
c2C(k):n2c
Xc  1 8 n 2 N (6.2)
X 2 {0, 1}|C(k)| (6.3)
where R(X, u) specifies the objective value attained under the recourse policy for the
planned solution X and the scenario u 2 U. The objective (6.1) is to maximize some
objective value, as determined by the selected recourse policy (see below), in the worst
case scenario. The packing constraints (6.2) guarantee that each agent can be involved in
at most one trading cycle or chain.
Since the set of scenarios U is finite, the robust exchange problem can alternatively be
formulated as:
RE(U) :=
max
Z,X
Z (6.4)
s.t. Z  R(X, u) 8 u 2 U (6.5)X
c2C(k):n2c
Xc  1 8 n 2 N (6.6)
Z 2 R+ (6.7)
X 2 {0, 1}|C(k)| (6.8)
Here, Z is an auxilliary decision variable and Constraints (6.5) specify that the worst
case is taken with respect to the uncertainty set U.
6.2.3 Simple recourse
We will first consider the so-called simple recourse policy. In this policy we take into
account costs (or missed gains) for failing transactions. In other words, under this policy
the alternative solution that may be selected after verifying the planned transactions,
consists only of the cycles and chains in the planned solution for which all nodes and arcs
are available. Although this policy does not allow failing trading cycles or chains to be
recovered, it ostensibly allows better decisions to be made regarding the set of transactions
that is initially proposed because the possibility of failure is explicitly taken into account.
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Let f : A ! R be a weight function over the arcs in D, such that f(a) indicates the
benefit associated to executing the transaction represented by the arc a 2 A. Next, let
wc :=
P
a2c f(a) denote the benefit associated to executing a cycle or chain c 2 C(k), let
X indicate a planned solution, and let u 2 U. Then, the simple recourse policy is defined
as:
RSimple(X, u) :=
X
c2C(k)
wcXc  
X
c2C(k):c/2Cu(k)
wcXc (6.9)
=
X
c2C(k)
wcXc  
X
c2C(k)
(1 
Y
n2c
⇣un
Y
a2c
⇣ua )wcXc
=
X
c2C(k)
(wcXc
Y
n2c
⇣un
Y
a2c
⇣ua )
If the weights wc are set equal to the number of nodes in each cycle or chain c 2 C(k),
then RSimple(X, u) equals the number of nodes belonging to cycles and chains that are in
the planned solution X and are feasible in scenario u.
Although the simple recourse policy may appear to be very restrictive as it does not
allow failing trading cycles or chain to be recovered, this restrictiveness corresponds to
current practice in some kidney exchange programs. In these programs it is simply not
possible to recover match failures in a timely fashion and the patients and donors involved
in a failing cycle or chain are left in the exchange pool until the next matching round.
By taking the possibility of failure already into account in the primary decision stage, the
simple recourse model allows better decisions to be made even for those programs.
6.2.4 Back-arcs recourse
The next recourse policy we consider is the so-called back-arcs recourse policy (see Manlove
and O’Malley (2012)). The idea is to allow part of a failing transaction cycle to be re-
covered if the remaining participants in the cycle can trade among themselves. We begin
with the following definition:
Definition 6.1. Let D = (N,A) be a digraph and let c be a cycle in D. An arc a =
(i, j) 2 A is a back-arc for c if i 2 c and j 2 c but a /2 c.
As for the simple recourse policy, let f : A! R be a weight function over the arcs in
D, such that f(a) indicates the benefit associated to executing the transaction represented
by the arc a 2 A. Also, let wc :=
P
a2c f(a) denote the benefit associated to executing a
cycle c 2 C(k).
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Furthermore, let X indicate a planned solution, let A(X) ✓ A denote the set of arcs
included in cycles and chains selected in X, and let Aˆ(X) ✓ A denote the set of back-arcs
for cycles selected in X. Finally, let Dˆu = (Nu, Au \ (A(X) [ Aˆ(X)) denote the recourse
graph in scenario u 2 U and denote with Cˆu(k) the set of all cycles and chains in Dˆu with
cardinality at most k.
We introduce the following additional decision variables:
Xuc =
8><>:
1 if cycle or chain c 2 C(k) is selected in the recourse solution
under scenario u 2 U,
0 otherwise.
Then, the back-arcs recourse policy is defined as:
RBack-arcs(X, u) :=
max
Xu
X
c2Cˆu(k)
wcX
u
c (6.10)
s.t.
X
c2Cˆu(k):n2c
Xuc  1 8 n 2 Nu (6.11)
Xu 2 {0, 1}|C(k)|
The recourse objective (6.10) maximizes the benefit of the transactions selected in the
final solution given a specific scenario u 2 U. Constraints (6.11) ensure that agents can
be selected at most once in the final solution.
6.2.5 Full recourse
The last recourse policy we consider, called full recourse, allows for a complete recovery
of the planned solution using alternative transactions. We are interested in determining
a planned and alternative solution such that the number of nodes in the intersection of
both solutions is maximized.
As in the back-arcs recourse policy, let us use the following additional decision vari-
ables:
Xuc =
8><>:
1 if cycle or chain c 2 C(k) is selected in the recourse solution
under scenario u 2 U,
0 otherwise.
Futhermore, let X indicate a planned solution and let u 2 U. Then, the full recourse
policy is defined as:
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RFull(X, u) :=
max
Xu
X
c2Cu(k)
0@X
n2c
X
c02C(k):n2c0
Xc0
1AXuc (6.12)
s.t.
X
c2Cu(k):n2c
Xuc  1 8 n 2 Nu (6.13)
Xu 2 {0, 1}|C(k)|
The recourse objective (6.12) maximizes the number of nodes selected in both the
initial and the final solution given a specific scenario u 2 U (the quantity between paren-
thesis specifies the number of nodes of cycle c that are part of the initial solution). Con-
straints(6.13) ensure that nodes can be selected at most once in the final solution.
Alternatively, the full recourse function may be expressed directly in terms of the
uncertainty vector ⇣:
RFull(X, u) =
max
Xu
X
c2C(k)
0@X
n2c
X
c02C(k):n2c0
Xc0
1AXuc
s.t.
X
c2C(k):n2c
Xuc  ⇣un 8 n 2 N (6.14)X
c2C(k):a2c
Xuc  ⇣ua 8 a 2 A (6.15)
Xu 2 {0, 1}|C(k)|
Here constraints (6.14) guarantee that all nodes in the cycles in the final solution are
available. Constraints (6.15) do the same for arcs.
6.3 Solving the robust exchange problem with simple
recourse
In this section we consider solving the robust exchange problem with simple recourse. The
first di culty in solving the robust exchange problem, regardless of the form of recourse, is
that the number of scenarios, and hence the number of constraints (6.5) in our formulation
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(6.4)-(6.8), may be too large to solve the problem directly as a mixed integer program.
However, given a planned solution X, we can compute the worst case scenario by solving:
A(X) := minu2U R(X, u) =
min
⇣
R(X, u⇣) (6.16)
s.t. B⇣  b (6.17)
⇣ 2 {0, 1}|N |+|A| (6.18)
Let us call this problem the ‘adversary’s problem’. The objective (6.16) is to minimize
the benefits after recourse actions are performed. Constraints (6.17) ensure that a scenario
is selected within the uncertainty set U.
In case of simple recourse, the adversary’s problem reads as follows:
ASimple(X) :=
min
⇣
X
c2C(k)
wcXc
Y
n2c
⇣n
Y
a2c
⇣a
s.t. B⇣  b
⇣ 2 {0, 1}|N |+|A|
Before we present our main result for the simple recourse policy, we need the following
definition.
Definition 6.2. Consider an unreliable digraph D = (N,A). The setting in which at
most p % of the nodes and arcs can fail is called homogenous failure. This corresponds
to the uncertainty set U := {u ✓ N [ A :Pn2N ⇣un +Pa2A ⇣ua   (|N | + |A|)(1   p), ⇣u 2
{0, 1}|N |+|A|}.
Observe that in case of homogenous failure and simple recourse, only a single arc or
node failure is required to completely cancel a cycle or chain. Hence, a straightforward
strategy for the adversary is to cancel the bp(|N | + |A|)c most valuable cycles. We can
simplify the adversary’s problem by replacing node and arc failure with cycle failure. We
do this by introducing an additional decision variable ⇣c :=
Q
n2c ⇣n
Q
a2c ⇣a for each cycle
c 2 C(k) and rewrite the adversary’s problem as:
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ASimple(X) =
min
⇣
X
c2C(k)
wcXc⇣c (6.19)
s.t.
X
c2C(k)
⇣c   |C(k)|  bp(|N |+ |A|)c (6.20)
⇣ 2 {0, 1}|C(k)| (6.21)
We are now ready to present our main result for the simple recourse policy.
Theorem 6.1. In case of simple recourse and homogenous failure, the constraint matrix
associated to the adversary’s problem ASimple(X) is totally unimodular.
Proof. In case of simple recourse and homogenous failure, and after relaxing the inte-
grality requirement (6.21) on the ⇣ variables, the constraint matrix associated with the
adversary’s problem as specified by (6.19), (6.20) in standard form is of the form
0BBBBBBB@
1 1 1 . . . 1
 1 0 0 . . . 0
0  1 0 . . . 0
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
0 0 0 . . .  1
1CCCCCCCA . (6.22)
Theorem 13.3 from (Steiglitz and Papadimitriou, 1982), gives su cient conditions to
prove that matrix (6.22) is totally unimodular.
The first requirement is that all the entries in the matrix belong to { 1, 0, 1}. This
can be easily verified. Second, no more than two entries in the same column may be
non-zero. This is also easy to verify. Finally, it must be possible to partition the rows of
the matrix into two sets A and B such that: i) if a column has two entries of the same
sign, their rows are in di↵erent sets; ii) if a column has two entries of di↵erent signs, their
rows are in the same set. This is easily fulfilled if A contains all the rows and B is the
empty set.
Because of Theorem 6.1 there is no need to include the binary requirement (6.21) on the
variables ⇣ that represent the cycles surviving in the worst case scenario. Every extreme
point of the feasible region is integral. Then, using strong duality on the adversary’s
problem and letting v0 denote the dual of constraint (6.20) and vc, c 2 C(k), the dual
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of the unit upper bounds imposed by (6.21), we can obtain an equivalent mixed integer
programming formulation of the robust exchange problem:
max
X,v
(|C(k)|  bp(|N |+ |A|)c) v0  
X
c2C(k)
vc
s.t.
X
c2C(k):n2c
Xc  1 8n 2 N (6.23a)
v0   vc  wcXc 8c 2 C(k) (6.23b)
Xc 2 {0, 1} 8c 2 C(k)
v0   0
vc   0 8c 2 C(k)
Although the above model is still a mixed integer program, its size is much more
compact than the size of formulation (6.4)-(6.8).
6.4 Solving the robust exchange problem with back-
arcs recourse
In this section we study how to solve the robust exchange problem with back-arcs re-
course. Similar to how we analyzed the simple recourse policy, we begin by considering
the adversary’s problem:
ABack-arcs(X) :=
min
⇣
RBack-arcs(X, u⇣)
s.t. B⇣  b
⇣ 2 {0, 1}|N |+|A|
Since the back-arcs recourse function RBack-arcs(X, u) as defined in (6.10)-(6.11) is
a maximization problem, the adversary’s problem is, in the general case, a non-linear
optimization problem. However, we will consider a specific setting for which it can be
solved e ciently.
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Let us assume homogenous failure (see Definition 6.2), let k = 3 (this is the bound
used in most kidney exchange programs (Roth et al., 2007)), and let wc = |NS \ c| for
all c 2 C(k) (i.e. we want to maximize the number of agents that receive a good).
As, by definition, back-arcs cannot exist for cycles of length 2 and back-arcs recourse is
meaningless for chains of length 2, we then only have to consider recourse actions for cycles
and chains of length 3. Without loss of generality, there are four possible configurations
for back-arc reactions in cycles of size 3 that are illustrated in Figures 6.2 to 6.5, and four
possible configurations for back-arc reactions in chains of size 3 that are illustrated in
Figures 6.6 to 6.9. Note that, in the absence of failure, a length 3 cycle involves 3 agents
from NS, and a length 3 chain involves 2 agents from NS.
In the first three cases for cycles, illustrated in Figures 6.2-6.4, a single node failure is
su cient to completely cancel the cycle (in the worst case). However, in the fourth case,
illustrated in Figure 6.5, two node failures are required to completely cancel the cycle.
Similarly, in the first three cases for chains, illustrated in Figures 6.6-6.8, a single node
failure is su cient, but in the last case, illustrated in Figure 6.9, two failures are required.
Because of the above, in the case of homogenous failure and k = 3, it is possible
to solve the adversary’s problem using a trivial greedy algorithm (i.e. cancel cycles and
chains in order of the number of failures required per point of damage inflicted on the
objective function). However, this would not help us as we want to include the adversary’s
problem in a mixed integer program for RE(U). Therefore, using the knowledge of our
problem structure, we now proceed with the following steps:
1. Identify the cycles of length 3 with the structure of case 4; let C 0(3) ⇢ C(3) be the
set of such cycles;
2. For each c 2 C 0(3) create one auxiliary binary decision variables ⇣1c representing the
first failure for c;
3. Reformulate the recourse function and the adversary’s problem such that they satisfy
the following conditions for each c 2 C 0(3):
i if ⇣c = ⇣1c = 0 then the benefit from c must be 0, i.e. the adversary completely
cancels c and thus there is no back-arc recourse.
ii if ⇣c = ⇣1c = 1 then the benefit from c must be 3, i.e. the adversary does not
cancel c.
iii if ⇣c = 1 and ⇣1c = 0 then the benefit from c must be 2, i.e., the adversary cancels
c partially as two nodes can be recovered through back-arc recourse.
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Similarly, we perform the following steps for chains:
1. Identify the chains of length 3 with the structure of case 8; let C 00(3) ⇢ C(3) be the
set of such chains;
2. For each c 2 C 00(3) create one auxiliary binary decision variable ⇣1c representing the
first failure for c;
3. Reformulate the recourse function and the adversary’s problem such that they satisfy
the following conditions for each c 2 C 00(3):
i if ⇣c = ⇣1c = 0 then the benefit from c must be 0, i.e. the adversary completely
cancels c and thus there is no back-arc recourse.
ii if ⇣c = ⇣1c = 1 then the benefit from c must be 2, i.e. the adversary does not
cancel c.
iii if ⇣c = 1 and ⇣1c = 0 then the benefit from c must be 1, i.e., the adversary cancels
c partially as one node can be recovered through back-arc recourse.
Following these lines, we rewrite the back-arcs recourse function as:
RBack-arcs(X, u) =
X
c2C(3) (C0(3)[C00(3))
|c|Xc⇣uc +
X
c2C0(3)
Xc(⇣
1,u
c + 2⇣
u
c )
+
X
c2C00(3)
Xc(⇣
u
c + ⇣
1,u
c ) (6.24)
It is straightforward to check that (6.24) satisfies the above conditions. Furthermore,
note that the recourse function now has been reformulated as a linear function, whereas
before it was a maximization problem (recall (6.10) and (6.11)).
Next, letting b = bp(|N |+ |A|)c, we rewrite the adversary’s problem as:
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ABack-arcs(X) =
min
⇣
X
c2C(3) (C0(3)[C00(3))
|c|Xc⇣c +
X
c2C0(3)
Xc(⇣
1
c + 2⇣c) +
X
c2C00(3)
Xc(⇣
1
c + ⇣c) (6.25)
s.t.
X
c2C(3)
⇣c +
X
c2C0(3)[C00(3)
⇣1c   |C(3)|+ |C 0(3)|+ |C 00(3)|  b (6.26)
⇣c   ⇣1c 8c 2 C 0(3) [ C 00(3) (6.27)
⇣c  1 8c 2 C(3) (6.28)
⇣c 2 {0, 1} 8c 2 C(3)
⇣1c 2 {0, 1} 8c 2 C 0(3) [ C 00(3)
Here, the objective (6.25) is to minimize the number of agents receiving a good under
the back-arcs recourse policy as specified by (6.24). Constraint (6.26) specifies the adver-
sary’s uncertainty ‘budget’ in the homogenous failure setting. Constraints (6.27) ensure
condition (ii) and (iii) are met by guaranteeing that cycles and chains of cases 4 and 8 are
not cancelled entirely unless they contain two failures. Constraints (6.28) are redundant
but are added to aid the exposition of the remainder of our analysis.
The next step is to relax the binary requirement on the adversary’s variables ⇣c, ⇣1c
and ⇣2c in order to get a lower bound on the robust exchange problem with back-arcs
recourse. Let us denote the relaxed adversary’s problem by A0Back-arcs(X). Note that by
making this relaxation, the adversary has a larger set of feasible strategies and thus is
potentially capable of inflicting more damage on the planned solution. This is the reason
why we get a lower bound to the robust exchange problem by relaxing the integrality of
the adversary’s variables. Next, we can apply strong duality on A0Back-arcs(X) to achieve
a linear formulation for the relaxed robust exchange problem:
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RE 0Back-arcs(U) =
max
X,v
(|C(3)|+ |C 0(3)|+ |C 00(3)|  b)) v0  
X
c2C(3)
vc (6.29)
s.t.
X
c2C(3):n2c
Xc  1 8n 2 N
v0   vc  |c|Xc 8c 2 C(3)  (C 0(3) [ C 00(3)) (6.30)
v0 + v
1
c   vc  2Xc 8c 2 C 0(3) (6.31)
v0 + v
1
c   vc  Xc 8c 2 C 00(3) (6.32)
v0   v1c  Xc 8c 2 C 0(3) [ C 00(3) (6.33)
Xc 2 {0, 1} 8c 2 C(3)
v0   0
vc   0 8c 2 C(3)
v1c   0 8c 2 C 0(3) [ C 00(3)
The above formulation is a straightforward mixed integer program. Although we have
argued that it provides a lower bound to the original robust exchange problem, one could
question whether there exist situations in which the adversary is actually capable of using
the relaxation to inflict more damage on the planned solution (and thus whether the
integrality requirement was necessary to begin with). The following example shows us
that this is indeed the case.
Example 6.1. Consider the market digraph represented in Figure 6.10 in which at most 2
nodes can fail. We have the set of cycles C(3) = {c1 = h1, 2i , c2 = h2, 3i , c3 = h1, 3i , c4 =
h4, 5i , c5 = h1, 2, 3i , c6 = h3, 2, 1i} and C 0(3) = {c5, c6}.
1 2
3
4
5
Figure 6.10:
The optimal solution to the robust exchange problem with back-arcs recourse REBack-arcs(U)
is to select cycles c4 and c5 with objective value equal to 2. Although the optimal solution
for the relaxed robust exchange problem RE 0Back-arcs(U) leads to the same planned solution,
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the objective value is equal to 1.5, since the adversary variables need not be binary and
will be chosen as follows: ⇣c1 = 1, ⇣c2 = 1, ⇣c3 = 1, ⇣c4 = 0, ⇣
1
c5 = ⇣
2
c5 = ⇣c5 =
1
2 , ⇣
1
c6 = ⇣
2
c6 =
⇣c6 = 1.
We are now ready to provide our main results for the back-arcs recourse policy.
Lemma 6.1. Let X be an arbitrary feasible solution to the robust exchange problem.
In case of back-arcs recourse, if the optimal solution value for the relaxed adversary’s
problem A0Back-arcs(X) is zero then the optimal solution value for the adversary’s problem
ABack-arcs(X) is also zero.
Proof. For the optimal value to be zero, all ⇣ variables associated with selected cycles (for
which Xc = 1) must be zero such that these cycles are completely cancelled and cannot be
reconstructed. If this is feasible in the relaxed problem A0Back-arcs(X), this is also feasible
under the binary requirement in ABack-arcs(X).
Lemma 6.2. Let X be an arbitrary feasible solution to the robust exchange problem and
let k = 3. In case of back-arcs recourse and homogeneous failure, the adversary’s budget
constraint (6.26) evaluated in an optimal solution to the adversary’s problem A0Back-arcs(X)
is either binding or the optimal objective value is zero.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that for a given X the optimal adversary’s objective
function is positive and that the optimal solution ⇣⇤ is such that constraint (6.26) is not
binding:
X
c2C(3)
⇣c +
X
c2C0(3)[C00(3)
⇣1c > |C(3)|+ |C 0(3)|+ |C 00(3)|  b
The first hypothesis implies that there is a cycle for which Xc = 1 and ⇣⇤c > 0.
The second hypothesis implies that the slack variable associated to constraint (6.26) is
positive. By complementary slackness, the optimal solution of the dual problem must
have v⇤0 = 0. In particular, v
⇤
0 = 0 implies that the optimal objective function value of the
dual (6.29) is non-positive. On the other hand, by strong duality, the primal and dual
optimal values are to be equal which contradicts our hypothesis that the primal optimal
value is positive.
Lemma 6.3. Let X be an arbitrary feasible solution to the robust exchange problem and
let k = 3. In case of back-arcs recourse and homogenous failure, it holds that in an optimal
solution ⇣⇤ to the relaxed adversary’s problem A0Back-arcs(X), for all c 2 C 0(3) for which
Xc = 1 we have ⇣⇤c = ⇣
1⇤
c .
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Proof. By constraint (6.27) ⇣⇤c   ⇣1⇤c . Additionally, the adversary’s optimization problem
is a minimization one and all the coe cients in the objective function are positive for ⇣c
and ⇣1c where Xc = 1. Therefore, it is clear that in an optimal solution ⇣c will be as small
as possible and thus equal to ⇣1c .
Theorem 6.2. Consider the setting with back-arcs recourse and homogenous failure. Let
k = 3, let X be an arbitrary feasible solution to the robust exchange problem and let
b = bp(|N | + |A|)c. Furthermore, let F3 := {c 2 C(3)   C 0(3) : |c| = 3 and Xc = 1},
F2 := {c 2 C(3)   C 00(3) : |c| = 2 and Xc = 1}, F1.5 := {c 2 C 0(3) : Xc = 1}, and
F1 := {c 2 C(3) : |c| = 1, Xc = 1} [ {c 2 C 00(3) : Xc = 1}. If the optimal objective value
is positive, there is an optimal solution ⇣⇤ to the relaxed adversary’s problem A0Back-arcs(X)
that satisfies:
• |F ⇤3 := {c 2 F3 : ⇣⇤c = 0}| = n3 with n3 := min(b, |F3|);
• |F ⇤2 := {c 2 F2 : ⇣⇤c = 0}| = n2 with n2 := min(b  n3, |F2|);
• |F ⇤1.5 := {c 2 F1.5 : ⇣⇤c = ⇣1⇤c = 0}| = n1.5 with n1.5 := min(b b n3 n22 c, |F1.5|) and
|F ⇤⇤1.5 := {c 2 F1.5 : ⇣⇤c = ⇣1⇤c = 12}| = n01.5 with n01.5 := 1{n1.5<|F1.5| and b n3 n2 is odd}.
• |F ⇤1 := {c 2 F1 \ C 00(3) : ⇣⇤c = ⇣1⇤c = 0} [ {c 2 F1   C 00(3) : ⇣⇤c = 0}| = n1 = n01 + n001
and |F ⇤⇤1 := {c 2 F1 \ C 00(3) : ⇣⇤c = ⇣1⇤c = 12}| = n0001 with n01 := |{c 2 F1 \ C 00(3) :
⇣⇤c = ⇣
1⇤
c = 0}| and n001 := |{c 2 F1   C 00(3) : ⇣⇤c = 0}| and 2n01 + n001 + n0001 =
min(b  n3   n2   2n1.5   n01.5, |F1|) and n0001 := 1{2n01+n001<min(b n3 n2 2n1.5 n01.5,|F1|)}.
• the variables associated with cycles not in F ⇤3 [F ⇤2 [F ⇤1.5 [F ⇤⇤1.5 [F ⇤1 [F ⇤⇤1 are equal
to 1.
Proof. Suppose that the theorem conditions are satisfied. Then, since the optimal objec-
tive value is positive, by Lemma 6.2 it holds:
X
c2C(3)
⇣c +
X
c2C0(3)[C00(3)
⇣1c = |C(3)|+ |C 0(3)|+ |C 00(3)|  b
We will prove the theorem by induction on b.
If b = 0, the equation above becomes
X
c2C(3)
⇣c +
X
c2C0(3)[C00(3)
⇣1c = |C(3)|+ |C 0(3)|+ |C 00(3)|
138_Erim Glorie[stand].job
126 Robust barter exchange
and in order for the decision vector ⇣⇤ to be feasible all its entries must be equal to
one (binary). It follows that n3 = n2 = n1.5 = n1 = 0 which is in accordance with the
theorem statement.
Assume that the theorem holds for b = i   1 > 0. Note that by the induction
hypothesis, there is a cycle c 2 F ⇤3 [ F ⇤2 [ F ⇤1.5 [ F ⇤1 [ F ⇤⇤1.5 [ F ⇤⇤1 such that
⇣⇤c = 0 if c 2 C(3) \ (F ⇤⇤1.5 [ F ⇤⇤1 )
or
⇣⇤c = ⇣
1⇤
c =
1
2
if c 2 (F ⇤⇤1.5 [ F ⇤⇤1 ) (applying Lemma 6.3).
Taking into account that ⇣⇤c < 1 for all c 2 F ⇤3 [ F ⇤2 [ F ⇤1.5 [ F ⇤1 [ F ⇤⇤1.5 [ F ⇤⇤1 , by
complementary slackness, v⇤c = 0. If we increase b by one unit, since constraint (6.26)
is binding, the value of the dual variable v⇤0 associated to the problem with b = i   1
tell us how much the objective function decreases if b = i. Consider the cycle c 2
F ⇤3 [ F ⇤2 [ F ⇤1.5 [ F ⇤1 [ F ⇤⇤1.5 [ F ⇤⇤1 that is in the F ⇤j with smallest index. There are four
possible cases.
Case 1: F ⇤j ⇢ Fj and j   2. Then, cycle c belongs to C(3)  (C 0(3)[C 00(3)). As noted
before v⇤c = 0 and thus, evaluating constraint (6.30) for c 2 C(3)  (C 0(3) [ C 00(3)) leads
to
v⇤0  j.
We conclude that the adversary’s optimal objective value with b = i decreases by at most
j units in comparison with the case of b = i   1. In fact, a decrease of exactly j units
can be achieved by choosing an additional cycle c 2 (Fj   F ⇤j ) to be part of F ⇤j (i.e put
⇣c = 0). Note that this solution is feasible for the problem with b = i. Moreover, this
optimal solution is in accordance with the theorem statement.
Case 2: F ⇤j = Fj, j = 3 and F2 6= ;. Using our induction hypothesis together with
strong duality, constraints (6.30) to (6.33) come down to
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v⇤0  3 8c 2 F3
v⇤0 = 2 + v
⇤
c 8c 2 F2
v⇤0 = 1 + v
⇤
c 8c 2 F1   C 00(3)
v⇤0 = v
⇤
c 8c 2 C(3)  (C 0(3) [ C 00(3) [ F1 [ F2 [ F3)
v⇤0   v1c ⇤ = 1 8c 2 F1.5
v⇤0 + v
1
c
⇤   v⇤c = 2 8c 2 F1.5 ) 2v⇤0   3 = v⇤c
v⇤0   v1c ⇤ = 0 8c 2 C 0(3)  F1.5
v⇤0 + v
1
c
⇤   v⇤c = 0 8c 2 C 0(3)  F1.5 ) 2v⇤0 = v⇤c
v⇤0   v1c ⇤ = 1 8c 2 F1 \ C 00(3)
v⇤0 + v
1
c
⇤   v⇤c = 1 8c 2 F1 \ C 00(3) ) 2v⇤0   2 = v⇤c
v⇤0   v1c ⇤ = 0 8c 2 C 00(3)  F1
v⇤0 + v
1
c
⇤   v⇤c = 0 8c 2 C 00(3)  F1 ) 2v⇤0 = v⇤c
Observe that setting v⇤0 = 2 and the v
⇤
c accordingly is a dual feasible solution. More-
over, that dual solution is optimal: by the induction hypothesis the adversary’s optimal
value is
2|F2|+ 3|F1.5|+ 2|F1 \ C 00(3)|+ |F1   C 00(3)|
and the dual objective function evaluated at the dual solution just described takes the
same value
(|C(3)|+ |C 0(3)|+ |C 00(3)|  b) v⇤0  
X
c2C(3)
v⇤c
=(|C(3)|+ |C 0(3)|+ |C 00(3)|  |F3|) 2 
X
c2F2
0
 
X
c2C(3) (C0(3)[C00(3)[{F1 C00(3)}[{F1\C00(3)}[F2[F3)
2 
X
c2F1.5[{F1 C00(3)}
1
 
X
c2{C0(3) F1.5}[{C00(3) F1\C00(3)}
4
=2|C(3)|+ 2|C 0(3)|+ 2|C 00(3)|  2|F3|  2|C(3)|+ 2|C 0(3)|+ 2|F2|+ 2|F3|
+2|C 00(3)|+ 2|F1   C 00(3)|  2|F1 \ C 00(3)|  |F1.5|  4|C 0(3)|+ 4|F1.5|
 4|C 00(3)|+ 4|F1 \ C 00(3)|  |F1   C 00(3)|
=2|F2|+ 3|F1.5|+ 2|F1 \ C 00(3)|+ |F1   C 00(3)|
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Therefore, the optimal value of the relaxed adversary’s problem with b = i decreases
by 2 units in comparison with the case of b = i   1 and that decrease can be achieved
by choosing an additional cycle c 2 (F2   F ⇤2 ) to be part of F ⇤2 (i.e put ⇣c = 0). Note
that this solution is feasible for the problem with b = i and it is in accordance with the
theorem statement.
Case 3: F ⇤3 = F3, F
⇤
2 = F2 and F
⇤
1.5 [ F ⇤⇤1.5 ⇢ F1.5. The proof is analogous to the
previous case. Using the induction hypothesis together with strong duality, constraints
(6.30) to (6.33) now come down to:
v⇤0  3 8c 2 F3
v⇤0  2 8c 2 F2
v⇤0 = 1 + v
⇤
c 8c 2 F1   C 00(3)
v⇤0 = v
⇤
c 8c 2 C(3)  (C 0(3) [ C 00(3) [ F1 [ F2 [ F3)
v⇤0   v1c ⇤ = 1 8c 2 F1.5   F ⇤1.5 [ F ⇤⇤1.5
v⇤0 + v
1
c
⇤   v⇤c = 2 8c 2 F1.5   F ⇤1.5 [ F ⇤⇤1.5 ) 2v⇤0   3 = v⇤c
v⇤0   v1c ⇤ = 0 8c 2 C 0(3)  F1.5
v⇤0 + v
1
c
⇤   v⇤c = 0 8c 2 C 0(3)  F1.5 ) 2v⇤0 = v⇤c
v⇤0   v1c ⇤ = 1 8c 2 F1 \ C 00(3)
v⇤0 + v
1
c
⇤   v⇤c = 1 8c 2 F1 \ C 00(3) ) 2v⇤0   2 = v⇤c
v⇤0   v1c ⇤ = 0 8c 2 C 00(3)  F1
v⇤0 + v
1
c
⇤   v⇤c = 0 8c 2 C 00(3)  F1 ) 2v⇤0 = v⇤c
Observe that setting v⇤0 =
3
2 and the v
⇤
c accordingly with the updated system of
equations leads to a dual feasible solution. Moreover, that dual solution is optimal: by
the induction hypothesis the adversary’s optimal value is
3|F1.5|  3|F ⇤1.5|+ 2|F1 \ C 00(3)|+ |F1   C 00(3)| 
3
2
|F ⇤⇤1.5|
Additionally, the dual objective function evaluated at the dual solution just described
takes the same value:
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(|C(3)|+ |C 0(3)|+ |C 00(3)|  b) v⇤0  
X
c2C(3)
v⇤c
=(|C(3)|+ |C 0(3)|+ |C 00(3)|  |F3|  |F2|  2|F ⇤1.5|  |F ⇤⇤1.5|)
3
2
 
X
c2C(3) (C0(3)[C00(3)[{F1 C00(3)}[F2[F3)
3
2
 
X
c2F1.5 F ⇤1.5
0
 
X
c2C0(3) F1.5
3 
X
c2F1 C00(3)
1
2
 
X
c2F1\C00(3)
1 
X
c2C00(3) F1
3
=
3
2
|C(3)|+ 3
2
|C 0(3)|+ 3
2
|C 00(3)|  3
2
|F3|  3
2
|F2|  3|F ⇤1.5| 
3
2
|F ⇤⇤1.5|
 3
2
|C(3)|+ 3
2
|C 0(3)|+ 3
2
|F2|+ 3
2
|F3|+ 3
2
|F1   C 00(3)|+ 3
2
|C 00(3)|
 3|C 0(3)|+ 3|F1.5|  1
2
|F1   C 00(3)|  |F1 \ C 00(3)|  3|C 00(3)  F1|
=3|F1.5|  3|F ⇤1.5|+ 2|F1 \ C 00(3)|+ |F1   C 00(3)| 
3
2
|F ⇤⇤1.5|
Therefore, the optimal value of the relaxed adversary’s problem with b = i decreases
by 32 units in comparison with the case of b = i   1 and that decrease can be achieved
by making ⇣1c0 = ⇣c0 = 0 for the c
0 2 F ⇤⇤1.5 if |F ⇤⇤1.5| > 0, and otherwise, by adding a cycle
c 2 F1.5   F ⇤1.5 to F ⇤⇤1.5 (i.e put ⇣1c = ⇣c = 12). Note that this solution is feasible for the
problem with b = i and that it is in accordance with the theorem statement.
Case 4: F ⇤3 = F3, F
⇤
2 = F2, F
⇤
1.5 = F1.5 and F
⇤
1 [ F ⇤⇤1 ⇢ F1. Again the proof is
analogous. Using the induction hypothesis together with strong duality, constraints (6.30)
to (6.33) now come down to:
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v⇤0  3 8c 2 F3
v⇤0  2 8c 2 F2
v⇤0 = 1 + v
⇤
c 8c 2 F1   (C 00(3) [ F ⇤1 )
v⇤0 = v
⇤
c 8c 2 C(3)  (C 0(3) [ C 00(3) [ F1 [ F2 [ F3)
v⇤0   v1c ⇤  1 8c 2 F1.5
v⇤0 + v
1
c
⇤   v⇤c  2 8c 2 F1.5
v⇤0   v1c ⇤ = 0 8c 2 C 0(3)  F1.5
v⇤0 + v
1
c
⇤   v⇤c = 0 8c 2 C 0(3)  F1.5 ) 2v⇤0 = v⇤c
v⇤0   v1c ⇤ = 1 8c 2 (F1 \ C 00(3))   (F ⇤1 [ F ⇤⇤1 )
v⇤0 + v
1
c
⇤   v⇤c = 1 8c 2 (F1 \ C 00(3))   (F ⇤1 [ F ⇤⇤1 ) ) 2v⇤0   2 = v⇤c
v⇤0   v1c ⇤ = 0 8c 2 C 00(3)  F1
v⇤0 + v
1
c
⇤   v⇤c = 0 8c 2 C 00(3)  F1 ) 2v⇤0 = v⇤c
Observe that now setting v⇤0 = 1 and the v
⇤
c accordingly with the updated system of
equations leads to a dual feasible solution. Moreover, that dual solution is optimal: by
the induction hypothesis the adversary’s optimal value is
2|F1 \ C 00(3)|+ |F1   C 00(3)|  2|F ⇤1 \ C 00(3)|  |F ⇤1   C 00(3)|  |F ⇤⇤1 |
Additionally, the dual objective function evaluated at the dual solution just described
takes the same value:
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(|C(3)|+ |C 0(3)|+ |C 00(3)|  b) v⇤0  
X
c2C(3)
v⇤c
=(|C(3)|+ |C 0(3)|+ |C 00(3)|  |F3|  |F2|  2|F1.5|  2|F ⇤1 \ C 00(3)|  |F ⇤1   C 00(3)|  |F ⇤⇤1 |) 1
 
X
c2C(3) (C0(3)[C00(3)[{F1 C00(3)}[F2[F3)
1
 
X
c2C0(3) F1.5
2 
X
c2F1 C00(3)
0 
X
c2F1\C00(3) F ⇤1 [F ⇤⇤1
0 
X
c2C00(3) F1
2
=|C(3)|+ |C 0(3)|+ |C 00(3)|  |F3|  |F2|  2|F1.5|  2|F ⇤1 \ C 00(3)|  |F ⇤1   C 00(3)|  |F ⇤⇤1 |
 |C(3)|+ |C 0(3)|+ |C 00(3)|+ |F1   C 00(3)|+ |F2|+ |F3|
 2|C 0(3)|+ 2|F1.5|  2|C 00(3)|+ 2|F1 \ C 00(3)|
=2|F1 \ C 00(3)|+ |F1   C 00(3)|  2|F ⇤1 \ C 00(3)|  |F ⇤1   C 00(3)|  |F ⇤⇤1 |
Therefore, the optimal value of the relaxed adversary’s problem with b = i decreases by
1 unit in comparison with the case of b = i 1 and that decrease can be achieved by making
⇣1c0 = ⇣c0 = 0 for the c
0 2 F ⇤⇤1 if |F ⇤⇤1 | > 0, otherwise, by adding a cycle c 2 (F1\C 00(3)) F ⇤1
to F ⇤⇤1 (i.e put ⇣
1
c = ⇣c =
1
2) or by adding a cycle c 2 (F1   C 00(3))   F ⇤1 to F ⇤1 (i.e put
⇣c = 0). Note that this solution is feasible for the problem with b = i and that it is in
accordance with the theorem statement.
Corollary 6.1. In case of back-arcs recourse, homogenous failure and k = 3, the optimal
value for the robust exchange problem REBack-arcs(U) is equal to the optimal value of the
relaxed robust exchange problem RE 0Back-arcs(U) rounded up.
Proof. The optimal value of the relaxed adversary’s problem A0Back-arcs(X) rounded up
gives a lower bound to the adversary’s problem. By Theorem 6.2, there always exists
an optimal solution to the relaxed adversary’s problem in which at most 3 variables are
fractional. In case of fractional variables, that optimal value is equal to some integer,
say OPT , plus 12 and thus the lower bound is OPT + 1. By making ⇣c0 = 1 = ⇣
1
c0 and
⇣2c0 = 0 we get a binary feasible solution for the adversary which has objective value equal
to OPT+1. Since the objective values of REBack-arcs(U) and RE 0Back-arcs(U) respectively
coincide with ABack-arcs(X) and A0Back-arcs(X), the corollary follows.
144_Erim Glorie[stand].job
132 Robust barter exchange
6.5 Solving the robust exchange problem with full
recourse
In this section we consider solving the robust exchange problem with full recourse. The
methodology we develop works equally well for the forms of recourse discussed previously,
particularly when the considered setting does not allow the theorems presented in the
previous sections to be applied.
6.5.1 Delayed scenario generation
As discussed in Section 6.3, the first di culty in solving the robust exchange problem,
regardless of the form of recourse, is that the number of scenarios and hence the number
of constraints (6.5) is typically prohibitively large. Therefore, in this section, we develop
the concept of delayed scenario generation. The main idea is to start out with only a
small set of scenarios and to generate additional scenarios only when required (i.e. when
the corresponding constraint (6.5) is violated). As we will see, the scenario generation
algorithm involves simultaneous row and column generation.
The delayed scenario generation algorithm is as follows:
Delayed scenario generation algorithm
1. Let U¯ := {N [ A}.
2. Solve RE(U¯).
3. Check if there exists a scenario u 2 U\U¯ such that RE(U¯ [ {u}) < RE(U¯). If yes,
go to 4, otherwise go to 5.
4. Set U¯ := U¯ [ {u} and go to 2.
5. Done.
Proposition 6.1. The delayed scenario generation algorithm described above returns the
optimal solution to the robust exchange problem RE(U).
Proof. Because of the finiteness of U the procedure terminates in a finite number of
iterations. When it terminates, because of step 3, there exists no u 2 U\U¯ such that
RE(U¯ [ {u}) < RE(U¯). Hence, all constraints (6.5) are satisfied and the procedure
returns the optimal solution to RE(U).
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Proposition 6.2. Let {Z⇤, X⇤} denote an optimal solution to the robust exchange problem
RE(U¯). Furthermore, let ⇣⇤ denote an optimal solution of the adversary’s problem A(X⇤)
with objective value z⇤. There exists a scenario u 2 U\U¯ such that RE(U¯[{u}) < RE(U¯)
if and only if z⇤ < Z⇤.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the observation that
A(X) = min
⇣
{R(X, u⇣) : B⇣  b, ⇣ 2 {0, 1}|N |+|A|} = min
u2U
R(X, u)
6.5.2 Full recourse linearization
Step 2 in the scenario generation algorithm requires solving RE(U¯) for a subset U¯ ✓ U.
For the case with full recourse we begin by substituting the full recourse function (6.12)-
(6.13) in the robust exchange problem (6.1)-(6.3). The resulting robust exchange problem
with full recourse is:
REFull(U) =
max
Z,X
Z
s.t. Z 
X
c2Cu(k)
0@X
n2c
X
c02C(k):n2c0
Xc0
1AXuc 8 u 2 UX
c2C(k):n2c
Xc  1 8 n 2 NX
c2Cu(k):n2c
Xuc  1 8 u 2 U, n 2 Nu
Z 2 R+
X 2 {0, 1}|C(k)|
Xu 2 {0, 1}|C(k)|
Observe that this is a non-linear mixed integer program. However, we can linearize it
by introducing the following additional decision variables:
Y un =
8><>:
1 if node n 2 N is selected in both the planned solution and the final
solution under scenario u 2 U,
0 otherwise.
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Then we can rewrite the full recourse function as:
RFull(X, u) =
max
Xu,Y u
X
n2N
Y un (6.35)
s.t. Y un 
X
c2C(k):n2c
Xc 8 n 2 N (6.36)
Y un 
X
c2Cu(k):n2c
Xuc  1 8 n 2 Nu (6.37)
Y u 2 R|N |+
Xu 2 {0, 1}|Cu(k)|
As before, the objective (6.35) is to maximize the number of nodes in the intersection
of the planned and the final solution given the scenario u 2 U. Constraints (6.36) check
whether a node is in the planned solution and constraints (6.37) check whether a node
is in the final solution. The advantage of this formulation is that we can now again
substitute the recourse function in the robust exchange problem (6.1)-(6.3) and write it
as the following linear problem:
REFull(U) =
max Z
s.t. Z 
X
n2N
Y un 8 u 2 U (6.38)
Y un 
X
c2C(k):n2c
Xc  1 8 u 2 U, n 2 N (6.39)
Y un 
X
c2Cu(k):n2c
Xuc  1 8 u 2 U, n 2 Nu (6.40)
Z 2 R+
Y u 2 R|N |+ 8 u 2 U
X 2 {0, 1}|C(k)|
Xu 2 {0, 1}|Cu(k)| 8 u 2 U
Here, constraints (6.2) and (6.5) are replaced by constraints (6.38), (6.39) and (6.40).
The formulation above is a regular mixed integer program, albeit with a prohibitively
large number of variables and constraints if the complete set U is considered. Adding a
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scenario u to the above formulation corresponds to simultaneously generating the relevant
rows in (6.38), (6.39) and (6.40) and the relevant columns associated with the variables
Y u and Xu.
6.5.3 The scenario generation subproblem
Proposition 6.2 implies that step 3 in the delayed scenario generation algorithm - the
scenario generation subproblem - is equivalent to solving the adversary’s problem. We
will now first study the complexity of the adversary’s problem in case of full recourse.
In case of full recourse, the adversary’s problem reads as follows:
AFull(X) =
min
⇣
RFull(X, u⇣) (6.41)
s.t. B⇣  b (6.42)
⇣ 2 {0, 1}|N |+|A| (6.43)
The adversary’s problem as presented by (6.41) - (6.43) belongs to the class of ‘inter-
diction problems’, in particular it is a directed cycle interdiction optimization problem.
Let us consider the following decision variant of the problem:
Problem 1. Directed Cycle Interdiction
Input: A digraph G = (V,A), a budget b, an integer m.
Output: A subset V 0 ✓ V such that |V 0|  b and such that the maximum number
of nodes covered by a disjoint collection of directed cycles in G \ V 0 is at most m.
We will now first consider membership of the NP-class.
Theorem 6.3. A solution for the Directed Cycle Interdiction problem can be verified in
polynomial time.
Proof. Given a set of nodes V 0, it can be verified in polynomial time that V 0 ✓ V and that
|V 0|  b. Furthermore, G \ V 0 can be computed in polynomial time. Since the maximum
number of nodes covered by disjoint directed cycles can be computed in polynomial time
(for example by transforming G \V 0 to a perfect matching problem in a bipartite graph),
it can be verified whether this number does not exceed m in polynomial time as well.
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Next we only need to consider NP-hardness. Let us consider the Feedback Vertex Set
problem:
Problem 2. Feedback Vertex Set
Input: A digraph G = (V,A), an integer l.
Output: A set of nodes V 0 ✓ V with |V 0|  l such that if we remove V 0 from G
the remaining graph does not contain any directed cycles.
It is well known that the Feedback Vertex Set problem is NP-complete.
Theorem 6.4. Feedback Vertex Set is a special case of Directed Cycle Interdiction.
Proof. Let us take a Feedback Vertex Set instance and create a Directed Cycle Interdiction
instance with the same graph, budget b = l and parameter m = 0. Now the Directed
Cycle Interdiction instance is a YES-instance if and only if there exists a Feedback Vertex
Set.
We now obtain our final complexity results for the Directed Cycle Interdiction problem
and, subsequently, the adversary’s problem.
Corollary 6.2. In case of full recourse, the adversary’s problem is NP-hard.
Proof. From Theorem 6.3 and Theorem 6.4 it follows that the Directed Cycle Interdiction
problem is NP-complete. Since the adversary’s problem is a directed cycle interdiction
optimization problem, the adversary’s problem is NP-hard.
6.5.4 Solving the scenario generation subproblem
Let X⇤ denote an optimal solution to the robust exchange problem RE(U¯). In case of full
recourse, the adversary’s problem AFull(X⇤), which is equivalent to the scenario generation
subproblem, may be solved exactly by branch-and-bound. Branching can be performed
on the nodes and arcs in the exchange digraph D.
For any node t of the branch-and-bound tree let u(t) denote any scenario in which the
branching decisions made in t are respected, i.e. enforced nodes and arcs are available
in the recourse stage and banned nodes and arcs are not. Then note that RFull(X⇤, u(t))
provides an integral upper bound for node t in the branch-and-bound tree. Furthermore,
note that if B⇣u(t)  b a lower bound can be obtained by solving either the adversary’s
problem for simple recourse ASimple(X⇤) or the adversary’s problem for back-arcs recourse
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ABack-arcs(X⇤) under the settings for which these can be solved e ciently (recall Section
6.3 and Section 6.4). If B⇣u(t) > b a lower bound is equal to +1. Whenever for any node
in the branch-and-bound tree the lower bound is no better than the best upper bound
found so far, that node’s subtree can be pruned. If, at any node, the upper bound matches
the lower bound at the root node, the adversary’s problem AFull(X⇤) has been solved to
optimality.
For some nodes in the branch-and-bound tree it is possible to obtain substantially
better upper bounds than those obtained by solving RFull(X⇤, u(t)). This is particularly
the case for nodes near the root of the branch-and-bound tree. In order to explain how
to achieve these improved bounds, note that if the integrality of the recourse variables
Xu in the full recourse problem RFull(X⇤, ⇣) described by (6.12), (6.14), (6.15) is relaxed,
the adversary’s problem AFull(X⇤) can be solved by rewriting the nonlinear min-max
objective as a minimization problem by using the dual of the recourse problem. The
resulting problem is a minimum vertex and arc cover problem with variable cost:
A0Full(X) =
min
⇣,W
X
n2N
⇣nWn +
X
a2A
⇣aWa (6.44)
s.t.
X
n2c
Wn +
X
a2c
Wa  
X
n2c
X
c02C(k):n2c0
Xc0 8 c 2 C(k) (6.45)
B⇣  b
⇣ 2 {0, 1}|N |
W 2 R|N |+|A|+
Here, the variables W are the duals of constraints (6.14) and (6.15). The objective
(6.44) is to find a minimum cost cover. Constraints (6.45) imply that all cycles that
include nodes selected in the first stage must be covered.
The nonlinear terms
P
n2N ⇣nWn and
P
a2A ⇣aWa in the objective (6.44) may be lin-
earized by introducing a variable Tn := ⇣nWn for each n 2 N and a variable Sa := ⇣aWa
for each a 2 A, and by imposing the additional constraints Tn   Wn  M(1   ⇣n) for
all n 2 N and Sa   Wa  M(1   ⇣a) for all a 2 A, where M is some su ciently large
number. In this case, setting M := k is su cient because constraints (6.45) imply that
neither any Wn nor any Wa ever need to be larger than k. Applying these adjustments,
we obtain the following mixed integer program:
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A0Full(X) =
min
⇣,W,S,T
X
n2N
Tn +
X
a2A
Sa
s.t.
X
n2c
Wn +
X
a2c
Wa  
X
n2c
X
c02C(k):n2c0
Xc0 8 c 2 C(k)
Wn + k⇣n   Tn  k 8 n 2 N
Wa + k⇣a   Sa  k 8 a 2 A
B⇣  b
⇣ 2 {0, 1}|N |
W 2 R|N |+|A|+
S 2 R|A|+
T 2 R|N |+
The di↵erence between the bound obtained by solving RFull(X⇤, u(t)) and the bound
obtained by solving A0Full(X
⇤) is that the former accurately takes into account the recourse
actions but underestimates the adversary’s potential by using the scenario u(t), whereas
the latter overestimates the recourse actions because the recourse variables are relaxed
but accurately takes into the adversary’s potential to damage the planned solution.
Finally, note that it is possible to use the LP relaxations R0Full(X
⇤, u(t)), A0Simple(X
⇤),
and A0Back-arcs(X
⇤) when determining the bounds in the branch-and-bound procedure.
While this may provide bounds that are less tight, it may save computation time. We
have the following relationships:
R0Full(X
⇤, u(t))   RFull(X⇤, u(t)),
A0Simple(X
⇤)  ASimple(X⇤),
A0Back-arcs(X
⇤)  ABack-arcs(X⇤)
that hold in any branch-and-bound node t.
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6.6 Refinement of the robust solution
In barter exchanges there may be multiple solutions that are optimal with respect to
the chosen objective. This frequently occurs in kidney exchange for example, where the
objective typically is to maximize the number of transplants but there are multiple ways
in which the maximum number of transplants can be achieved (Manlove and O’Malley,
2012; Glorie et al., 2014d). Preliminary experiments suggest that this may also happen
for our robust exchange models.
The most common approach to deal with multiple optimal solutions is to use a set
of tie-breaking rules or secondary criteria (Manlove and O’Malley, 2012; Glorie et al.,
2014d). A set of multiple objectives may be combined into a single objective function
by including a separate term for each criterion under consideration. Each term is then
multiplied with the relative weight attached to the criterion it models. It is very common
in kidney exchange for the criteria to be hierarchically ordered (De Klerk et al., 2010;
Manlove and O’Malley, 2012; Kim et al., 2007). The objective weights should then be
scaled such that the first criterion is indeed more important than the second, the second
criterion more important than the third, etc. Alternatively, in case of hierarchical criteria,
an iterative lexicographic approach may be considered (Glorie et al., 2014d).
In Section 6.7, we compare the best (0 nodes fail) and worst case (p nodes fail) scenarios
in the presence of a kidney exchange program that takes into account only the best scenario
(U = {N [ A}) and a kidney exchange program that takes into account all scenarios
(U := {u ✓ N [ A :Pn2N ⇣un   |N |(1  p),Pa2A ⇣ua   |A|, ⇣u 2 {0, 1}|N |+|A|}).
Frequently, an optimal solution to the optimistic program performs equally to an
optimal robust solution in the worst case scenario. This is because there are typically
multiple optimal robust solutions and thus we would like to select the one among them
that performs best in the optimistic scenario.
In order to select the optimal solution for the robust exchange problem that performs
best for the optimistic scenario we replace the objective function in (6.1) by
max
Z,X
Z + "
X
c2C(k)
wcXc
with " > 0.
The value of " must be carefully chosen in order to avoid obtaining kidney exchange
programs that are not robust, i.e, the second term in the new objective function should
never be greater than the first term. Therefore, it is su cient to set
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" =
1P
n2N maxc2C(k):n2c
wc
|c|
(6.46)
Note that we can also add the term "
P
c2C(k)wcXc to the objective function of the
adversary’s problem (6.16). This is equivalent to adding a constant, because in the ad-
versary’s problem the decision variables X are already determined/fixed. In this way
the results we obtained for solving the robust exchange problem for the various forms of
recourse still apply.
In a similar way, we can use objective weights to assign priority to specific groups
of agents, such as highly sensitized patients in kidney exchange. In case of the full
recourse policy, we can also use a more e cient formulation than adding another term
to the objective function. Because of the structure of the recourse objective (6.35), we
can replace the unit objective weights of the Y variables by scaled weights, such that
the desired groups of agents are prioritized. In particular, in Section 6.7 we will use a
scaling that prioritizes highly sensitized patients. If N⇤ denotes the set of highly sensitized
patients, we replace the full recourse objective (6.35) by:
max
Xu,Y u
X
n2N⇤
Y un +
X
n2N\N⇤
"Y un + "
2
X
c2C(k)
wcXc (6.47)
where " is defined as above.
Given that highly sensitized patients have a particularly high probability of match
failure compared to non-highly sensitized patients (see Appendix A), we explicitly consider
arc failure for this patient group. In the next section we present the results that these
small modifications lead us to.
6.7 Computational results
6.7.1 Instance generator
To evaluate the solution approach for the robust exchange problem described in this paper,
we test it on several kidney exchange instances generated by the well known Saidman
kidney exchange simulator (Saidman et al., 2006), which we have adjusted to include
altruistic donors in addition to incompatible patient-donor pairs.
The simulator uses US population data from the United Network for Organ Sharing
(UNOS). It generates patients with a random blood type, sex, and probability of being
crossmatch incompatible (this probability is called the PRA level) with a randomly chosen
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donor. Each patient is assigned a potential donor with a random blood type and relation
to the patient. If the patient and the potential donor are incompatible, they are added to
the kidney exchange pool. Blood types and probabilities of crossmatch failure are then
used to determine the compatibilities in the pool. Table 6.1 summarizes the probabilities
as described in (Saidman et al., 2006). As the original simulator did not include altruistic
donors, we add to each pool a fixed percentage of altruistic donors (generated as above
but without assignment to a patient).
Prob. blood type A .3373
Prob. blood type B .1428
Prob. blood type AB .0385
Prob. blood type O .4814
Prob. low PRA (5 %) .7019
Prob. medium PRA (10 %) .2
Prob. high PRA (90 %) .0981
Prob. female .409
Prob. spousal donor* .4897
% altruistic donor** 4.5
* Applies to female patients only.
Spousal PRA := 1 - .75 (1 - PRA )
** Original simulator did not have
altruistic donors
Table 6.1: Probabilities in Saidman simulator
For our experiments we will generate 30 instances of 20, 50 and 100 nodes. Table 6.2
summarizes some characteristics of these instances.
We have implemented the robust exchange problem with simple, back-arcs, and full
recourse in C#.NET. All instances were run using a computer equipped with a 2.3 GHz
Intel Core i7 processor with 16 GB of RAM memory. All LPs and MIPs were solved using
CPLEX 12.5.
6.7.2 Simple recourse
Table 6.3 describes our findings for the performance and run times of the simple recourse
policy on various instances. The first column specifies the instance size in terms of the
number of nodes. The second column specifies the maximum number of failures. The
third and fifth column respectively specify the number of proposed transplants for the
robust program (which anticipates failures) and the deterministic program (which does not
anticipate failures). The fourth and sixth column specify the actual number of transplants
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for these programs. The seventh column specifies the run time and the eighth column
specifies the percent of instances in which the loss in transplants (= number of first
stage matches minus number of actual transplants in the second stage) is lower than the
maximum possible loss.
From Table 6.3 it becomes clear that all instances can be solved within very short run
times. There is no substantial di↵erence between the run times of the 1-failure and the
2-failures tests. Also, the number of transplants proposed in the robust and deterministic
program is similar.
In the worst case scenario, we could lose at most 3 transplants per failing node or arc.
Hence, in case of a single failure, at most 3 transplants can be lost. If the instance size is
small, this loss can sometimes be restricted to less than 3 transplants (see the instances
of size 20 in which 2.43 transplants are lost on average in the robust program, versus 3
in the deterministic program). However, for larger instance sizes (50 and 100) the loss
of 3 transplants cannot be avoided by anticipation of failure. In case of two failures, at
most 6 transplants can be lost. Again, this loss can be restricted if the instance size is
small enough (in the instances of size 20 and 50 on average 4.33 and 5.83 transplants are
lost respectively). Interestingly, in case the number of failures is higher, the percentage
of instances in which the loss can be reduced increases substantially.
6.7.3 Back-arcs recourse
Table 6.4 summarizes our results for the back-arcs recourse policy.
Table 6.4 shows that, also for the back-arcs policy, all instances can be solved within
very short run times. With the exception of the 20 node instance for the 1 failure setting,
the transplant numbers are identical to the transplant numbers of the simple recourse
policy. The same holds true for the percentage of instances with reduced loss. This
indicates that in the worst case scenario the additional flexibility for recovering from
failures provided by the back-arcs recourse is insu cient to reduce the losses compared to
what could be gained by anticipating failures as by the simple recourse policy. The main
reason is that, in nearly all instances, it is not possible to select only cycles with su cient
back-arcs to recover from a single node or arc failure. Therefore, in the worst case any of
the selected ‘non-robust’ cycles will be cancelled.
6.7.4 Full recourse
Table 6.5 describes our findings for the performance and run times of the full recourse
policy on various instances. In addition to the statistics reported for the simple and
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back-arcs recourse policies, we now also report the average number of scenarios that is
generated (column 6).
From Table 6.5 it becomes clear that, as expected, the running time for solving the
full recourse problem increases strongly with the instance size and the number of failures.
However, all instances can be solved within run times acceptable to kidney exchange
programs in practice. Interestingly, the number of scenarios that needs to be generated
is very small for all instances and does not show much variation.
Compared to the simple and back-arcs recourse policies, the number of transplants in
the worst case scenario is higher for all instances. Also the percentage of instances with a
reduced loss is substantially higher. In up to 86.67 percent of the instances it is possible
to reduce the losses by combined anticipation of failure and a flexible response to failure.
6.7.5 Protecting highly sensitized patients
Table 6.6 describes our findings for the performance and run times of the refined full
recourse policy which prioritizes highly sensitized patients on various instances. In all
instances we allow at most 30 % of the arcs to highly sensitized patients to fail. The first
row in the table reports the actual number of arc failures corresponding to this percentage.
The second and third row report the number of first stage matches in respectively the
robust and the deterministic program. The fourth and fifth row report the matches
specifically for highly sensitized patients. Rows six and seven provide the number of
transplants, i.e. the matches that can actually go forward, for highly sensitized patients.
Rows eight to ten contain the run time statistics we also reported for the previously
considered policies.
The first observation that can be made from Table 6.6 is that the total number of
matches in any of the instances is not substantially di↵erent between the robust and the
deterministic program. The deterministic program does tend to propose slightly more
matches for highly sensitized patients, but substantially less of these matches go forward
to transplantation. Moreover, the magnitude of this di↵erence increases as the instance
size grows. This indicates that the value of the robust program increases with the size of
the kidney exchange program. Another observation is that, even though the tests consider
a substantially larger number of failures than our previous tests, the run times are still
likely to be acceptable to practice. Also, the number of scenarios that need to be generated
increases when the instance grows from 20 to 50 nodes, but stays almost constant when
the instance grows further to 100 nodes. Finally, the percentage of instances in which the
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loss of transplants can be reduced also grows with the instance size. In the largest size
programs it is possible to reduce the losses in 100 % of the tested instances.
6.8 Conclusions
In this research we have considered the centralized clearing of barter exchange markets in
which proposed transactions must be verified before they can proceed. Proposed trans-
actions may fail to go forward if verification fails or if a participant withdraws. We have
modeled the clearing problem in these markets as a vertex-disjoint cycle packing problem
in an unreliable digraph. The arcs and nodes of this graph are subject to failure.
Our research has many natural and interesting applications, of which kidney exchange
is probably the most important. Deciding which donors get matched to which patients in
kidney exchange can be a matter of life and death. Unfortunately, the present algorithms
employed to clear kidney exchanges often leave highly-sensitized patients, who are hard
to match, without a transplant. It has been the need to protect the rare transplant
opportunities for these highly-sensitized patients that has motivated us in particular to
consider the concept of a ‘robust exchange’.
Other methodologies that aim to take market uncertainty into account, such as max-
imizing the expected number of transplants, typically disadvantage highly-sensitized pa-
tients as transactions involving these patients tend to have a high probability of failure.
Under our ‘robust exchange’ methodology we aim to protect transactions against a large
set of possible scenarios for failure. Our methodology allows in particular to protect the
transactions for highly-sensitized patients.
In addition to protecting against failure, we explicitly consider the option of flexible
response to failures. We do this by allowing recourse actions. We have considered three
recourse policies - simple recourse, back-arcs recourse, and full recourse - which can be
easily implemented in practice. Our clearing algorithm selects an optimal planned solution
taking the possibility of recourse into account. If actual failures occur, our algorithm
selects the optimal recourse action.
We have provided results for settings in which the problem of determining the optimal
recourse action can be solved e ciently, whereas in general this requires time exponential
in the input size. Moreover, we have shown that for these settings also the problem of
determining the worst case scenario (taking into account the possibility of recourse) can
be solved e ciently. These results apply to the simple recourse and back-arcs recourse
policies, when trading cycles and chains are limited to three agents and failure is con-
sidered to be homogenous. For other settings and for the full recourse policy, we have
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developed an advanced methodology for delayed scenario generation. In this methodology
row and column generation are combined with a branch-and-bound algorithm.
We have tested our algorithms on various instances generated by the most commonly
used kidney exchange simulator based on US population data. Our computational results
show that instances of realistic size (the size of current kidney exchange pools), can be
solved within run times that are acceptable to practice. More importantly, our results
show that in a substantial number of instances, it is possible to actually protect patients
against failures that prevent them from undergoing a transplant. In this regard, our
algorithms may o↵er a significant improvement over current practice.
There are several opportunities to expand the research presented in this paper. Direct
extensions include extending the experiments to di↵erent types of uncertainty sets that
reflect heterogenous failure or that tail-o↵ as scenarios become more extreme (as per
the concept of globalized robustness (Ben-Tal et al., 2009)). Another direction would be
to combine our solution approach with delayed generation of trading cycles and chains
(Abraham et al., 2007; Glorie et al., 2014d). This would be particularly advantageous if
the market size grows far beyond what it is today or if the bound on the trading cycles
and chains becomes large.
There also remain general challenges to barter exchange markets that are important to
mention. Dynamic market clearing - in which the market is not cleared by accumulating
batches of agents and then maximizing the transactions per batch as is done in present
exchanges, but in which the market is cleared while taking future arrivals into account - is
a problem that has received attention but has not yet been solved optimally. Our model
of market uncertainty can ostensibly be extended to take future arrivals into account.
Another challenge is the internationalization of markets and the conflicts of interest that
may arise between market participants (e.g. participation and incentive compatibility for
hospitals and networks of hospitals in kidney exchange). Finally, we would like to mention
that generalizations of our work could consider allowing monetary transfers and private
information regarding agent preferences. While these factors may be less important in
kidney exchange markets, they may be important in other markets such as house trading.
In conclusion, we hope our work may serve to improve allocations in barter exchange
markets. In particular, we hope it may make allocations more reliable so agents can hold
faith in the markets, and, in the case of kidney exchange, that the most disadvantaged
patient groups can benefit by having more transplants made available to them.
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1 2
3
Figure 6.2: Case 1. Cycle without back-
arcs. If one node or arc fails, the entire cycle
fails and cannot be recovered.
1 2
3
Figure 6.3: Case 2. Cycle with one back-
arc. If node 1 or node 3 fails, the entire cycle
fails and cannot be recovered. Therefore a
single failure is su cient to completely cancel
the cycle.
1 2
3
Figure 6.4: Case 3. Cycle with two back-
arcs. If node 1 fails, the entire cycle fails
and cannot be recovered. Therefore a single
failure is su cient to completely cancel the
cycle.
1 2
3
Figure 6.5: Case 4. Cycle with three back-
arcs. If there is a single failure, the transac-
tions can always be recovered for at least two
nodes. However, if two nodes fail, the entire
cycle fails and cannot be recovered. There-
fore two failures are required to completely
cancel the cycle.
A 1 2
Figure 6.6: Case 5. Chain without back-
arcs. If one node or arc fails, the entire chain
fails and cannot be recovered.
A 1 2
Figure 6.7: Case 6. Chain with one back-
arc. If node A fails, the entire chain fails
and cannot be recovered. Therefore a single
failure is su cient to completely cancel the
chain.
A 1 2
Figure 6.8: Case 7. Chain with one back-
arc. If node 1 fails, the entire chain fails and
cannot be recovered.
A 1 2
Figure 6.9: Case 8. Chain with two back-
arcs. If there is a single failure, a transaction
can always be recovered for at least one node.
However, if two nodes fail, the entire chain
fails and cannot be recovered. Therefore two
failures are required to completely cancel the
chain.
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Nb Max nb Robust nb Robust nb Det. nb Det. nb Time % of instances
nodes failures proposed transplants proposed transplants (s) with reduced loss
20 1 7.43 5.00 7.43 4.43 .03 36.67
50 1 25.03 22.03 25.03 22.03 .14 .00
100 1 54.33 51.33 54.33 51.33 10.96 .00
20 2 7.43 3.10 7.43 1.43 .04 70.00
50 2 25.03 19.20 25.03 19.03 .95 16.67
100 2 54.33 48.33 54.33 48.33 10.31 .00
Table 6.3: Average performance characteristics for the simple recourse policy over 30
instances generated by the Saidman simulator with altruistic donors. The objective is to
maximize the number of transplants. Cycle and chain limit is 3 and there is homogenous
failure.
Nb Max nb Robust nb Robust nb Det. nb Det. nb Time % of instances
nodes failures proposed transplants proposed transplants (s) with reduced loss
20 1 7.43 5.03 7.43 4.43 .02 40.00
50 1 25.03 22.03 25.03 22.03 .14 .00
100 1 54.33 51.33 54.33 51.33 27.73 .00
20 2 7.43 3.10 7.43 1.43 .04 70.00
50 2 25.03 19.20 25.03 19.03 .95 16.67
100 2 54.33 48.33 54.33 48.33 9.28 .00
Table 6.4: Average performance characteristics for the back-arcs recourse policy over 30
instances generated by the Saidman simulator with altruistic donors. The objective is to
maximize the number of transplants. Cycle and chain limit is 3 and there is homogenous
failure.
Nb Max nb Nb Det. nb Time Scenarios % of instances
nodes failures transplants transplants (s) generated with reduced loss
20 1 5.20 4.43 .33 2.33 60.00
50 1 22.27 22.03 3.93 2.37 23.34
100 1 51.50 51.33 85.64 2.9 20.00
20 2 3.40 1.43 2.74 2.6 86.67
50 2 19.63 19.03 114.93 2.8 53.33
100 2 48.76 48.33 3157.84 2.7 36.67
Table 6.5: Average performance characteristics for the full recourse policy over 30 in-
stances generated by the Saidman simulator with altruistic donors. The objective is to
maximize the number of transplants. Cycle and chain limit is 3 and there is homogenous
failure.
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Nb nodes
20 50 100
Max nb arc failures .43 6.13 22.46
Nb matches 7.80 26.30 57.13
Nb matches det. 7.83 26.47 57.42
Nb matches PRA   80 1.10 5.47 14.25
Nb matches PRA   80 det. 1. 17 6.10 15.21
Nb transplants PRA   80 .83 4.43 12.67
Nb transplants PRA   80 det. .60 .20 .08
Time (s) .49 157.25 5067.80
Scenarios generated 1.37 4.43 4.13
% of instances with reduced loss 16.67 96.67 100.00
Table 6.6: Average performance characteristics for the refined full recourse policy which
prioritizes highly sensitized patients over 30 instances generated by the Saidman simulator
with altruistic donors. Cycle and chain limit is 3 and at most 30 % of the arcs to highly
sensitized patients (PRA   80) can fail.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions
In this thesis we have considered the clearing problem in barter exchange markets. Our
research has many natural and interesting applications, of which kidney exchange is prob-
ably the most important. Deciding which donors get matched to which patients in kidney
exchange can be a matter of life and death. We have therefore focused in particular on
kidney exchange markets. Our results are, however, easily applicable to other types of
barter exchange markets.
We have started in Chapter 2 by providing an extensive literature review of the state
of the art in kidney exchange clearing. We have shown that as the transplant community
strives to balance quantity and equity of transplants to achieve the best possible outcomes,
determining the right long-term allocation strategy in kidney exchange markets becomes
increasingly important. Challenges we have identified include making full use of the
various transplant modalities that are now available through integrated and optimized
clearing software, encouragement of transplant centers to fully participate, improving
transplant rates by focusing on the expected long run number of transplants, and selecting
uniform allocation criteria to facilitate international pools.
In Chapter 3 we have considered solving the clearing problem with multiple objective
criteria and long cycles and chains. We have shown that to achieve the best possible
score on all criteria long cycles and chains are often needed, particularly when there
are many hard-to-match patients. We have presented a generic iterative branch-and-
price algorithm which can deal e↵ectively with multiple criteria and side-constraints such
as individual rationality constraints. We have shown how the pricing problem may be
solved in polynomial time in the cycle and chain length for a general class of criteria and
constraints. Our approach and its e↵ects are demonstrated using simulations with kidney
exchange data from the Netherlands and the US. We find that our algorithm is e↵ective
even for large realistic barter exchange markets.
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In Chapter 4 we have studied various policy improvements for kidney exchange. We
have shown that there is clear synergy in the central coordination of both unspecified
donation and transplantation across the blood type barrier. Transplants can be increased
by up to 10 % and by up to 22 % and 58 % for blood type O and highly sensitized patients
respectively. Transplant centers can be encouraged to participate by including individual
rationality constraints for the groups of patients and donors they represent. Implementing
these constraints has negligible consequences for the long term outcomes that can jointly
be achieved, and for individual objectives of the transplant centers, such as maximizing
the number of transplants for the patients enrolled at a center. We have further shown
that, although the best configuration of a national kidney exchange program depends
on the composition of the patient-donor population, su cient time between matching
rounds is essential and that benefits of non-simultaneous extended altruistic donor chains
are limited in case of low numbers of highly sensitized patients and su cient unspecified
donors. Furthermore, chains are best terminated when no further segment is part of an
optimal exchange within 3 months.
In Chapter 5 we have considered the health outcomes of various allocation policies used
in kidney exchange clearing. We have introduced an individualized health value model,
which is a Markov process with patient-donor specific transition probabilities. We found
that conventional allocation rules and criteria do not increase health value compared to
a straightforward policy intended to maximize the number of transplants. However, we
have also proposed a new policy intended to maximize health value. This model links the
individualized Markov model to the branch-and-price algorithm described in Chapter 3.
Under our newly proposed policy an improvement in quality adjusted life years of 6 %
over current practice is possible. In particular, under this policy an improvement of 31
% is possible for the group of patients that are left unmatched. Furthermore, we have
calculated an upper bound on the maximum health value that can be achieved by any
allocation policy and have shown that our newly proposed policy comes 32 % closer to
this bound than existing policies.
Finally, in Chapter 6 we have considered market failure. In particular, we have studied
the clearing of barter exchange markets in which proposed transactions must be verified
before they can proceed. For instance, in kidney exchange, patients and donors are pre-
pared and crossmatch tests between each donor and selected recipient are performed.
Proposed transactions may fail to go forward if verification fails or if a participant with-
draws. In case one or more matches fail, a new allocation may be selected. The new
allocation should be as close as possible to the initial set in order to minimize the ma-
terial and emotional costs of the alteration. We have presented a robust optimization
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approach that intends to maximize the number of agents selected in both the first and
second allocation in a worst case scenario. Our methodology allows in particular the
transactions for highly-sensitized kidney exchange patients to be protected. In addition
to protecting against failure, we have explicitly considered the option of flexible response
to failures. We have done this by allowing recourse actions. We have considered three
recourse policies that can be easily implemented in practice. Our clearing algorithm se-
lects an optimal planned solution taking the possibility of recourse into account. If actual
failures occur, our algorithm selects the optimal recourse action. We have provided results
for settings in which the problem of determining the optimal recourse action can be solved
e ciently, whereas in general this requires time exponential in the input size. Moreover,
we have shown that for these settings also the problem of determining the worst case sce-
nario (taking into account the possibility of recourse) can be solved e ciently. For other
settings we have developed an advanced methodology for delayed scenario generation. In
this methodology, row and column generation are combined with a branch-and-bound
algorithm. Computational results show that instances of realistic size (the size of current
kidney exchange pools), can be solved within run times that are acceptable to practice.
Our results, especially those from Chapters 3 and 6, are applicable to general barter
exchange markets, even when these markets allow for side payments. If prices are fixed
(e.g. if agents have a fixed asking price for the goods they brought to the market and a
maximum buying price for every good they are interested in) the results can be directly
applied by taking prices into account when determining the possible transactions. If prices
are not fixed but need to be determined by the market, auction techniques such as those
used in combinatorial auctions may be required.
Based on the contributions made in this thesis, we see several interesting possible
directions for future research. In addition to taking into account auction techniques
to determine transfer prices, these include considering participation and incentive com-
patibility in international markets when national markets have di↵erent characteristics;
considering the dynamic or online variant of the clearing problem to take future arrivals
into account; considering stochastic allocation mechanisms such as lotteries; and consid-
ering coordination between related markets, such as the markets for living and deceased
donor kidneys. We hope our research may serve as a reference framework to study these
challenges.
Finally, and most importantly, we hope the findings described in this thesis may benefit
the patients su↵ering from end stage renal disease across the globe.
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Appendix A
Estimating the probability of match
failure due to positive crossmatch1
In order to determine kidney exchange matches, compatibility between all patients and
donors in the kidney exchange pool is analyzed by testing blood type compatibility and by
performing a virtual crossmatch. Then, after a set of desirable recipient-donor matches is
identified by a specialized computer algorithm, actual crossmatches are performed for all
proposed recipient-donor matches. If a crossmatch is positive it means that the respective
recipient-donor match fails to go forward to transplantation. The number of positive
crossmatches after a negative virtual crossmatch can be substantial. In this appendix we
estimate the probability of positive crossmatch after a negative virtual crossmatch on an
individual level using Dutch clinical data.
Data
The available data include 438 ABO blood type or crossmatch incompatible patient-donor
pairs who participated in Dutch kidney exchanges between October 2003 and January
2011, as well as outcomes of 331 crossmatch tests performed by the national reference
laboratory for histocompatibility testing in Leiden. The data contain blood types of
all patients and donors as well as center-reported patient PRA values at time of entry
and, if available, at time of transplantation. Donor HLA types and recipient unacceptable
HLA mismatches are also included. The national reference laboratory identifies unaccept-
able HLA specificities on basis of a combination of a complement dependent cytotoxicity
(CDC) and a solid phase antibody screening. Antibody specificities leading to a positive
1This appendix is based on (Glorie, 2012).
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CDC crossmatch are considered to be a contraindication for transplantation and the HLA
antigens recognized are defined as unacceptable mismatches.
Because center-reported PRA levels are based on the general population, they may
not accurately reflect the di culty of finding compatible donors in the kidney exchange
program. For that reason additional kidney exchange donor population PRA levels are
computed based on virtual crossmatches between each patient and all donors in the data
set. Throughout the rest of this appendix, whenever we refer to a PRA level, we refer to
these kidney exchange donor population based PRA levels. Table A.1 details the patient
and donor characteristics.
ABO blood type
A B AB O
Patients (%) 30 15 1 54
Donors (%) 56 14 2 29
PRA level w.r.t. general population (at time of entry)
0-9 10-79 80-100
Patients (%) 78 17 5
PRA level w.r.t. kidney exchange donor population
0-9 10-79 80-100
Patients (%) 48 35 17
Table A.1: Patient and donor characteristics
Table A.2 displays the number of positive crossmatch outcomes after a negative virtual
crossmatch for each of the PRA level categories of Table A.1. The numbers clearly
indicate that there is a relationship between the probability of a positive crossmatch after
a negative virtual crossmatch and the PRA level.
PRA level w.r.t. kidney exchange donor population
0-9 10-79 80-100
# Actual crossmatches 126 173 32
Positive (%) 6 31 44
Table A.2: Relation between positive crossmatch after a negative virtual crossmatch
and PRA level
However, the crossmatch tests reported in Table A.2 are not all independent. Regu-
larly, multiple crossmatch tests correspond to an individual patient. Multiple tests might,
for example, be required when a patient’s initial test is positive, or when a patient’s cross-
match test is negative but the proposed transplant procedure cannot take place because
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of a positive crossmatch for another patient involved in the procedure. We need to inves-
tigate the e↵ects and significance of this dependence relation before making inferences.
Analysis
Table A.3 shows the outcomes of a  2 test for independence of the probability of a positive
crossmatch test and the outcomes of previous crossmatch tests, per PRA category as in
Table A.1. For each of the PRA categories, there is no significant evidence to reject the
null hypothesis of independence. Therefore all the observed crossmatch results can be
straightforwardly used to estimate the probability of a positive crossmatch within each
PRA category, as was done in Table A.2.
Table A.4 shows the outcomes of a probit regression of the latent individual probability
of a positive crossmatch on recipient PRA, recipient age, recipient blood type and recipient
gender. Only the coe cient of recipient PRA is highly significant. We exclude the other
factors and repeat the regression (Table A.5). Again, the coe cient of PRA is highly
significant, as is the likelihood-ratio test for model fit. Figure A.1 shows a plot of the fitted
probabilities. The non-linear relationship between the probability of a positive crossmatch
and the PRA level is clearly visible. To assess whether this relationship is correctly
modeled, we further diagnose a plot of the standardized residuals (Figure A.2). The
standardized residuals behave nicely overall, showing only weak signs of heteroskedasticity
for PRA values close to 0 and 100. This indicates that possibly the tails of the normal
distribution do not correctly fit the distribution of the probabilities. However, a formal
Lagrange Multiplier test reveals that the amount of heteroskedasticity is not significant
(Table A.5). It therefore appears that
Pr[Ti,j = 1 : PRAj] =   ( 1.5007 + 0.0170 · PRAj)
appropriately models the individual probability of a positive crossmatch.
Conclusion
In this appendix we have estimated the probability of virtual crossmatch failure in kidney
exchange matching by relating this probability to the recipients PRA level. Our findings
indicate that highly sensitized patients have a significantly higher probability of virtual
crossmatch failure than non-highly sensitized patients. Moreover, we find that the non-
linear relationship between the PRA level and the probability of virtual crossmatch failure
is modeled appropriately by a homoskedastic probit model.
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Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.1970 0.4602 -1.9926 0.0463
PRA 0.0154 0.0031 4.9607 <0.0001
DUMMY A 0.1649 0.1974 0.8358 0.4033
DUMMY B 0.4868 0.2705 1.8000 0.0719
DUMMY AB 0.8269 0.4202 1.9681 0.0491
AGE -0.0133 0.0071 -1.8802 0.0601
DUMMY MALE -0.2317 0.1946 -1.1907 0.2338
Deviance 293.4677 Prob (Deviance) <0.0001
Table A.4: Probit regression involving several recipient characteristics
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1.5007 0.1486 -10.1007 <0.0001
PRA 0.0170 0.0026 6.5340 <0.0001
Deviance 304.5770 Prob (Deviance) <0.0001
LM-test 1.7514 Prob (LM-test) 0.1857
McFaddens R-squared 0.1342
Table A.5: Probit regression involving only recipient PRA
Figure A.1: Fitted probabilities
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Figure A.2: Standardized residuals versus PRA
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Although this model improves on the estimations made in previous literature (e.g.
(Ashlagi et al., 2011b)), we do not claim that the PRA level is the sole explanatory factor
for virtual crossmatch failures, nor that virtual crossmatch failure is the only cause of
failure preventing kidney exchange matches from going forward to transplantation. There
may be other factors which play a role, such as recipient health status and likelihood
of withdrawal of incompatible donors, but their impact will likely be smaller than the
impact of the PRA level, and as we did not have data available on these other factors,
they were not explicitly included. Instead, these exogenous factors are captured by the
constant terms in our model.
Additionally, our findings are conditional to our assumptions (although we applied
multiple statistical test to verify these assumptions) and to our data (although comparison
of our data (see Table A.3) with the data used in related literature (see Table 2 in (Ashlagi
et al., 2011b)) suggests failure rates are comparable).
Considering the practical impact of failure of kidney exchange matches, particularly
due to failure of virtual crossmatching, we hope the present findings may serve to improve
kidney exchange simulations by taking into account virtual crossmatch failure more accu-
rately, and thereby help policy makers select the best kidney exchange mechanisms.
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(Summary in Dutch)1
Vrijwel iedereen heeft weleens iets geruild. Van knikkers tot voetbalplaatjes tot wellicht
een dienst met een collega. Dit ruilen gebeurt vaak e´e´n op e´e´n: men zoekt iemand die
een object heeft dat hij of zij graag wil hebben e´n die ge¨ınteresseerd is in het object dat
men aanbiedt. Dit decentraal en paarsgewijs ruilen kost vaak veel tijd en is vaak niet erg
e cient. Een gecentraliseerde markt, waarin iedereen zijn wensen kenbaar maakt aan een
operator, kan veel tijd besparen en een betere allocatie van goederen mogelijk maken. Dit
is met name het geval als er ruilcycli worden toegestaan waarin elke deelnemer een object
geeft aan de volgende deelnemer in de cyclus en een object ontvangt van de voorgaande
deelnemer. In de praktijk is er veelal een natuurlijke beperking op het aantal deelnemers
in een ruilcyclus, bijvoorbeeld vanwege logistieke redenen. Dit proefschrift beschouwt
het allocatieprobleem voor de marktoperator in dit soort ruilmarkten. In het bijzonder
beschouwt het daarbij de markt voor nieruitwisseling, welke e´e´n van de meest impactvolle
en geprofessionaliseerde ruilmarkten van dit moment is.
Er zijn in Nederland circa 60.000 patie¨nten met ernstige nierproblemen (Nierstichting
Nederland, 2011). 6400 van hen zijn aan het dialyseren, wat betekent dat ze drie tot vijf
keer per week naar een dialysecentrum moeten om hun bloed gedurende vier uur te laten
zuiveren en onderworpen zijn aan een streng dieet. De kwaliteit van leven met dialyse
is erg laag en het jaarlijkse overlijdenspercentage is 20 %. Het geprefereerde alternatief,
transplantatie, is helaas niet voor iedereen beschikbaar. Per jaar kunnen slechts 860
patie¨nten op deze manier geholpen worden (Nederlandse Transplantatie Stichting (NTS),
2012).
De helft van het aantal transplantaties is postmortaal. Dat wil zeggen dat de trans-
plantaties plaatsvinden met een orgaan van een overleden donor, waarvoor patie¨nten
gemiddeld 4 jaar op de wachtlijst staan. De andere helft vindt plaats met een levende
donor, zoals een broer of zus van de patie¨nt. Ruim 30 % van de levende donoren is
1Deze samenvatting is gebaseerd op (Glorie et al., 2012a).
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echter incompatibel met de patie¨nt waaraan ze in eerste instantie zouden willen doneren.
Om transplantatie voor deze groep patie¨nten toch mogelijk te maken is in 2004 een nier-
uitwisselingsprogramma opgericht. Dit programma stelt incompatibele paren in staat te
ruilen van donor om zodoende op een indirecte manier toch door te gaan met transplan-
tatie (Hoofdstuk 2).
Het nieruitwisselingsprogramma werkt als volgt. Stel, patie¨nt Anna heeft een nier
nodig. Haar broer Bart wil haar graag helpen en een van zijn twee gezonde nieren
doneren. Na enkele tests in het ziekenhuis blijkt echter dat de bloedgroepen van Bart
en Anna niet compatibel zijn. Een transplantatie zou vrijwel onmiddellijk tot afstoting
leiden. Elders in het land zitten Cynthia en Dirk met een soortgelijk probleem. Cynthia
heeft na haar zwangerschap antisto↵en aangemaakt tegen de cellen van Dirk. Hierdoor
kunnen ook zij niet doorgaan met transplantatie. In een nationale database kunnen trans-
plantatiedeskundigen echter constateren dat Cynthia en Bart wel compatibel zouden zijn,
evenals Anna en Dirk. Zij stellen daarom voor dat beide paren, weliswaar anoniem, ruilen
van donor via het nieruitwisselingsprogramma. Op deze manier zouden zowel Anna als
Cynthia toch een transplantatie kunnen krijgen.
Tien jaar geleden hadden Anna en Cynthia niet geholpen kunnen worden. Gelukkig
voor hen en vele andere patie¨nten was Nederland in 2004 het eerste land ter wereld met
een nationaal nieruitwisselingsprogramma. Maar net als bij de toewijzing van postmortale
organen rijst de vraag: wie krijgt een tranplantatie en wie niet? In ons voorbeeld ruilden
Anna en Bart bijvoorbeeld met Cynthia en Dirk. Maar wellicht hadden zij ook kunnen
ruilen met Eduardo en Floor. Wie gaat er dan voor, Cynthia of Eduardo?
Het ruilen binnen het nieruitwisselingsprogramma hoeft zich niet te beperken tot twee
patie¨nt-donor paren. Er kunnen ook grotere ruilcycli gevormd worden. Een risico is
echter dat een donor zich terugtrekt nadat zijn patie¨nt een nier heeft ontvangen. Dit
zou de andere patie¨nten in de cyclus die nog niet getransplanteerd zijn, maar waarvan de
donor reeds heeft gedoneerd, ernstig benadelen. Dit terugtrekken hoeft niet opzettelijk
te gebeuren en kan bijvoorbeeld veroorzaakt worden door ziekte of zwangerschap van de
donor.
Om benadeling van patie¨nten op deze manier te voorkomen zijn er een paar mogelijk-
heden: (1) alle transplantaties in een cyclus gelijktijdig uitvoeren, (2) in plaats van een
ruilcyclus een ruilketen vormen die start met een Samaritaanse donor (een levende donor
zonder specifieke patie¨nt) en eindigt met een donatie aan een patie¨nt op de postmortale
wachtlijst, en (3) een patie¨nt in plaats van een directe transplantatie voorrang geven op
de wachtlijst in ruil voor donatie door zijn levende donor. Opties (2) en (3) hebben als
voordeel dat zij de ruilmogelijkheden vergroten, dit in tegenstelling tot optie (1). Bij
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optie (1) is er namelijk een beperking op hoeveel paren kunnen deelnemen in een cyclus,
ingegeven door het aantal operatiekamers en operatieteams dat simultaan beschikbaar is.
Hoe wordt hier in Nederland mee omgegaan? Wel, simultaniteit is een standaard-
vereiste voor ruilcycli (die om logistieke redenen uitgevoerd worden met maximaal vier
paren) en Samaritaanse donorketens worden waar mogelijk regionaal per transplantatie-
centrum gecoo¨rdineerd. De derde optie, wachtlijstprioriteit, is echter bij wet verboden
omdat dit patie¨nten die reeds op de wachtlijst staan zou kunnen benadelen. Met deze
maatregelen wordt gepoogd te zorgen dat er binnen een van de grootste nieruitwisselings-
programma’s ter wereld ‘van ruilen geen huilen komt’.
Een belangrijk criterium bij het bepalen wie met wie ruilt is het helpen van het maxi-
male aantal patie¨nten. Dit kan worden bereikt door het ruilvraagstuk te formuleren als een
wiskundig optimaliseringsprobleem. Een bottleneck bij het oplossen van dit probleem is
dat het aantal variabelen zeer groot kan zijn. Er zijn namelijk zeer veel mogelijke ruilcycli
en ruilketens. Gelukkig is het door gebruik te maken van een zogeheten branch-and-price
algoritme mogelijk snel een optimale oplossing te vinden, zelfs als er veel participanten in
een ruilketen of cyclus kunnen deelnemen (Hoofdstuk 3).
Maximaliseren van het aantal transplantaties is niet het enige criterium. Want is
een maximale oplossing ethisch gezien wel juist? Op Europees niveau is afgesproken dat
er sprake moet zijn van zowel een optimale als een rechtvaardige verdeling (Council of
Europe, 2002). Dit houdt in dat factoren als de kans op transplantatie en de wachttijd
ook meegenomen moeten worden. Om op ons voorbeeld terug te komen: stel dat Eduardo
antisto↵en heeft tegen een zeer hoog percentage van alle donoren waardoor de kans op
het vinden van een geschikte match zeer klein is, dan is het wellicht eerlijker om Bart aan
Eduardo te laten doneren dan aan Cynthia.
De Nederlandse transplantatiestichting heeft de volgende zes hie¨rarchische beslissings-
regels opgesteld waaraan een allocatie binnen het nieruitwisselingsprogramma moet vol-
doen:
1. het aantal transplantaties is maximaal;
2. het aantal bloedtype identieke transplantaties is maximaal;
3. de patie¨nt met de laagste matchkans wordt gematcht (iteratief voor elke transplan-
tatie);
4. het aantal paren in de langste ruilcyclus is zo klein mogelijk;
5. de spreiding over transplantatiecentra in de minst gespreide ruilcyclus is zo groot
mogelijk;
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6. de patie¨nt met de langste dialysetijd wordt gematcht.
Het doel van criterium 2 is om patie¨nten met een lastig te matchen bloedtype te
beschermen. Dit wordt vervolgens verfijnt door criterium 3 dat rekening houdt met een
meer specifiek gedefinie¨erde matchkans. Criteria 4 en 5 zijn logistiek van aard en criterium
6 spreekt voor zich. De hie¨rarchische opzet van de criteria sluit aan bij de traditionele
prioriteitsmechanismen die worden gebruikt bij de toewijzing van postmortale organen
aan patie¨nten op de wachtlijst.
Hoewel het toevoegen van deze criteria het optimalisatieprobleem computationeel
lastiger maakt, blijft het gelukkig door het op een slimme manier uitvoeren van branch-
and-price iteraties, waarbij de doelfunctiewaarden gepropageerd worden door het toevoe-
gen van restricties, ook mogelijk om dit probleem snel tot optimaliteit op te lossen (Hoofd-
stuk 3).
De hierboven genoemde criteria zijn niet de enige mogelijkheid om tot een recht-
vaardige ruil te komen. Als alternatief wordt ook wel een lotingsprocedure genoemd.
Hoewel een dergelijke stochastisch mechanisme mooie theoretische eigenschappen heeft
zoals het bieden van zoveel als mogelijk gelijke kansen voor patie¨nten, wordt zij in de
praktijk echter (nog) nergens omarmd.
Daarnaast is het bijvoorbeeld mogelijk te matchen op basis van gezondheidswinst
(Hoofdstuk 5). Naast het feit dat dit de voordelen van transplantatie maximaliseert,
schept het ook een mogelijkheid voor de inclusie van compatibele paren in het nier-
uitwisselingsprogramma. Stel dat een compatibel echtpaar van wat oudere leeftijd, Greet
en Henk, de mogelijkheid geboden wordt om te ruilen met de jongere Cynthia en Dirk. Dit
zou er toe kunnen leiden dat Greet een betere kwaliteit orgaan krijgt en dat Cynthia niet
ongematcht hoeft achter te blijven. Door compatibele paren een verbetering in levens-
verwachting te garanderen zouden de kansen voor alle patie¨nt-donor paren in het pro-
gramma zo verbeterd kunnen worden.
Bij het bespreken van degenen die door het ruilen benadeeld kunnen worden hebben
we ons direct gericht op de patie¨nt-donor paren. Maar zij zijn niet de enigen die er
op achteruit kunnen gaan. De transplantatiecentra zelf dienen ook in acht genomen te
worden, met name wanneer het gaat om het ruilen met Samaritaanse donoren. Een
centrum steekt namelijk veel tijd en geld in de voorbereidende onderzoeken en opwerking
van donoren. Met een Samaritaanse donor zou het centrum dan ook het liefst zoveel
mogelijk van de eigen patie¨nten helpen. Dit vormt in veel landen een groot praktisch
probleem bij het opzetten van een nationaal programma en is mogelijk een van de redenen
waarom ruilketens in Nederland tot op heden lokaal worden gecoo¨rdineerd.
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In Hoofdstuk 4 is gekeken naar de toevoeging van participatierestricties (garanties
dat een transplantatiecentrum in een nationaal mechanisme minstens zoveel transplan-
taties kan verrichten als in een lokaal mechanisme) voor verschillende configuraties van
het nieruitwisselingsprogramma. Hieruit blijkt dat dergelijke restricties geen negatieve
consequenties hebben op de lange termijn. Bovendien wordt aangetoond dat onder lande-
lijke multimodale coo¨rdinatie een toename in het aantal transplantaties mogelijk is van
bijna 60 % voor de meest lastig te matchen patie¨nten.
Hoewel we het nieruitwisselingsprogramma tot dusver in een statische toestand hebben
beschouwd, is het dat in werkelijkheid niet. Maandelijks melden zich nieuwe patie¨nten
en donoren aan en verdwijnen reeds aangemelde paren (bijvoorbeeld door verergering van
de ziekte, transplantatie buiten het programma om, etc). Deze dynamische context heeft
implicaties voor de optimaliteits- en rechtvaardigheidscondities van optimale oplossingen.
In Hoofdstuk 4 hebben we ook gekeken naar de e↵ecten van het veranderen van de
tijd tussen allocatiebeslissingen. We ontdekten dat het belangrijk is om niet teveel tijd
tussen beslissingen te laten zodat patie¨nten niet onnodig hoeven wachten, maar ook om
voldoende tijd tussen beslissingen te laten zodat er zich voldoende ruilmogelijkheden
voordoen. In het Nederlandse programma treft een drie-maandelijkse allocatiebeslissing
hierin een goede balans.
In Hoofdstuk 7 hebben we in het bijzonder gekeken naar mogelijkheden om rekening
te houden met de kans op het falen van een voorgestelde ruil, bijvoorbeeld door het
op het laatste moment terugtrekken van een patie¨nt of donor of door het falen van een
medische test ter controle van de compatibiliteit tussen donor en ontvanger. Wij hebben
verschillende manieren voorgesteld om te reageren op een falende ruil, afhankelijk van de
gewenste flexibiliteit. Het beschermen tegen marktfalen kan vooral belangrijk zijn voor
de meest moeilijk-te-matchen patie¨nten.
Het aloude gezegde “van ruilen komt huilen” hoeft niet op te gaan voor het ruilen
van nieren binnen het nieruitwisselingsprogramma. Integendeel, het programma biedt
deelnemers de kans om te overleven in betere gezondheid. Dat brengt belangrijke opti-
maliseringsvraagstukken met zich mee. Ten eerste om te zorgen dat het maximaal aan-
tal patie¨nten geholpen wordt, ten tweede om er voor te zorgen dat dit rechtvaardig, of
zelfs zo rechtvaardig mogelijk gebeurt. Dankzij recente ontwikkelingen op het gebied van
operations research zoals gepresenteerd in dit proefschrift blijven deze optimaliserings-
vraagstukken praktisch oplosbaar, nu en in de toekomst als nieruitwisselingsprogramma’s
verder groeien. Zo draagt operations research bij aan de kwaliteit en het behoud van
leven van een groeiende populatie van patie¨nten.
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KIDNEY EXCHANGE AND BEYOND
Advanced computer assisted markets, otherwise known as smart markets, are becoming
an important part of our modern society. This dissertation considers smart barter exchange
markets, which enable people to trade a wide range of goods: from shifts, to houses, to
kidneys. Centralized and computerized clearing is what makes these markets ‘smart’. The
market clearing problem is to match demand and supply so as to maximize the gains of
trade. Trades, in this regard, need not be limited to pairwise swaps but may consist of
trading cycles and chains involving multiple agents.
This dissertation presents several sophisticated market clearing algorithms that enable
optimal clearing in large real-life barter exchange markets. With a particular focus on
kidney exchanges, it shows how these algorithms can enable a significant alleviation of the
present shortage of kidney donors and an improvement in health outcomes for kidney
patients. State-of-the-art techniques are developed to allow the algorithms to be scalable,
even when there are bounds on the number of simultaneous transactions, multiple
objective criteria, and side constraints. Furthermore, innovative models and solution
approaches are presented to allow market uncertainty, such as transaction failure, to be
taken into account.
The research presented in this dissertation contributes to the advancement of scientific
knowledge in combinatorial optimization and market design, particularly in the domains of
mathematical programming and market clearing, and aids the establishment and operation
of smart barter exchange markets in the field of kidney exchange and beyond.
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